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Abstract
Ruzana Davoyan
The issue of inter-provider cost distribution in international interconnection has been a
subject of intense debate in the past few years. For various reasons, developing countries
have had to bear high costs for international Internet connectivity. The transition of
communication networks to IP-based networks enhances the urgency to resolve the ap-
parent lack of fairness in international interconnection. This is due to the development
of cheap technologies for voice communications, which reduces the revenues of develop-
ing countries received from international telephone calls, and at the same time, places
the burden of international Internet connectivity costs on developing countries.
There exists a large body of literature toward achieving the equitable and sustainable
expansion of infrastructures in developing countries. It is mainly focused on proposing
interconnection pricing schemes. However, the existing approaches strike the balance
between the two objectives of interconnection pricing, viz., competition development
and profitability quite differently. Hence, no single solution has a clear advantage over
the others. The alternative approach towards solving the interconnection cost-sharing
problem involves compensating each provider for the costs that it incurs in carrying
traffic generated by other providers. However, compensation between providers cannot
be solely done based on the traffic flows, because it provides a poor basis for allocating
any costs. In the Internet, it is not clear who originally initiated a transmission, and
therefore, who should pay for the costs.
The key contribution of this dissertation is to support the development and profitability
of the communications market by reducing the existing imbalance in the interconnec-
tion cost allocation. A novel technique called Differentiated Traffic-based Interconnec-
tion Agreement (DTIA) was proposed. The key idea behind DTIA is that instead of
performing intercarrier compensation based on traffic flows, compensation is performed
based on the original initiator of a transmission. Determination of a transmission ini-
tiator in packet-switched networks is a complicated task that deals with technical issues
and considerable costs. We have tackled this challenge by marking the information
about the transmission initiator in the IP packet header, and have proposed a traffic
differentiation mechanism that has low computational complexity. In DTIA, providers
get compensated differently for traffic originally initiated by their own customers, as op-
posed to traffic initiated by customers of other networks. Such an approach stimulates
the development of market by ensuring that each provider is compensated for utilization
of its infrastructure.
In order to evaluate the differentiated traffic-based approach, we formulated economic
models and analyzed their behaviors from different perspectives. Compared to existing
solutions, the DTIA model enhances the economic efficiency of the market by improving
social welfare.
Zusammenfassung
Ruzana Davoyan
In den letzten Jahren war die Kostenverteilung von Zwischenanbietern bei interna-
tionalen Internetverbindungen ein viel diskutiertes Thema. Aus verschiedenen Gru¨nden
mussten Entwicklungsla¨nder hohe Kosten fu¨r internationale Internetverbindungen tra-
gen. Der U¨bergang von Kommunikationsnetzwerken zu IP-basierten Netzwerken erho¨ht
den Druck, den offensichtlichen Mangel an Gerechtigkeit bei internationalen Internetverbindun-
gen zu beheben. Dies ist durch die Entwicklung von kostengu¨nstigen Technologien
fu¨r Sprachkommunikationen bedingt, welche die durch internationale Telefongespra¨che
erzielbaren Einku¨nfte von Entwicklungsla¨ndern reduzieren und zugleich den Entwick-
lungsla¨ndern die Bu¨rde der stark zunehmenden internationalen Internetverbindungskosten
auferlegen.
Es gibt viel Literatur daru¨ber, wie ein gerechter und zukunftsfa¨higer Ausbau des Inter-
nets in Entwicklungsla¨ndern erreicht werden kann. Diese richten sich im Wesentlichen
darauf, Schemata fu¨r Verbindungspreise vorzuschlagen. Nichtsdestoweniger ziehen die
existierenden Ansa¨tze ziemlich unterschiedliche Bilanz zwischen den beiden Zielen der
Verbindungspreisermittlung, na¨mlich Wettbewerbsentwicklung und Rentabilita¨t. In-
folgedessen hat kein einzelnes Lo¨sungskonzept einen klaren Vorteil gegenu¨ber den an-
deren. Ein alternativer Ansatz, um das Problem der Verteilung der Verbindungskosten
zu lo¨sen, beinhaltet den Ausgleich der Kosten von jedem Anbieter, die er u¨bernimmt,
indem er Datenverkehr u¨bertra¨gt, welcher von anderen Anbietern generiert wurde. Den-
noch kann der Abgleich zwischen Anbietern nicht nur auf Grund der IP-Verkehrsflu¨sse
durchgefu¨hrt werden, da dies, wie wir zeigen werden, eine schlechte Grundlage fu¨r die
Verteilung der Kosten bietet. Im Internet ist na¨mlich nicht klar, wer urspru¨nglich eine
U¨bertragung initiiert hat und demzufolge, wer die Kosten bezahlen soll.
Der wesentliche Beitrag dieser Dissertation ist es, die Entwicklung und Rentabilita¨t
des Kommunikationsmarktes zu fo¨rdern, indem das bestehende Ungleichgewicht in der
Verteilung von Verbindungskosten auf die Service-Provider reduziert wird. Wir schlagen
ein neues Verfahren namens “Differentiated Traffic-based Interconnection Agreement
(DTIA)” vor. Der Grundidee von DTIA besteht darin, anstatt einen Ausgleich von
Zwischentra¨gern basierend auf dem IP-Datenstrom durchzufu¨hren, die Kompensation
aufgrund des urspru¨nglichen Initiators einer U¨bertragung IP-vorzunehmen. Die Bestim-
mung des Initiators einer U¨bertragung in paketvermittelten Netzwerken ist eine kom-
plizierte Aufgabe, bei der technische Aspekte und betra¨chtliche Kosten beru¨cksichtigt
werden mu¨ssen. In dieser Dissertation wurde diese Herausforderung gelo¨st, indem
die Informationen u¨ber den U¨bertragungsinitiator im IP-Paketkopf markiert werden.
Zusa¨tzlich wurde ein Verfahren zur Differentiation von Datenstro¨men vorgeschlagen, das
eine geringe rechnerische Komplexita¨t hat. In DTIA werden Anbieter unterschiedlich fu¨r
den Datenverkehr vergu¨tet, abha¨ngig davon, ob dieser urspru¨nglich von ihren eigenen
Kunden oder von Kunden anderer Netzwerke initiiert wurde. Ein solcher Ansatz kurbelt
die Marktentwicklung an, indem er sicherstellt, dass jeder Anbieter fu¨r die Nutzung
seiner Infrastruktur vergu¨tet wird.
Um den auf differenziertem Datenverkehr basierenden Ansatz zu bewerten, haben wir
analytische wirtschaftliche Modelle erstellt und ihre Verhaltensweisen analysiert. Wir
zeigen mithilfe dieser Modelle, dass unser DTIA-Modell die wirtschaftliche Marktef-
fizienz in Bezug auf die soziale Wohlfahrt im Vergleich mit existierenden Lo¨sungen
steigert.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“If you can‘t explain it simply, you don‘t understand it well enough.”
Albert Einstein
The telecommunications market comprised of a variety of communications networks
enables any network to convey information to others. The establishment of communi-
cation between networks is referred to as interconnection. International interconnection
has been a subject of debate from economic, technical, and regulatory perspectives in
the past few years.
This dissertation is focused on interconnection economics in Next Generation Networks
(NGNs), which present the migration of circuit-switched networks to packet-based net-
works using Internet Protocol (IP). According to the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU, the United Nations agency) the term NGN is defined as follows:
“A Next Generation Network (NGN) is a packet-based network able to provide services
including Telecommunication Services and able to make use of multiple broadband, QoS-
enabled transport technologies and in which service-related functions are independent
from underlying transport-related technologies. It offers unrestricted access by users to
different service providers. It supports generalized mobility which will allow consistent
and ubiquitous provision of services to users.”
The convergence of networks (i.e., the shift towards IP-based networks) raises the ques-
tion whether NGN interconnection should be based on the economics of interconnection
in traditional telephony or in IP networks to ensure overall efficiency and transparency
of the communications market [62], [60]. Unlike traditional telephony, which is highly
regulated, the Internet interconnection is not subject to any regulation and is a mat-
ter of private bilateral negotiations [3], [56]. The regulation of interconnection is the
1
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most important issue of regulators with regard to the development of competition on
the telecommunications market. Interconnection regulation is mainly achieved by deter-
mining interconnection obligations and controlling interconnection pricing. Determining
interconnection charges is the most controversial issue of telecommunications regulation,
because it affects both the level of competition and returns on investments [37], [50].
Setting high interconnection rates stimulates high returns on investments. This is at-
tractive to the incumbent providers, who invested in their infrastructures, however,
discourages entry or expansion of the market [37]. On the other side, establishing low
interconnection charges is thought to favour entrants, but can discourage investments
of the incumbents in infrastructure. Thus, the purpose of regulation of interconnection
prices is to promote service-based competition and to encourage investments into infras-
tructure. Interconnection prices play an important role in the total cost of delivering
telecommunications services to customers.
Generally, regulators consider four main interconnection pricing approaches, namely
historical cost-based pricing, Long-run Incremental Cost (LRIC) pricing, Efficient Com-
ponent Pricing Rule (ECPR), and peering arrangements (or Bill and Keep). The range
of existing solutions to the interconnection pricing is described in [64]. These approaches
do not achieve the two objectives of interconnection pricing, viz., competition develop-
ment and profitability simultaneously. Hence, no single method has a clear advantage
over the others. For example, LRIC stimulates competition by new entrants in the down-
stream market. However, this is only achieved under a number of unrealistic/limited
circumstances, and in reality, the LRIC scheme might induce inefficiencies. The detailed
analyses are provided in [4], [33], [2], [50].
International Internet interconnection is mainly based on the transit relationships, where
a customer provider pays a transit provider to deliver traffic between customers. Such
a cost distribution model with unilateral settlements (i.e., the transit model) makes the
access and the use of the Internet more expensive for customers, in particular in low
income developing countries [35]. The interconnection challenges in developing countries,
in particular in Africa, have been extensively studied in [10], [30], [58], [43], [60], [61]. The
problem concerns the net cash flow that flows from developing to developed worlds. In
telephony, for example, it is acceptable that more than 50% of rural providers’ revenues
in developing countries could come from incoming calls [10]. In fact, the number of
incoming calls is higher than the number of outgoing calls, which is mainly explained
by affordability of the urban customers. Such a traffic imbalance between areas with
different level of affordability and willingness to pay is also true for the international
calls. In contrast to the telephony example, in the Internet, the customer provider pays
for sent and received traffic. Moreover, the estimations of ITU-T Study Group 3 showed
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that due to the development of cheap technologies for voice communications (e.g., voice
over IP, VoIP), the payments of developing countries for traffic exchange may increase
[58]. Hence, the migration towards NGNs enhances the urgency to resolve international
Internet interconnection issues.
In recent years, some non-US carriers, especially from the Asia-Pacific region, com-
plained about unfair sharing of the international transmission capacity costs. Asia-
Pacific carriers, which arranged transit relationships with the US carriers, pay for the
both ends of international connectivity to the United States, i.e., cover 100% of the cost
of international link as well as transit fees. The study [52] that investigated the in-
terconnection issues claimed that there is no anti-competitiveness against international
carriers in interconnection arrangements, and that U.S. Internet backbones deal with
domestic and foreign backbones in the same way.
Since 1998 ITU has studied the issue of international interconnection cost sharing. More
specifically, in 1998 APEC has raised this issue during the debate, known as International
Charging Arrangements for Internet Services (ICAIS). Later in 2000, ITU adopted the
recommendation D.50 that pursued to encourage providers to adopt symmetric peering
(settlement-free) arrangements [51]. This is due to the perception that regulators cannot
measure the interconnection costs correctly, and historically, set interconnection prices,
which exceed the real costs [40]. However, various FCC studies showed that support of
a symmetric peering is lacking, and commercial agreements are dominant. Attempts to
impose peering creates disincentive for larger providers to invest in further infrastructure
because smaller providers can abuse this investment without investing of their own.
In 2000, the Sector ITU-T Study Group 3 adopted a proposal, introduced by the Asia
and Oceania Region tariff group, which recommended the establishment of bilateral
arrangements and the compensation of each provider to be based on the costs that it
incurs in carrying traffic generated by the other network [52]. More specifically, the Asia-
Pacific carriers argued to assign benefits or costs of interconnection based on flows of
traffic. In response to this, the USA submitted to the ITU World Telecommunications
Standardization Assembly (WTSA) “formal contributions in opposition to both the
substance of this recommendation and the procedures used in its adoption” [52]. Indeed,
traffic flows are not a reasonable indicator to share the costs, since in the Internet it is not
clear who originally initiated a transmission and, therefore, who should pay for the costs.
An incoming packet to Taiwan from the USA, may be i) either part of a transmission,
such as a webpage that was requested by a user in Taiwan or ii) part of a transmission,
such as an email that was sent by a customer in the U.S. Moreover, in some cases, U.S.
backbones accept traffic from one Asia-Pacific region that is forwarded to another Asia-
Pacific region. In this case, U.S. customers do not benefit from this traffic. Overall, it
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can be concluded that compensation between Internet providers cannot be solely done
based on the traffic flows, which provide a poor basis for cost sharing. In addition to this,
“backbones negotiating an interconnection arrangement consider, among other things,
relative infrastructure investments as well as the composition and location of customers
and content providers” [52]. The current program of the ITU-T Study Group 3 for the
Study Period 2009-2012 continues to examine international Internet connectivity aspects
meeting the standardization challenges.
To summarize, two key challenges that remain in international Internet interconnection
are i) an imbalance in the allocation of interconnection cost, and ii) a scarcity of cheap
international connectivity. Under such circumstances “there are serious structural prob-
lems in supporting a highly diverse and well populated” global service provider industry
[49]. Thus, the adaptation of the interconnection arrangement that stimulates equitable
cost distribution between a wide diversity of players both large and small, remains an
open issue.
1.1 Research Question
The research objective of this dissertation is formulated in the following research ques-
tion:
• How should we balance the allocation of the Internet interconnection costs in order
to improve the economic efficiency ?
Economic efficiency refers to the allocation of resources that maximizes social welfare of
a system. We evaluate the efficiency of the proposed in this thesis model from different
perspectives (on both retail and wholesale markets). In order to achieve our goal we
make the central assumption that the inter-provider cost distribution model based on the
determination of an original initiator of a transmission is beneficial and improves social
welfare.
In more precise terms, the research questions that are addressed can be summarized in
the following points:
• How can the original initiator of an IP transmission be determined?
• How can the information about the IP transmission initiator be conveyed along
the path?
• How can the proposed intercarrier compensation model be supported in a large-
scale system?
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1.2 Approach
The ability to perform intercarrier compensation based on the original initiator of a
transmission would allow i) to reduce the existing imbalance in the allocation of the
interconnection costs and ii) to promote the improvement of social welfare. To illustrate
this point consider the telephony market. The developing countries are characterized by
the lack of a regional communication infrastructure, which leads to a scarcity of cheap
international connectivity. This results in an imbalance between incoming and outgoing
traffic in developing countries, which is explained by a different level of affordability
in different countries. Consequently, the revenue obtained by an operator located in a
developing country mostly comes from incoming calls.
In contrast, international Internet interconnection is based on transit arrangements,
where the customer provider pays for the entire traffic flow. Although it may be ar-
gued that a TCP session can be considered as a call where the initiator of a session
pays for the entire traffic flow, such a model deals with technical issues, considerable
costs, and implies uniform retail pricing [46], [49]. To satisfy the simplicity criterion
that is crucial in the Internet we follow an Internet interconnection accounting model
that is packet based. In order to diminish inequality in the interconnection cost alloca-
tion, each provider has to be compensated when its infrastructure is used by others. As
discussed earlier, traffic flows provide a poor basis for cost sharing, since it is impossible
to determine who originally initiated any IP transmission. Therefore, we suggest that
providers compensate each other based on the original initiator of a transmission, who
is determined by means of traffic differentiation into two types. In the proposed model,
providers get compensated differently for traffic originally initiated by their own cus-
tomers, as opposed to traffic initiated by customers of other networks. Unlike the PSTN
model, where the transmission initiator covers the entire costs, imposing uniform retail
pricing, our model stimulates cost sharing between all parties and supports the diversity
of the existing retail pricing schemes in the Internet. Summarizing, the proposed ap-
proach uses packet-based accounting and introduces a new cost sharing characteristic,
viz., transmission initiator. It promotes development of infrastructures, in particular in
developing countries, by reducing international connectivity costs there.
1.3 Contributions
The main contribution of this dissertation is to provide the first intercarrier compensation
scheme that performs inter-provider cost distribution in IP networks based on an original
initiator of a transmission. The main objective of the proposed solution is to ensure
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that each provider is compensated for utilization of its infrastructure. The key ideas
that allow us to achieve this goal are:
• Determine the original initiator of a transmission by means of traffic differentiation
into two types.
• Compensate interconnection costs based on the distinguished traffic flows.
The following points summarize the main components of our solution:
• A novel Differentiated Traffic-based Interconnection Agreement (DTIA) model and
its traffic management mechanism for private peering arrangements are proposed
[17]. In comparison to the existing solution, which performs cost compensation
based on traffic flow, in the proposed approach, intercarrier compensation is done
based on a new element, namely the transmission initiator. A critical challenge
in DTIA is determining the original initiator of a transmission in packet-switched
networks. We have tackled this challenge by marking the information about the
transmission initiator in the IP packet header, and have proposed a simple traf-
fic differentiation mechanism that allows accounting the volume of a particular
traffic type, ignoring the detailed examination of the packet header. This makes
mechanism simple and leads to low computational complexity.
• Economic models and their analytical studies are formulated to explore the impact
of the determination of a transmission initiator on the wholesale and retail markets
[18], [20], [21], [24]. More specifically, the studies examine inter-provider payments,
demand, and profits of providers dealing with all available market states in terms
of providers’ market shares. The economic models consider reciprocal and non-
reciprocal access charges.
• The DTIA model and its traffic management mechanism are extended for transit
arrangements [23]. This mechanism considers important properties, such as sim-
plicity and scalability for deployment in the Internet. To convey information about
the traffic type along the path, our mechanism requires a two-bit value incorpo-
rated in the IP packet header. The simple packet re-marking operations allow the
recognition of the traffic type with regard to the interconnected networks. Further,
we have addressed the issue of incentive compatibility (i.e., how to ensure that it
is in the best interest of a provider to mark packets truthfully). More specifically,
if a provider marks a packet mendaciously, it bears financial loss.
• Economic models and their analytical studies are provided to investigate a key
question; that is how attractive traffic differentiation is to all participants of the
Chapter 1. Introduction 7
communications market [22], [25]. More specifically, our analysis examined the
customer providers only and then providers of different layers. Finally, the studies
explored economic efficiency of the market that improves social welfare.
1.4 Thesis Overview
The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses fundamental
concepts and a literature review related to this thesis. In the first part, network tech-
nologies such as circuit switching and packet switching are discussed. In particular, the
features of these networks and their differences in interconnection economics are summa-
rized. In the second part, it examines international Internet interconnection challenges
and the proposed solutions.
Chapter 3 proposes a novel intercarrier compensation model, referred to as DTIA for
private peering arrangements to overcome the existing imbalance in the allocation of the
interconnection costs. This solution is the first to distribute inter-provider costs based on
the determination of an original initiator of a transmission. The chapter presents a traffic
management mechanism that supports the proposed approach. It formulates economic
models and provides analytical studies to evaluate the strategy on the wholesale and
retail levels of the market. The solution is compared with existing models.
Chapter 4 extends the model presented in Chapter 3 for transit arrangements. In the
first part, it designs a traffic management mechanism with the defined functionalities
that satisfy scalability issues. Moreover, it discusses the issue of incentive compatibility
(i.e. how to make it rational for the providers to mark packets truthfully) of the pro-
posed mechanism. In the second part, analytical studies are provided to evaluate the
effectiveness of the presented approach from the perspectives of different players. It also
investigates the effect of traffic differentiation on social welfare of a system.
Chapter 5 summarizes the conclusions of this dissertation and discusses the directions
for potential future work.
Chapter 2
Fundamental Concepts and
Related Literature
“Sometimes one pays most for the things one gets for nothing.”
Albert Einstein
This chapter provides an overview of the fundamental concepts and research work rel-
evant to this thesis. In particular, it introduces methodologies of telecommunications
and surveys the state of the art in the Internet interconnection challenges.
2.1 Interconnection in Telecommunications
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are an inherent part of human
society. A user subscribed to a communications network enjoys the benefits of informa-
tion exchange with others. The ICTs do not operate isolated from each other, instead,
they cooperate with one another. Interconnection is important for the convergence of
various networks and their integration into a whole [63]. Interconnection refers to the
physical and logical linking between different communication networks so that a user of
one network can communicate with the customers of another network and also access the
services present in another network. According to the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) the term interconnection is defined as
“The commercial and technical arrangements under which service providers connect their
equipment, networks and services to enable customers to have access to the customers,
services and networks of other service providers.”
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In the beginning, technical standards, service definitions, and interconnection contracts
were relatively simple. However, demand to access the Internet, which nowadays rep-
resents a powerful tool to information and knowledge, is increasing. Due to the con-
tinuous development of the telecommunication infrastructure and associated electronic
commerce, new interconnection policies1 are required to provide a more competitive en-
vironment. In other words, economic research is focused on the efficient provision of the
network services and proper allocation of the costs [71].
The migration to the IP-based Next Generation Networks (NGNs) represents conver-
gence of the traditional telephony and the Internet. Internet interconnection fundamen-
tally differs from interconnection of the traditional telecommunications networks, based
on circuit switching. More specifically, unlike the Internet, the telephone industry is
highly regulated. The imposition of regulation generally is appropriate to protect anti-
competitive behavior of communications networks with market power against smaller
providers in a variety of ways. The industry-specific regulations are rules or restrictions
applied by a legitimate authority that governs the activities of the operators. To ensure
the efficiency of the entire system, the emergence of NGNs poses challenges in establish-
ing the prices for interconnection. Interconnection pricing is a key regulatory issue, and
is crucial for the development of competition.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the funda-
mental differences between the telephony model and the Internet in order to explain the
interconnection economics of these networks. The existing cost distribution models in
the telecommunications networks are described in Section 2.3. The difference between
interconnection in the telephone industry and the Internet is covered in Section 2.4. Sec-
tion 2.5 examines the international Internet interconnection issues. And finally, Section
2.6 concludes this chapter by summarizing our findings.
2.2 Circuit Switching vs. Packet Switching
This section proceeds by considering the fundamental differences between circuit-switched
and packet-switched networks. In the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) each
circuit (channel) is dedicated to a particular connection, and therefore, traffic flows in
both directions along a symmetric path. An active channel is unavailable to other users,
no matter whether actual communication takes place or not. In IP networks, data is
divided into chunks, called packets, which are sent towards the destination through a
shared network. For routing an individual packet and its delivery to a destination host,
the IP protocol is used over the network. In order to identify a host, it is assigned at
1Policy is the key determinant of legislation and regulation [63].
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least one IP address. The current addressing system, called IPv4, uses a 32-bit num-
ber. However, due to the dynamic growth of the Internet, the next generation protocol
(IPv6) uses a 128-bit number for the IP address. Once arriving at the destination, the
packets are reassembled to restore the original information. The major advantage of
packet switching is statistical multiplexing, i.e., sharing of the communication channel.
Therefore, in contrast to the telephony approach, in the Internet the packets are routed
irrespective of each other. Statistical multiplexing provides higher link utilization than
the circuit switching technology, however, on the other side, can lead to congestion. This
happens when the volume of traffic exceeds the network capacity. Consequently, circuit
switching provides more reliable connections, than a packet switching network, which
works in a best-effort manner.
Apart from technical differences between packet-switched and circuit-switched networks,
there also exist differences on the business side, which influences the structure of these
networks. Before examining financial models which determine the cost distribution be-
tween networks, we consider “transaction unit” in telephony and the Internet. Consider
a scenario where Alice makes a call to Bob. Accepting the call, Bob incurs termination
costs to its provider that should be covered either directly by billing Bob or indirectly
by billing the calling party’s carrier. As cited in [26], “existing access charge rules and
the majority of existing reciprocal compensation agreements require the calling party’s
carrier, [. . . ], to compensate the called party’s carrier for terminating the call”. Thus,
the initiator of the call, i.e., Alice pays to the subscribed provider for the entire call since
Alice asked to reserve the circuit. In contrast to the telephony example, establishing a
connection in the Internet does not require the reservation of a circuit. Therefore, as
cited in [75], “it is very important to distinguish between the initiator and the sender,
and likewise between the destination and the receiver”. The initiator is the party that
initiates a call or a session, and the destination is the party that receives a call. In
contrast, the sender (the originator) is the party that sends traffic, and the receiver (the
terminator) is the party that receives traffic. In the telephony, the initiator is consid-
ered to be the originator, and is charged based on the transaction unit, namely a “call
minute” for using the terminating network.
Huston in [46], [49] examined two potential settlement models for the Internet, which are
based on the packet cost and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) session accounting.
The packed-based settlement model accounts each packet transferred through the net-
work, under which either “sender pays” or “receiver pays” retail pricing can be used by
Internet service providers (ISPs). If the first retail pricing is used, then the originating
network pays the interconnection fees to the terminating network to deliver traffic. If the
“receiver pays” model is applied, then the receiving network funds the sending network
for a received packet.
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In the strawman model where each network sells a packet to an adjacent network, the
total cost of carrying a packet increases. Consequently, a network benefits when it
successfully delivers (i.e., sells) a packet to the next ISP. This creates a motivation to
improve the quality of a network since there is no economic incentive to drop a packet,
implying financial loss. As explained in [46] the packet cost accounting model “does
allow for some level of reasonable stability and cost distribution in the inter-provider
settlement environment”.
The following shortcomings are associated with this mechanism. Providers should main-
tain complete routing tables in order to minimize the liability from accepting undeliv-
erable packets, and accept only packets with reliable routes. Moreover, there is an
incentive to abuse this mechanism by sending malicious packets through a provider in-
terface, in order to gain revenue. However, the major weakness of this model is varying
retail prices, which are based on incremental per-hop transmission costs. More specifi-
cally, consumers do not want to deal with variable pricing schemes, which are difficult
to understand [19].
A TCP session can be the basis of an alternative accounting model where the initiator
of a session pays for the entire traffic flow. However, deployment of such mechanisms
experience technical issues and considerable costs. More specifically, the provider has to
maintain a complex identification process of a transmission initiator, and has to inspect
the IP header of packets in order to determine and record all subsequent packets of a
transmission. Moreover, as mentioned in [46], the biggest disadvantage of this model
is the diversity of the existing retail pricing schemes, such as flat-rate, received or sent
volume-based, mixed, etc. The TCP session model implies uniform retail pricing (i.e.,
the initiator of a session is charged) and therefore, does not match the real Internet
environment.
Continuing the example above, Alice, the initiator of a call under the TCP model, will
pay for the entire traffic flow. If we are concerned with the actual use of network re-
sources, the financial settlement needs to be done at the IP level, accounting each packet
of a flow. In this case the sender can be charged for an originated packet. Currently the
Internet uses the packet-based accounting model, under which the volume of the exchange
traffic in both directions is measured, and adopts a small set of interconnection mod-
els. More specifically, in the service-provider (unilateral) settlement, namely transit and
paid peering business relationships, a customer ISP pays to a transit ISP for sent and re-
ceived traffic. In the settlement-free agreement, namely peering relationships, providers
do not pay each other. The alternative to peering and service-provider settlements is
the negotiated-financial (bilateral) settlement where the payments are based on the net
flow of traffic. However, which direction money should flow in relationship to traffic flow
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Characteristic Circuit Switching Packet Switching
Provided Service Single Service: human conversa-
tion
Multi-service
Transaction Unit Call Packet
Service Reliability Guaranteed No guarantee: best-effort packet
delivery
Network Path Symmetric for forward and re-
verse traffic flows
Asymmetric for forward and re-
verse traffic flows
Table 2.1: Fundamental Differences between Circuit Switching and Packet Switching.
is not immediately obvious. Therefore, this model introduces significant financial risks
to the ISP interconnection environment and is not a commonly deployed mechanism.
For detailed discussion see [46], [49], [41], [75]. The fundamental differences between the
telephony model and the Internet model are summarized in Table 2.1.
2.3 Economics of Network Interconnection
The interconnection of telecommunications networks have been extensively studied in
the literature (see the seminal papers [3], [56]). Various interconnection models between
symmetric and asymmetric networks are introduced in [11], [12], [13], [45], [72], [73].
The survey of existing studies of interconnection has been reviewed in [57], [4]. This
section discusses the economics of interconnection, providing an overview of the existing
financial models in the telephony and the Internet at the wholesale level.
It is known that usually, before interconnecting, each provider calculates whether the
benefits would exceed the interconnection costs [57]. The simple economic principle
suggests sharing the costs between all parties. For example, in telephony it was argued
that both calling and called parties benefit from the call, and consequently, should share
the interconnection costs [26]. In order to determine the distribution of the intercon-
nection costs, providers arrange interconnection models [46], [41]. The two standardized
types of Internet interconnection agreements are peering and transit. Being able to com-
municate with anyone in the Internet increases the benefits of the system and thereby
provides strong positive network externalities as defined in the economics literature and
as explained below.
2.3.1 Network Externalities
In economics, an externality is an impact of one party on someone else who is not directly
involved in an activity (transaction) [31], [32]. In the system without externalities, costs
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should be shared based on the benefits obtained by each party. However, like any other
network, the Internet exhibits externalities, and therefore, it is impossible to measure
the total benefits of parties and so to share the costs in a fair way. The Internet exhibits
two types of externalities, positive and negative. The network positive externalities
emerge when the utility (benefit) derived from consumption of a service increases as more
customers use it (i.e., with the increase in the size of a network). The reason of this effect
is the complementary relationship among the components of the system. In particular,
when joining a network, a user considers only the private benefits and does not take into
account that the value of the entire network increases with its size. The impact when
someone imposes the costs on other participants without suffering penalty is defined as
negative externalities. Congestion is an example of negative network externality.
The literature also considers direct and indirect network externalities. The externalities
can be direct when users communicate with each other or share files. In this case the
more subscribed users exist, the higher the value of a network for each user. A classical
example of a network that exhibits direct externalities is the telephone system. Indirect
network externalities exist when the growth in network size increases the number of
services available to the users of a network: the more subscribers are in the Internet,
the more content will be provided. Generally, the Internet externalities are associated
with a statement known as “Metcalfe’s Law”, which claims that the value of a network
is proportional to the square of the number of users connected to it.
2.3.2 Interconnection Arrangements for Telephony
Before considering the business models for the Internet, we examine interconnection
arrangements within the international telephony model. There are essentially three pos-
sible interconnection relationships for circuit-switched networks, such as Bill-and-Keep
(BAK, also known as the Sender Keeps All, or SKA), Calling Party’s Network Pays
(CPNP), and a model with unilateral transit fees [49]. Under the BAK arrangement the
calling party’s carrier does not pay any termination charge to the called party’s carrier.
More specifically, each network agrees to terminate the calls from the other network at
no charge and recovers the termination costs from their own customers. The retail prices
that reflect the network usage costs and the other commercial considerations eventually
lead to competition among carriers. The BAK model exists only under the restrictive
condition of roughly balanced traffic flows in both directions. The lack of termination
fees can “cause originating carriers (and calling parties) to overuse other carriers’ termi-
nation facilities” [39]. Therefore, BAK arrangements are generally considered inefficient
in terms of costs compensation.
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Figure 2.1: Calling Party’s Network Pays.
Unlike BAK, the CPNP arrangement assumes that the subscribers do not pay for the
incoming calls. Instead, both providers charge each other a common call accounting rate
to compensate the interconnection costs. In CPNP, the calling party’s Local Exchange
Carrier (LEC) or Inter-exchange Carrier (IXC) pays the called party’s local network for
the call transfer through its network. More specifically, the calling subscriber pays an
originating fee, called access charge, to the calling party’s LEC, and a terminating access
charge to the called party’s LEC, i.e., covers the entire call. The structure is shown in
Figure 2.1. Access charges can be either flat-rate, meaning that a user is charged a
monthly subscription regardless of usage and actual network conditions, or usage-based
under which a user is charged on a per-minute basis.
An important issue addresses the question of what network costs should be recovered by
access charges. Generally, the costs of a network are categorized as traffic sensitive and
non-traffic sensitive costs. Traffic sensitive costs vary with usage, while non-traffic costs
(local loop equivalent) do not vary with usage and constitute the most of the cost of
interconnection. According to economics the costs should be recovered in a manner they
are incurred [70], [40]. Therefore, traffic sensitive costs should be recovered through a
usage-based price, and non-traffic sensitive costs should be recovered through a flat-rate
price. In particular, it was shown that an economically efficient access charge should be
equal to the marginal cost2 of access. There has been debate on traffic sensitive and non-
traffic sensitive costs. Traditionally, the non-traffic sensitive cost has been split between
long-distance carriers and a customer in order to keep the subscriber’s monthly fee low.
However, usage-based prices, which recover the fixed costs, diminish social welfare by
causing users to buy fewer services [34]. Recently, Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) recommended reforming the existing distribution of the access charges, which
cannot be sustained in a competitive environment [39]. The series of the FCC’s actions
on changing the structure of access charges in telephony lead to the decrease of long-
distance access charges, and consequently, the enhancement of consumer welfare.
Some pressing issues arise from the CPNP model. First, the major problem of this
arrangement is that the terminating carrier, irrespective to its size, has a monopoly
2Marginal cost is the costs required to produce an addition unit of output.
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power over termination to its customers [39], [61]. In other words, only a single provider
can terminate calls to a particular telephone number. Especially in case of long distance,
there are a number of competing IXCs that can transfer a call between LECs of both
parties, but a call should be transferred through the IXC of the terminating carrier.
Consequently, in the presence of a termination monopoly, the provider can increase the
termination charges without loosing the customers. In fact, due to a growth of the
average termination price, the users have little or no incentive to change the operator
[15]. To prevent a monopoly in the market, it is necessary to impose regulation of
termination rates.
A special case of the CPNP model is when the intercarrier compensation for long dis-
tance is governed by designed access charges applied in one direction. In this model
with unilateral transit fees, one party, namely the transit provider charges the customer
provider for originating and terminating traffic.
In some cases, providers serving complementary markets use the revenue sharing ar-
rangement (RSA) as a substitute for paying explicit interconnection charges. The RSA
model is based on a negotiation between providers and, generally, is unrelated to the
actual costs of the networks. As a result, efficiency of such an arrangement depends on
how precisely networks access their costs.
2.3.3 Internet Interconnection
History of the Internet Interconnection
Let us briefly discuss the evolution of the Internet and its architecture [14]. Prior the
commercialization of the Internet, in 1969, there was only one backbone, ARPANET,
funded by Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the U.S. Department of De-
fense. One of the research programs of ARPA was to investigate large-scale systems in
order to allow collaboration between scientists and researchers. Thus, ARPANET was
the first packet-switched network which allowed exchanging information between con-
nected computers. In 1985, National Science Foundation (NSF) funded the NSFNET
backbone project, which connected five supercomputer centers. As the demand for the
Internet access grew, the number of the commercial networks began to increase. How-
ever, according to the Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) it was not allowed to exchange
commercial traffic over the NSFNET backbone. As a result, in the beginning of the
1990s, commercial backbones established Commercial Internet Exchange (CIX) to in-
terconnect and directly exchange the traffic of their own users. In 1995, NSFNET was
transitioned to the private sector, by interconnecting commercial ISPs at four geographi-
cally distributed Network Access Point (NAP), which were privately owned and operated
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by Sprint (in New York), Pacific Bell (in San Francisco), Ameritech (in Chicago), and
MFS (in Washington D.C.). Thus, NAPs were the first commercial Internet Exchange
Points (IXPs) where backbones could choose any NAP to interconnect with one an-
other. A NAP provider was obliged to provide and operate switching facilities under
the conditions defined by NSF.
Internet Architecture and Infrastructure
The Internet is a system of interconnected networks, which are connected either through
a direct link or through an intermediate point, called IXP to exchange traffic. The
autonomous systems (ASs) which comprise the Internet, communicate with each other
in a decentralized manner, i.e., without central authority, supporting the standardized
Internet Protocol Suite (TCP/IP).
The Internet has a hierarchical structure because of existing relationships between
providers, known as horizontal (e.g., peering) and vertical (transit) interconnections.
A hierarchical model of the Internet connectivity market, called tier structure, consists
of three main levels of the participants [15]: the Tier-1 that is the top of the hierarchy
consists of the Internet backbone providers (IBPs), the Tier-2 consist of downstream
ISPs, and the Tier-3, which is the bottom of the structure, consists of ISPs that service
customers directly. Each tier is the customer of the tier above. The top tier consists of
the backbone ISPs, such as AT&T, Verizon Business (MCI/WorldComp), Sprint, Cable
& Wireless, and Genuity (formerly called GTE Interworking). Generally, there is no
money exchange between backbones (i.e., they peer) since originated traffic volumes are
symmetric and IBPs would both benefit equally. IBPs get access to the whole Internet,
without purchasing transit from anyone. Instead, IBPs sell the wholesale services to
the competitive ISPs. In the second tier providers operate at the national and regional
levels. In order to get access to the whole Internet, they acquire transit services from
the top tier backbones. And finally, the Tier-3 ISPs consists of the providers which
operate on the retail market and sell connectivity services directly to the customers.
Tier-3 providers arrange transit relationships with the upper tier providers to access the
Internet. The Internet hierarchical structure is shown in Figure 2.2.
Historically, the Internet provides two types of interconnection arrangements: peering
and transit [66]. Peering is the business relationship that usually takes place on the same
level on the Internet hierarchy. In contrast, a transit relationship is hierarchical where
one provider pays another to deliver the traffic between the customers. The outcome
of the negotiation process of being a transit or peered ISP reflects on the assessment of
the actual cost of traffic exchange and was studied in [67], [68]. Peering offers several
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Figure 2.2: Internet Hierarchical Structure.
advantages in terms of interconnection costs and quality of data transmission, but gives
access to a part of the entire Internet only. According to the estimates in [53], 80% of
the Internet traffic is routed via private peering. In some cases, however, in order to
recover the infrastructure costs, instead of peering with the smaller ISPs, the larger ISPs
offer transit arrangements at a certain rate, providing access to the whole Internet. In
addition to this, new types of interconnection models, such as paid peering and partial
transit, have emerged in the market [38]. The following subsection discusses the Internet
interconnection arrangements in details.
2.3.4 Interconnection Arrangements for the Internet
Peering is the arrangement of traffic exchange on the free-settlement basis, called Bill-
and-Keep, so that ISPs do not pay each other and derive revenues from their own
customers only. Peering arrangements do not specify any minimum performance of
traffic, which is handled in a best-effort manner. Peers exchange traffic only between
their own customers and do not act as intermediate or transit carriers. It is fair and
efficient under symmetry of traffic flows, termination charges, and costs. To ensure
balanced traffic flows, generally, providers of similar size will peer with each other. The
measures of a network size could be several criteria, such as the number of subscribed
customers, geographical coverage, traffic volume, network capacity, or the number of
content websites. In order to establish peering, only set up costs are shared, so that
each ISP pays for its own equipment and circuit. Routing information is exchanged and
updated between peering parties using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). Peering
can be differentiated based on three different criteria [74]. Firstly, according to the
physical interconnection, peering can be categorized into the following two types: public
and private peering. Public peering allows interconnecting many parties via a peering
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fabric, at a focal point, called NAP, or IXP, as shown in Figure 2.3(a). Because of the
rapid growth of the Internet traffic IXPs eventually became congested [1]. In order to
avoid bottlenecks at IXPs and to improve data transmission quality, providers began to
interconnect directly with each other based on private peering arrangements, as indicated
in Figure 2.3(b). Private peering offers dedicated capacity that is not shared with
the other parties. However, a fully interconnected structure consisting of N providers
requires N ∗ (N − 1)/2 interconnections, and therefore, leads to scalability issues in
large-scale systems. Discussions on the evolution of peering arrangements were provided
by several researches [8], [52].
According to the second criterion peering with respect to the number of peering part-
ners is divided into two types, such as bilateral (BLPA) and multilateral (MLPA) peering
agreements. On the BLPA basis, ISPs exchange traffic destined for each other’s cus-
tomers. In MLPA, more than two ISPs are involved, and in some instances, fees are
charged for the traffic exchange. Financial compensation is significant to cover trans-
mission costs when traffic is unbalanced. And finally, peering is differentiated according
to the market it deals with: primary peering in the top tier market or secondary peer-
ing in the downstream market. Peering itself reduces transit costs, which ISPs pay for
connectivity to the global Internet. Moreover, direct interconnection reduces latency
by avoiding packet transmission over great distance. In general, the ISP’s decision on
whether to peer depends on an estimation of costs for setting up a peering, and savings
which it can make without connecting to a transit provider [66], [42], [69]. Various as-
pects of peering arrangements have been analyzed in [55], [28], [29], [7], [59], [54], [65].
Unlike peering, in the transit model, a customer provider (downstream ISP) pays a
transit provider (upstream ISP) to deliver the traffic between customers, and therefore,
incurs the total interconnection costs. The structure is indicated in Figure 2.3(c). More
specifically, a customer ISP pays for a port into the transit network and for the capacity
of a link. Thus, in case of international connectivity, the costs are not shared, and
a downstream ISP pays for the both ends of the international lines and the costs of
the exchanged traffic (even through traffic flows in both directions). Generally, the
total payment amount depends on the exchanged traffic volume since transit fees are
typically offered on a megabit per second per month basis (Mbit/s/Month). A transit
provider using BGP advertises the preferred routes of its peering and transit partners.
Interconnected providers negotiate an agreement, called Service Level Agreement (SLA),
which specifies the required level of transit services provided to a customer ISP. SLAs
are generally not disclosed.
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Due to the dynamic nature of the Internet new types of providers, such as content net-
works and eyeball networks, emerged in the markets [38]. Two types of content providers
are considered: content providers like Abovenet and Cogent host a great amount of con-
tent; and large content providers such as Google and Yahoo. The large providers (Google
and Yahoo) are interacting with the eyeball providers like Verizon and Comcast which
host a large number of the subscribed users. The content and eyeball providers cause
highly asymmetric traffic flows: indeed, traffic generated in response to a user request
is much more compared to the traffic submitting this request. As a consequence, the
new types of providers led to the emergence of the new types of interconnection ar-
rangements, such as paid peering and partial transit. In a paid peering arrangement,
providers advertise route information of their own customers, however, unlike in the
peering model, traffic is exchanged on a settlement basis. This model can take place
when a provider does not need access to the whole Internet, and can safe money without
purchasing transit services. Under a partial transit arrangement, a network announces
a particular subset of a routing table to its customer provider at a discounted price from
the full transit. The providers seek to obtain this commitment primarily for two reasons:
to balance inbound and outbound traffic, and to give their customers access to the valu-
able peering relationships. Discussion on the diversity of the Internet interconnection
models that exist today can be found in [38].
Comparing the intercarrier compensation models in PSTN and the Internet, it is worth
ISP-A
ISP-B
ISP-C
NAP
(a) Public Peering
ISP-A
ISP-B
ISP-C
(b) Private Peering
ISP-A
ISP-B
ISP-C
(c) Transit
Figure 2.3: Interconnection Arrangements for the Internet.
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noting that the bilateral settlement model of telephone networks, namely CPNP, is
not applicable in the Internet. The principle reason is the significant difference be-
tween the Internet and telephone infrastructures: unlike PSTN that is circuit-based and
connection-oriented, the Internet is packet-based and connectionless.
2.4 Interconnection and Regulation
The telecommunications industry takes advantage of economies of scale which arise when
cost per unit decreases as the volume of production increases. For example, Internet
access in the USA is cheaper than in some other countries because of the developed
infrastructure both in terms of number of users and amount of content [63]. According
to economic theory and practice a monopoly is likely to appear in the industry with the
presence of economies of scale. Indeed, telecommunications operators generally have
high fixed costs, and therefore, it is easier for one company to expand than for another
to enter the market. The monopoly implies artificially increased service prices above
the competitive level and/or degradation in quality of service (QoS). Moreover, natural
monopolists are likely to leverage and abuse their market power. The existence of a
transparent and competitive market is crucial for the fair distribution of the intercon-
nection costs. Cre´mer stated that there are three ways to achieve network connectivity:
“regulation, private negotiation among providers, and alternative methods, such as the
customer’s affiliation to multiple networks” [16].
Generally, in order to open the market for competition and to ensure affordable access
to the network, governments regulate the natural monopolists in the market. In 1934,
Congress established FCC to regulate telecommunications common carriers and thus pre-
vent unreasonable discrimination [52]. The telephone industry is regulated domestically
and internationally. Unlike the telephony, the Internet interconnection is decentralized
and is not subject to any industry-specific regulations. The Internet interconnection is
based on bilateral negotiations, and its outcome is described by the well-known Coase
theorem introduced by the British economist. The Nobel Prize laureate Ronald H. Coase
stated that in the presence of a competitive market private negotiations between parties
could lead to a more efficient outcome than regulation handled by government. Since it
is unlikely that the backbones are able to gain significant market power in order to act
in an anti-competitive manner, therefore, bilateral negotiation is a reasonable solution
for the Internet environment [62].
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The Unregulated Internet
This section briefly discusses why the Internet is unregulated and when the regulation
may be imposed as in the telephone industry. According to [52], over forty years, “the
absence of market power in the computer services industry led the Commission to con-
clude that imposing common carrier regulation was unnecessary and might discourage
innovation and distort the nascent data marketplace”. The influence of deregulation in
the development of the Internet is highlighted in the 1996 Act that states “the Inter-
net . . . [has] flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government
regulation.” [52]. Over the last years the Internet increased drastically in size. The
analysis showed that since the Internet privatization in 1995, the market for Internet
backbone services has expanded, and in 1999 consisted of forty-two national backbones
[52]. However, it was questioned whether larger backbones are able to exercise market
power against smaller and new backbone providers. The study [52] examined the pos-
sible anti-competitive behavior of the backbones, considering both the competitive and
dominant backbone markets.
In the competitive market, the Internet backbone providers have an incentive to coop-
erate with each other while competing for the retail and wholesale customers. There
is concern that backbone providers discriminate the smaller providers, refusing to peer
with them. This action was stated as anti-competitive. However, the anti-competitive
behavior addresses the actions that harm consumers but not the competitors. The
major index of market competitiveness is whether new affiliates can enter the market
successfully. In the competitive backbone market there are two reasons that connectivity
services are available in a nondiscriminatory manner. First, the larger backbones can
refuse to peer with smaller ISPs for legitimate reasons, such as free riding, under which
the infrastructure investments are not compensated, etc, but because of competition in
the top-tier market, have an incentive to offer transit interconnections. And second,
backbones competing for the transit business have no incentive to use a price squeeze
and therefore, set the prices for acquiring the interconnection services at the competitive
level.
In the market with a single dominant backbone, anti-competitive actions indeed could
appear. Although it is unlikely that provider can grow and become a dominant backbone,
such dominance could be achieved for example, by consolidation [52]. Existence of a
dominant backbone, like in the case of a natural monopoly, could harm public interests
in some ways. In particular, a dominant provider i) can raise retail prices, ii) can use
market power by denying access to its network, i.e., refusing to interconnect with smaller
providers, and finally, iii) can raise the prices at the wholesale market. In addition to this,
a dominant provider can also apply non-price-based discrimination, such as degradation
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in quality of interconnection in order to “steal” customers of a rival provider. The study
[52] examined an anti-competitive manner of a dominant backbone, and argued that
until there are competitive backbones in the market no need for regulation is required.
It is acceptable that providers are unable to obtain sufficient market power to act in an
anti-competitive manner, however, this assumption may not be viable in the system of
universal connectivity between backbones [52]. For the purpose of attracting new users
or increasing revenues, backbones differentiate and offer new types of services to their
customers. Some pressing issues arise from the possible Internet “balkanization” where
competing providers attempt to differentiate themselves from others. In particular, some
backbones may not have an incentive to interconnect with others in order to share a
particular service. Such a decision might be based on the fact that other backbones are
not able to guarantee a certain level of quality of the provisioned services. Another issue
concerns the possible increase in congestion level. Since there is no money exchange
in the peering model, providers have little or no economic incentive to increase their
capacity to terminate traffic. This may lead to a degradation in the level of QoS.
Under such circumstances, a provider who is unwilling to interconnect can grow and
become dominant. To prevent harming public interest, i.e., social welfare, industry-
specific regulations might be applied. However, the study [52] showed that even at the
first stage providers are unwilling to interconnect, this is a temporary phase. More
specifically, imposition of regulation is unlikely to be necessary because there are strong
market forces that would induce providers to interconnect.
2.5 Interconnection Challenges
This section discusses international Internet interconnection issues and the proposed
recommendations. It also examines international connectivity to the Internet in a con-
verging environment.
2.5.1 International Internet Interconnection
For many year international interconnection has been the subject of debate related to
the cost of connectivity to the Internet. In recent years, some non-U.S. carriers, espe-
cially from the Asia-Pacific region, complained about unfair sharing of the international
transmission capacity costs. Non-U.S. carriers arranging transit relationships with U.S.
carriers are required to pay the full costs of international Internet connectivity regardless
of the direction of traffic flows.
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The recent study reported by the Telecommunication Working Group set up by Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) stated that the traffic to and from the U.S.
became more balanced. In fact, the Australian carrier Telstra claimed that 30% of the
traffic between Australia and the United States is flowing from Australia to the U.S., due
to increasing demand for the content provided by Australia [52]. Further, Telstra argued
that it subsidizes the U.S. carriers whose customers are utilizing its infrastructure.
On the other side, according to the European Commission report, the European back-
bone providers stated that international connectivity is evolving rapidly and leads to
“many different types of arrangements for achieving global connectivity” [35]. In par-
ticular, some local European providers arrange peering with transit ISPs and therefore,
access the U.S. backbones without payment. Indeed, according to all publicly available
information, there is no indication that any U.S. backbones are abusing market power
with respect to non-U.S. carriers.
Since 1998, the ITU has studied the issue of international interconnection cost shar-
ing. In particular, this issue was raised on the debate, known as International Charging
Arrangements for Internet Services (ICAIS). Later in 2000, the ITU adopted the rec-
ommendation D.50 that pursued to encourage providers to adopt symmetric peering
arrangements [51]. However, this failed due to various FCC studies, which demon-
strated that symmetric peering is lacking, and that commercial agreements are domi-
nant. As a result, recommendation D.50 admitted commercial arrangements suggesting
that providers take into account “the possible need for compensation between them for
the value of elements such as traffic flow, number of routes, geographical coverage and
cost of international transmission among others” [58].
In 2000, the Sector ITU-T/SG3 adopted a proposal, introduced by the Asia and Oceania
Region tariff group, which recommended the establishment of bilateral arrangements
and the compensation of each provider for the costs that it incurs in carrying traffic
generated by the other provider. In response to this, the USA submitted to the ITU
World Telecommunications Standardization Assembly (WTSA) “formal contributions
in opposition to both the substance of this recommendation and the procedures used in
its adoption” [52]. In fact, traffic flows are not a reasonable indicator to share the costs
since it is not clear who originally initiated a transmission and, therefore, who should
pay for the costs. More specifically, an incoming packet to Taiwan from the USA, may
be i) either part of a transmission, such as webpage that was requested by user in Taiwan
or ii) part of a transmission, such as an email that was sent by a customer in the USA.
Moreover, in some cases, U.S. backbones accept traffic from one Asia-Pacific region
that is forwarded to another Asia-Pacific region. In such cases, the U.S. customers do
not benefit from this traffic. Overall, it can be concluded that compensation between
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providers cannot be solely done based on the traffic flows, which provide a poor basis for
cost sharing. The current program of the ITU-T Study Group 3 for the Study Period
2009-2012 continues to study international Internet connectivity aspects meeting the
standardization challenges.
The issue of unequal cost distribution between networks makes the access and the use of
the Internet more expensive for customers, especially in low-income developing countries
[35]. Interconnection challenges in developing countries have been extensively studied
[10], [30], [58], [43]. In particular, a report provided by African Internet Service Providers
Association (AFRISPA) is concerned with the net cash that flows from the developing
South to the developed North. Being a key element in telecommunications, interconnec-
tion “is needed to achieve equitable and sustainable expansion of infrastructure services
in the poorest countries of the world” [10]. African backbone providers pay for the ac-
cess circuits, and therefore subsidize the connectivity costs to the international backbone
providers. For example, when a Kenyan user sends email to the USA, it is the Kenyan
ISP that bears the cost of the international connectivity from Kenya to the USA. When
a user in U.S. sends email to a user in Kenya, it is still the Kenyan ISP that bears the
cost of the international connectivity [63]. Such a cost distribution leads to higher sub-
scription fees in Kenya. It was estimated that annual connectivity costs by Asia Pacific
ISPs reach a total of USD 5 billion, and the costs by African operators come to between
USD 250 and USD 500 million [10]. The scarcity of cheap international connections
and the degradation in quality of service is caused by a variety of reasons, such as geo-
graphical remoteness, the lack of regional/international communications infrastructure
and competition in developing countries. The lack of regional and national transmission
infrastructures in Africa imply that a considerable amount of traffic goes via Europe
or North America. This adds additional costs to the operations of the providers, and
therefore makes international interconnection costly. As cited in [63] the gap between
Internet access in developed and developing countries is huge and continues to increase.
In particular, only 5% of the people in low-income countries, which make 60% of the
world’s population, have access to the Internet.
2.5.2 Next Generation Networks
Migration to the NGNs, which implies a combination of the Internet and the traditional
telephony system, enhances the urgency to resolve international interconnection issues
[58]. More specifically, the costs of interconnection borne by developing countries are
expected to increase as more traffic migrates to NGNs. The ITU estimated that during
the period between 1993 and 1998, the net payments from developed to developing
countries for international telephone calls reach a total of USD 40 billion. However, due
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to the development of cheap technologies for voice communications (e.g., VoIP), which
bypass international accounting rate system3, the estimations of ITU-T Study Group
3 showed that now developing countries may pay USD 3 billion per year to developed
countries.
The convergence of the networks raises the questions related to economics of intercon-
nection, the possible imposition of regulation, and the degree of regulation. Indeed,
the NGN interconnection problem is not a problem of technology but rather a problem
of economics [60], [61]. There have been arguments to withdraw the regulation alto-
gether since the competition progressively expands. The report [60] argued that in the
long-term run this is probably the right view. However, in the short-term run (i.e.,
intermediate time frame) where a market has not yet become effectively competitive,
regulation may be applied.
2.5.3 Interconnection Pricing
The main objective of telecommunications regulation is to promote a competitive mar-
ket. The regulator prevents incumbent providers to abuse their dominant positions and
ensures that there are no barriers for newcomers to enter the market [51]. Regulators
can use interconnection pricing as a tool to encourage competition in all segments of
a market [3], [56]. The interconnection prices are controversial because they have an
impact on the competition development and profitability: while high interconnection
rates are attractive to the incumbent providers and discourage entrants, low rates are
thought to favour entrants, decreasing the revenues of the incumbent providers. The
purpose of regulation of the interconnection prices is thus to promote the establishment
of a viable and fair competition.
Generally, regulators consider four main interconnection pricing schemes: historical cost-
based pricing, Long-run Incremental Cost (LRIC) pricing, Efficient Component Pricing
Rule (ECPR), and Bill and Keep. The range of existing solutions to interconnection
pricing is described in [64]. These approaches do not achieve the two objectives of in-
terconnection pricing, viz., competition development and profitability simultaneously.
Hence, no single model has a clear advantage over the others. For example, LRIC stim-
ulates competition by encouraging new entrants in the downstream market. However,
this is only achieved under a number of unrealistic/limited circumstances, and in reality,
the LRIC scheme might induce inefficiencies. The detailed analyses are provided in [4],
[2], [50], [33]. Thus, setting interconnection rates in a way to encourage efficient market
competition remains challenging for the regulators. Some innovative concepts for the
3The accounting rate system provides a set of agreed prices for interconnection of international calls.
Source: www.ictregulationtoolkit.org
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interconnection pricing are presented in [57]. One of the assumptions considers reciprocal
(i.e., symmetric) and non-reciprocal (i.e., asymmetric) interconnection charges. Symme-
try of interconnection prices conflicts with cost-based interconnection of the networks.
In particular, competing providers have different business plans, employ different tech-
nologies, and therefore, have different cost structures. Asymmetry of interconnection
prices can have a distorting effect on the market competition. In particular, high cost
networks with low market share can set higher access charges, which may diminish mar-
ket development. However, asymmetric interconnection charges have been considered
as increasing the sustainability of high-cost area providers and therefore, have become
economically acceptable [10]. In fact, termination rates provide an opportunity to in-
crease of revenue in low density (high-cost) areas from incoming calls. The justification
for interconnection asymmetry is discussed in the following lines.
Asymmetric Interconnection Pricing
The theoretical justification for asymmetric interconnection in telephony has the fol-
lowing reasons [30]. Firstly, the urban networks are located in low-cost areas, while
the rural networks are considered to operate in high-cost areas. This is due to the
less developed infrastructure, in particular the low density of subscribed users in rural
areas rather than in urban areas. Such a difference in costs explains the higher retail
prices in the rural than in urban networks. Secondly, setting cost-based access charges
increases the economic efficiency. It is recognized that geographical averaging main-
tained by the governments is considered social and desirable. However, it is also argued
that the users in the rural networks of developing countries cannot afford high costs of
services, and therefore, it is reasonable to move termination charges towards the costs.
Setting asymmetric charges enhances economic efficiency in liberalized or competitive
markets by increasing the interconnection revenues of the rural networks. And finally,
urban consumers are willing to pay higher prices to support rural networks, i.e., to cover
additional costs that are understandable to them. More specifically, it was shown that
in spite of the rural users’ willingness to pay, urban customers have more affordability
and therefore, are willing to pay more to call their friends in rural networks [30]. Thus,
rural networks in the developing countries with low income have the potential to increase
revenue and to generate traffic [10]. In telephony, for example, it is acceptable that more
than 50% of a rural network’s revenue (in developing countries) could come from the
incoming calls. Adoption of the asymmetric interconnection charges encourages rural
networks to generate revenues not only from incoming, but also from outgoing calls.
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2.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have examined methodologies for communications networks and pro-
vided an overview of international Internet interconnection challenges. Currently, the
Internet admits a small set of inter-provider cost distribution models, such as peering,
transit and their variations. In particular, under symmetry of traffic flows, the termina-
tion costs are set to zero since it is assumed that the termination fees are roughly the
same, and consequently, peering is negotiated. Generally, if providers are asymmetric
in terms of size, the peering model is not appropriate since the providers may incur dif-
ferent costs and benefits. In such cases the interconnection arrangement is governed by
the financial compensation in a unilaterally (paid peering, transit) or bilaterally negoti-
ated basis to recover the costs of the network. In the bilateral settlement arrangements,
the payments are done based on the net traffic flow. In the unilateral settlement ar-
rangements, a customer provider pays for sent and received traffic, even though traffic
flows in both directions. This causes the existence of imbalance in the allocation of
interconnection costs and scarcity of cheap international connectivity in the high cost
areas.
“Without the adoption of a settlement regime that supports some form of cost distri-
bution among Internet providers, there are serious structural problems in supporting a
highly diverse and well populated provider industry sector. These problems are exac-
erbated by the additional observation that the Internet transmission and retail markets
both admit significant economies of scale of operation. The combination of these two
factors leads to the economic conclusion that the Internet market is not a long term sus-
tainable open competitive market that is capable of supporting a wide diversity of players
both large and small” [49]. Summarizing, the problem of interconnection cost allocation
concerns fair compensation of each provider (for utilization of its infrastructure), rather
than the installation of transmission infrastructure, or the retailing of Internet services.
As stated in [49] “competition is not an end in itself, nor is regulatory impost”. The
objective here is to ensure an efficient and effective environment for all participants.
The aim of this dissertation is to support the development and profitability of the com-
munications market by reducing the existing imbalance in the allocation of the intercon-
nection costs. The existing approaches to interconnection challenges are mainly focused
on setting of interconnection charges. These models strike the balance between compe-
tition development and profitability quite differently, and therefore, no single solution
has an advantage over the others. One approach towards solving interconnection issues
recommended to set bilateral arrangements and to compensate each provider based on
the traffic flows. However, traffic flows are regarded as a poor basis for cost sharing
since it is impossible to determine who originally initiated any IP transmission. Instead
Chapter 2. Fundamental Concepts and Related Literature 28
of performing intercarrier compensation based on traffic flows, we suggest to perform
compensation based on the original initiator of a transmission, where providers get com-
pensated differently for traffic originally initiated by their own customers, as opposed
to traffic initiated by customers of other networks. This approach allows to compen-
sate providers for utilization of their infrastructures, and therefore, provides sustainable
conditions for all market players.
Chapter 3
Differentiated Traffic-based
Interconnection Agreement for
Private Peering Arrangements
“We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created
them.”
Albert Einstein
The objective of this chapter is to propose a novel inter-provider cost distribution model,
called Differentiated Traffic-based Interconnection Agreement (DTIA) for private peering
arrangements (i.e., between two directly interconnected providers). Interconnection of
providers through transit arrangements is considered in the next chapter.
Section 3.1 discusses the key technique of our approach, which is based on the deter-
mination of the original initiator of a transmission. In order to support the proposed
interconnection payment scheme, a traffic management mechanism is described in Sec-
tion 3.2. For the evaluation of the proposed algorithm, Sections 3.3 and 3.4 formulate the
economic models and their analytical studies. Section 3.3 presents the inelastic demand
model investigating the role of the proposed approach on the intercarrier compensation.
Section 3.4 considers the elastic demand model exploring the impact of traffic differen-
tiation on both customers and providers. In particular, it studies demand and profits
of the providers. The proposed model is compared with an existing solution, which
performs cost compensation based on the net traffic flow. The conclusions of the studies
are reported in Section 3.5.
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3.1 Traffic Differentiation-based Approach
The principle that we follow is that both parties derive benefits from the exchange of
traffic and should thus share the interconnection costs [6], [5], [44]. Considering a system
without externalities [31], the costs should be shared based on the benefits obtained by
each party. However, in the real world, which exhibits externalities, it is impossible
to measure the benefits of the parties. If content is not equally distributed between
providers, traffic imbalance occurs, and hence, costs and revenues are not shared evenly.
Most often, traffic between peering providers is routed using so called hot potato routing
scheme, where the sending ISP forwards packets as soon as possible and the receiving
ISP incurs the majority of the transportation cost. As a result, the network that sends
more traffic incurs lower cost than the network that receives more traffic [60]. As cited
in [47], traffic flows are dominant towards the customers requesting the content, and
they generate 85% of the Internet traffic. This implies that inbound traffic is much more
compared to outbound traffic of content requests.
As discussed in Chapter 2, to avoid the existing imbalance in the distribution of the
interconnection costs, there has been some pressure on regulatory commissions to adopt
interconnection arrangements at zero price (i.e., peering arrangements). This model
was not accepted due to inefficiency in terms of the cost compensation. One approach
towards solving interconnection cost distribution issues proposed to compensate each
provider for the costs which it incurs in carrying traffic based on the traffic flows. How-
ever, it was argued that traffic flows are not a good measure for costs sharing since it is
impossible to determine who originally initiated any given transmission on the Internet,
and therefore, provide a poor basis for cost allocation. Although it can be argued to
use a TCP session as a “call”, providers are unwilling to inspect the IP header of a
packet since “the cost of carrying an individual packet is extremely small, and the cost
of accounting for each packet may well be greater than the cost of carrying the packet
across the providers” [48].
The key aspect of the DTIA model is based on the determination of the original ini-
tiator of a transmission by means of traffic differentiation into two types, referred to as
native, which is originally initiated by the provider’s own customers, and stranger that
is originally initiated by the customers of the peered network. Indeed, outgoing traffic of
ISPi that is the same as incoming traffic of a rival provider may be either i) a part of a
transmission initiated by a customer of ISPi, or ii) a part of a transmission initiated by
a customer of the peered network. Further, we suggest that a provider compensates the
incurred costs differently for a particular type of traffic, where stranger traffic is charged
at a lower rate than native traffic. In particular, i) fully if the exchanged traffic is native
and ii) partially if the originated traffic is stranger. More specifically, interconnected
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networks arrange DTIA whereby each partner is compensated for the termination costs
which it incurs in carrying traffic according to the differentiated traffic flows.
3.2 Traffic Management Mechanism
The traffic management mechanism for the interconnection agreements, which we pro-
pose, allows to recognize the packet type between the peered networks. The key tech-
nique of the proposed mechanism is the identification of the traffic type based on a
one-bit field in the IP packet header referred to as the Membership Label (ML). Incor-
poration of the label in the IP header is described in Section 4.1.2.
We assume that all nodes within the network support packet marking where each node
sets the ML field of a native packet to ‘1 ’ and the packet of stranger traffic to ‘0 ’. The
assignment of the label to ‘1 ’ is done once, when a node originally initiates a transmis-
sion. It is obvious that native traffic with regard to one network is considered to be
stranger from the perspective of the other. Consequently, it is necessary to differentiate
the exchanged traffic between the networks. In order to achieve this, we distinguish the
provider’s border nodes, which we refer to as the Provider-to-Provider Border (PPB)
nodes. These nodes are trust boundaries and maintain the connection with the peered
network.
For outgoing traffic, the PPB node performs the NOT logical operation on the label.
In addition, in order to carry out intercarrier compensation based on the differentiated
traffic flows, each PPB node keeps two counters (one for inbound and another for out-
bound traffic), which calculate the volume of a particular type of traffic, i.e., either
native or stranger with regard to its network. The volume of the other type of traffic,
e.g., native (stranger) can be easily determined by subtracting the volume of stranger
(native) traffic from the total count. It is worth noting that the PPB nodes read the
labels of incoming traffic (to increase counter if necessary), but do not re-examine them.
Now, a website requested by a consumer can be hosted either by the local network or
by the peered network. As a result, traffic originated by the endpoint of a transmission
can be part of the transmission originally initiated either by the network’s customer
or by the customer of the peered network. Therefore, the identification of the type of
traffic (i.e., native or stranger) originated by the transmission endpoint is necessary. For
this purpose, the transmission endpoint does not re-examine the label and simply sends
response packets with the same ML field (i.e., the value ‘0 ’ or ‘1 ’ is duplicated from the
request packet). It is obvious that incoming network traffic with the bit set to‘ 1 ’ is part
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of a transmission initiated by its own customers. An example that helps to understand
how the described traffic management mechanism works is provided below.
Example
As an example, consider a model consisting of ISPi, ISPj , and their customers where
each provider calculates the volumes of native traffic. Assume that a customer of ISPi
requests data available on ISPj . Let N1 be the PPB router of ISPi, which receives a
packet marked by ‘1 ’. Before forwarding it to ISPj , N1 performs the NOT operation
on the ML field of the outgoing packet and increases the counter for outgoing native
traffic. The PPB node N2 of ISPj reads the IP header of the received packet and then
forwards it to the destination, e.g., the N3 node. After receiving the packet, N3 sends
a packet stream with the requested data where the label value of each packet is set to
‘0 ’. A similar procedure follows on the inverse path with the only difference that ISPi
considers incoming traffic as native, initiated by its own customers. The principle of our
traffic management mechanism for peering arrangements is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
ISPi ISPj
Originator
1->0
N1 N2
1
N31
1
0 0
0->1
1 0
Figure 3.1: Traffic Management Mechanism for Peering Arrangement.
Incentive Compatibility
Incentive compatibility of a mechanism is defined as the property when participating
providers have no incentive to lie or cheat. It is well known that strategic agents have
an incentive not to be truthful and, therefore, end-systems or the defined PPB nodes
can perform mendacious packet marking. However, there are several favorable reasons
to adopt the proposed approach. First, we considered that PPBs are trust boundaries,
therefore, their operations can be recorded and then audited. Second, applying a com-
monly used pricing scheme, such as a flat-rate, creates no incentive to the end-systems
to perform untruthful packet marking since it does not affect their fees and quality of
service. Finally, interconnection is a long-term and repeated process, arranged under
mutual benefits, and therefore, sustainable cooperation between interconnected ISPs is
a reasonable and natural solution. Nevertheless, in Section 4.1.1, we address the incen-
tive compatibility issue that deals with truthful packet marking . The proposed strategy
considers peering and transit models.
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3.3 Investigating the Inelastic Demand Model
In the following subsection, we analyze the impact of the determination of a transmission
initiator on intercarrier compensation between peers. First, we consider a regulated
environment with reciprocal access charges (ACs, i.e., equal), and then examine a market
model, where providers set non-reciprocal ACs (i.e., the charges are not the same in
each direction) without regulation. The studies examine inelastic demand model, where
customer demands do not increase or decrease with market price changes.
3.3.1 The Economic Model and its Analyses
In order to investigate the effect of traffic differentiation on the inter-provider payments,
we provide analytical studies based on a bargaining process that is explored using Nash
Bargaining Solution (NBS). It provides a fair and Pareto-efficient outcome. This ap-
proach was previously taken in [9], [75]. To capture the traffic imbalances between the
providers, we follow the assumption made in [55], and therefore, consider two types of
customers, namely websites (which host information and content) and consumers (who
use the information and content provided on websites). Actually, traffic is exchanged 1)
between consumers, 2) between websites, 3) from websites to consumers, and 4) from
consumers to websites. Generally, traffic between websites, between consumers (email
exchanges), and from consumers to websites (the requests for websites/file downloads)
is much smaller than traffic generated from websites to consumers. Recently, Peer-to-
Peer (P2P) traffic has increased rapidly and comprises a significant part of the Internet
traffic. According to the proposed approach, a node (a customer) in a P2P network is
considered as a consumer as well as a website simultaneously since it can act as a client
and as a server. Thus, traffic generated from websites to consumers and from consumers
to websites along with Web, FTP, and streaming media traffic captures P2P traffic,
while traffic between consumers captures email exchange and VoIP traffic that tends
to be symmetric. The studies investigate how net interconnection payments between
providers depend on the differentiated traffic flows and focus on traffic asymmetry in its
simplest way. Hence, they consider traffic exchange i) from consumers to websites and
ii) from websites to consumers.
The following assumptions were made to simplify the analytical studies:
Assumption 3.1. Let αi ∈ (0, 1) be network i’s market share for consumers and βi ∈
(0, 1) its market share for websites. The market consists of two providers i 6= j = 1, 2
and αi + αj = 1, βi + βj = 1.
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Assumption 3.2. For simplicity, a balanced calling pattern1 where each consumer re-
quests any website in any network with the same probability is considered.
Assumption 3.3. Each customer chooses only one provider to join because of homo-
geneity of the services.
Assumption 3.4. Each consumer originates one unit of traffic per each request of
website and downloads a fixed amount of content. The number of consumers and websites
in the market is given by N and M respectively. Hence, the number of consumers and
websites subscribed to ISPi is given by αiN and βiM respectively.
3.3.2 Reciprocal Access Charges
We start by examining a scenario in which ISPi fails to sign an interconnection agreement
with ISPj . The utility or benefit of joining ISPi for each consumer is u(βi,M) = f(βi),
and each website’s utility is given by h(αi, N) = g(αi). The presence of network pos-
itive externalities implies that f ′(·) > 0 and g′(·) > 0. In case of disagreement on
interconnection between providers, the total traffic volume generated by ISPi is
ti = αiβiNM + αiβiNMx (3.1)
where the first component is the volume of traffic exchanged from consumers to websites,
the second one denotes the volume of traffic exchanged from websites to consumers, and
x is the average amount of traffic caused by requesting a website. It is known that P2P
traffic asymmetry is typically caused by less capacity provisioned in the upstream direc-
tion. Thus upstream/downstream P2P traffic flows can be asymmetric, which implies
that x is different for the customers subscribed to different ISPs. However, this does not
affect the results of our studies. The pre-interconnection demand function of network i
is described by
Dprei = ti if f(βi) ≥ 0 and g(αi) ≥ 0
Let network i ’s marginal costs of origination and termination be coi > 0 and c
t
i > 0
respectively, where coi = c
t
i. We do not consider fixed network cost since our goal is
to investigate explicit monetary charges between ISPs. The profit of ISPi from on-net
traffic (i.e., destined to the customers of its network) is defined by
pii = [αiNf(βi) + βiMg(αi)]− ti(coi + cti) (3.2)
where the first two components present the total utility generated by the network and
the last component denotes the incremental costs of the network.
1Other works make a certain statistical assumption, such as a balanced calling pattern. This is due
to the lack of mathematical models on how traffic between networks is distributed.
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Suppose that ISPi obtained an agreement with ISPj . We assume that the providers’
market shares for customers do not change in case of interconnection. In this case each
consumer’s utility is defined by u(β,M) = f(β), and each website’s utility is given by
h(α,N) = g(α). The volumes of the differentiated traffic flows exchanged from ISPi to
ISPj are calculated as follows
tnatij = αiβjNM
tstrij = αjβiNMx
(3.3)
where tnatij and t
str
ij denote native and stranger traffic volumes with respect to ISPi.
Similarly, the differentiated traffic volumes from ISPj to ISPi are defined by
tnatji = αjβiNM
tstrji = αiβjNMx
(3.4)
where tnatji and t
str
ji denote native and stranger traffic volumes with respect to ISPj .
Summarizing, the total traffic volumes exchanged between the providers are given by
tij = t
nat
ij + t
str
ij (3.5)
tji = t
nat
ji + t
str
ji (3.6)
In case of the agreement, the demand of ISPi is defined by
Dposti = ti + tij if f(β) ≥ 0 and g(α) ≥ 0
Since it is out of the scope of this thesis to investigate how the access charges are set,
in this subsection, we assume that they are defined by an industry regulator and then
applied reciprocally. More specifically, the providers charge each other the same access
charges a and b for terminating native and stranger traffic respectively, where a > b
(since the provider compensates partially the costs of terminating stranger traffic). The
access charge b determines how the costs are shared between consumers and websites:
the higher access charge for terminating stranger traffic, the higher the per-unit charge
to websites. To carry out analysis, the access charge for terminating native traffic is set
to the lowest termination marginal cost, and for terminating stranger traffic is defined
by b = εa, 0.5 ≤ ε < 1. In order to simplify studies, we fix ε = 0.5. It is important to
note that the results are robust for the entire interval of ε. The profit of ISPi obtained
interconnection is calculated as follows
Πi = pii + σi (3.7)
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where σi is the incremental profit that ISPi gets from the interconnection. More specif-
ically, the incremental profit is obtained from off-net traffic exchange, which is destined
to the subscribers of another network and is given by
σi = αiNf(β) + βiMg(α) + t
nat
ij (−coi − a)
+ tstrij (−coi − b) + tnatji (a− cti) + tstrji (b− cti)
(3.8)
The outcome of j ’s network according to the Nash bargaining game2 is defined by
ΠNBSj = 0.5(Πj + Πi + pij − pii) = 0.5(σi + σj) + pij
where providers equally divide any payoffs relative to the disagreement (or threat) point,
which is the payment that providers receive in case of a disrupted connection. If σi > σj ,
then ISPj received the net interconnection payment from ISPi that is
ΠNBSj −Πj = 0.5(σi − σj) = 0.5∆σ (3.9)
We consider the case when f ′′(·) = 0 and g′′(·) = 0, so that the network externalities
exhibit constant returns to scale. This implies that the networks have the same incre-
mental revenues, while the incremental costs increase as the network size decreases. By
substituting (3.8) in (3.9) follows that
ΠNBSj −Πj = 0.5[tnatji (2a+ coj − cti)− tnatij (2a+ coi − ctj)]
+ 0.5[tstrji (2b+ c
o
j − cti)− tstrij (2b+ coi − ctj)]
(3.10)
In the DTIA model, the net interconnection charge is interpreted as two independent
components i) one for a native traffic business, which is denoted by σnatij , and ii) another
for a stranger traffic business that is denoted by σstrij . Summarizing
σnatij = 0.5[t
nat
ji (2a+ c
o
j − cti)− tnatij (2a− (ctj − coi ))] (3.11)
σstrij = 0.5[t
str
ji (2b+ c
o
j − cti)− tstrij (2b− (ctj − coi ))] (3.12)
The following analyses explore how the interconnection payments depend on the differen-
tiated traffic flows, which are determined by providers’ market shares for consumers and
websites. For this purpose, we consider all available market states in terms of providers’
sizes (i.e., market shares). It is obvious that the total number of all alternative states of
the market, where the providers have θ market shares, can be expressed as 2θ. Excluding
identical cases, we obtained the five states which are investigated below.
2A bargaining game for two players is defined as a situation where players must reach an agreement
on an outcome in a set of possible joint utility allocations (possible agreements).
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Proposition 3.1. The net payment from ISPi to ISPj is increasing in t
nat
ji and t
str
ji .
Proof. Partially differentiating ∆σ with respect to the corresponding parameters follows
∂∆σ
∂tnatij

> 0 if ctj > 2a+ c
o
i
= 0 if ctj = 2a+ c
o
i
< 0 if ctj < 2a+ c
o
i
∂∆σ
∂tstrij

> 0 if ctj > 2b+ c
o
i
= 0 if ctj = 2b+ c
o
i
< 0 if ctj < 2b+ c
o
i
∂∆σ
∂tnatji
= (2a+ coj − cti) > 0
∂∆σ
∂tstrji
= (2b+ coj − cti) > 0
This implies that the more incoming traffic to ISPi, the more benefit of the provider.
Proposition 3.2. If αi = αj and βi = βj, then net interconnection payments between
providers are zero.
Proof. Given the symmetry of the model in terms of size, then cti = c
t
j = a. From the
conditions (3.3) and (3.4) follows that tnatij = t
nat
ji and t
str
ij = t
str
ji . As a result, it is
straightforward to show that the net interconnection transfers are given by (ΠNBSi −
Πi) = (Π
NBS
j −Πj) = 0.
Proposition 3.3. If αi = αj and βi > βj, then ISPi subsidizes ISPj for native traffic.
Proof. In this case cti < c
t
j and a = c
t
i, because αi = αj and βi > βj .
Native: From the conditions (3.3) and (3.4) follows that tnatij < t
nat
ji . Given that c
t
i < c
t
j
and the component of the native traffic business (3.11), then (2a+ coj − cti) > (2a− (ctj −
coi )). Hence, we obtain that σ
nat
ij > 0. In this case, ISPi gets higher profit from native
traffic exchange than ISPj and therefore subsidizes the rival network.
Stranger: From the equations (3.3) and (3.4) follows that tstrij > t
str
ji . The component
of the stranger traffic business (3.12), where (2b + coj − cti) > (2b − (ctj − coi )) is not
straightforward and is defined by
σstrij

> 0 if tstrji /t
str
ij > (2c
t
i − ctj)/coj
= 0 if tstrji /t
str
ij = (2c
t
i − ctj)/coj
< 0 if tstrji /t
str
ij < (2c
t
i − ctj)/coj
(3.13)
Proposition 3.4. If αi > αj and βi = βj, then ISPi subsidizes ISPj for stranger traffic.
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Proof. Given that ISPi is larger than ISPj , then c
t
i < c
t
j and a = c
t
i.
Native: From the conditions (3.3) and (3.4) follows that tnatij > t
nat
ji . Considering the
native traffic business, the condition (3.11) is not straightforward and is given by
σnatij

> 0 if tnatij /t
nat
ji < (a+ c
o
j)/(2a+ c
o
i − ctj)
= 0 if tnatij /t
nat
ji = (a+ c
o
j)/(2a+ c
o
i − ctj)
< 0 if tnatij /t
nat
ji > (a+ c
o
j)/(2a+ c
o
i − ctj)
(2a+ coi − ctj) 6= 0 (3.14)
Stranger: Examining the equations (3.3) and (3.4), we obtain that tstrij < t
str
ji . From
(3.12) follows that σstrij > 0, and thus ISPj receives net payments for stranger traffic
from ISPi.
When αi > αj and βi > βj , the following cases for the traffic volumes are obtained from
the expressions (3.5) and (3.6): 1) tij > tji, 2) tij < tji, and 3) tij = tji. The cases
1) and 2) are analogous to those described above. The case when tij = tji is analyzed
below.
Proposition 3.5. If αi > αj, βi > βj, and tij = tji, then αi = βi.
Proof. The result is obtained from (3.5) and (3.6) that is
αiβjNM + αjβiMNx = αjβiNM + αiβjMNx
This gives αi(1− βi)− βi(1− αi) = αi − βi = 0 => αi = βi.
Corollary 3.1. If αi > αj, βi > βj, and tij = tji, then t
nat
ij = t
nat
ji and t
str
ij = t
str
ji .
Proposition 3.6. If αi > αj, βi > βj, and tij = tji, then ISPi subsidizes ISPj for
native and stranger traffic.
Proof. In this case cti < c
t
j and a = c
t
i, because αi > αj and βi > βj .
Native: Considering the native traffic component (3.11) when tnatij = t
nat
ji , it can be
obtained that σnatij > 0. Here, ISPi receives higher incremental profit than the rival
network and consequently subsidizes ISPj .
Stranger: Given that tstrij = t
str
ji , from the condition (3.12) follows that σ
str
ij > 0. Under
symmetric stranger traffic flows, ISPj receives net interconnection charges.
Allowing that αi > αj , βi < βj , and recalling that costs are higher for the smaller
network than for the larger network, the following cases for the termination costs are
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possible: 1) cti > c
t
j , 2) c
t
i < c
t
j , and 3) c
t
i = c
t
j . The cases 1) and 2) are similar to those
described above. The last case when the networks are equal in terms of size is examined
below.
Proposition 3.7. If αi > αj, βi < βj, and c
t
i = c
t
j = a, then ISPi (ISPj) subsidizes
ISPj (ISPi) for stranger (native) traffic.
Proof. Given that the networks are equal in terms of size, then αiN+βiM = αjN+βjM .
This gives αiN = βjM and αjN = βiM .
Native: From the conditions (3.3) and (3.4) follows that tnatij > t
nat
ji . Considering the
native traffic business component (3.11), we obtain that σnatij < 0. In this case, ISPi
receives net payments from ISPj .
Stranger: Considering the equations (3.3) and (3.4), it can be obtained that tstrij < t
str
ji .
From the equation (3.12) follows that σstrij > 0, and consequently, ISPj receives net
payments from ISPi.
3.3.3 Non-reciprocal Access Charges
In this subsection, we explore how interconnection payments depend on the differentiated
traffic flows when the providers set non-reciprocal access charges. Let ai and bi be
network i ’s access charges for terminating native and stranger traffic respectively, where
ai > bi (in DTIA, the charges for terminating stranger traffic are less than the charges
for terminating native traffic). To carry out our analysis, we assume that the network’s
access charge for terminating native traffic is set to the termination marginal cost, i.e.,
ai = c
t
i, and access charge for terminating stranger traffic is defined by bi = εai, where
0.5 ≤ ε < 1. The variable ε is the same for both networks and for simplicity is set to
ε = 0.5. By substituting these access charges in equation (3.8), the incremental profit
of ISPi obtained from the interconnection can be re-written as follows
σi = αiNf(β) + βiMg(α) + t
nat
ij (−coi − aj)
+ tstrij (−coi − bj) + tnatji (ai − cti) + tstrji (bi − cti)
(3.15)
The net payment from ISPi to ISPj (i.e., when σi > σj) is obtained by substituting
(3.15) in (3.9) and is given by
ΠNBSj −Πj = 0.5
[
tnatji (2ai + c
o
j − cti)− tnatij (2aj + coi − ctj)
]
+ 0.5
[
tstrji (2bi + c
o
j − cti)− tstrij (2bj + coi − ctj)
] (3.16)
According to the proposed approach, the net interconnection charge is considered as two
independent components i) one for a native traffic business, which is denoted by σnatij ,
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and ii) another for a stranger traffic business which is denoted by σstrij . Summarizing
σnatij = 0.5
[
tnatji (2ai + c
o
j − cti)− tnatij (2aj − (ctj − coi ))
]
(3.17)
σstrij = 0.5
[
tstrji (2bi + c
o
j − cti)− tstrij (2bj − (ctj − coi ))
]
(3.18)
Analogous to the previous studies which considered reciprocal access charges, the fol-
lowing analyses examine all available market states in terms of market shares.
Proposition 3.8. The net payment from ISPi (ISPj) to ISPj (ISPi) is a) increasing
in tnatji and t
str
ji (t
nat
ij and t
str
ij ), and b) decreasing in t
nat
ij and t
str
ij (t
nat
ji and t
str
ji ).
Proof. Partially differentiating ∆σ with respect to the corresponding parameters gives
∂∆σ
∂tnatij
= −(2aj + coi − ctj) < 0
∂∆σ
∂tnatji
= (2ai + c
o
j − cti) > 0
∂∆σ
∂tstrij
= −(2bj + coi − ctj) < 0
∂∆σ
∂tstrji
= (2bi + c
o
j − cti) > 0
It can be noticed that the more incoming traffic, the more benefit of the provider.
Proposition 3.9. If αi = αj and βi = βj, then net interconnection payments between
providers are zero.
Proof. Given that the networks are symmetric in terms of size, then cti = c
t
j . Using
the condition (3.16), it is straightforward to show that the net transfers are given by
(ΠNBSi −Πi) = (ΠNBSj −Πj) = 0.
Proposition 3.10. If αi = αj and βi > βj, then ISPi subsidizes ISPj for native traffic.
Proof. In this case cti < c
t
j , because ISPi is larger than ISPj .
Native: From the equations (3.3) and (3.4), it can be obtained that tnatij < t
nat
ji . Given
that cti < c
t
j and the component of the native traffic business (3.17), then (2ai+c
o
j−cti) =
(2aj − (ctj − coi )). Hence, we obtain that σnatij > 0. This implies that ISPi receives higher
incremental profit from native traffic exchange and consequently subsidizes ISPj .
Stranger: Following (3.3) and (3.4), it can be obtained that tstrij > t
str
ji . The stranger
traffic business component (3.18), where (2bi + c
o
j − cti) > (2bj − (ctj − coi )), is not
straightforward. Summarizing
σstrij

> 0 if tstrij /t
str
ji < c
o
j/c
o
i
= 0 if tstrij /t
str
ji = c
o
j/c
o
i
< 0 if tstrij /t
str
ji > c
o
j/c
o
i
(3.19)
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Proposition 3.11. If αi > αj and βi = βj, then ISPi (ISPj) subsidizes ISPj (ISPi) for
stranger (native) traffic.
Proof. Given that αi > αj and βi = βj , then c
t
i < c
t
j .
Native: From the conditions (3.3) and (3.4) follows that tnatij > t
nat
ji . Following (3.17), the
net payment for native traffic is given by σnatij < 0. Hence, ISPj gets higher incremental
profit than ISPi from native traffic exchange and subsidizes the peered network.
Stranger: Using (3.3) and (3.4), it can be obtained that tstrij < t
str
ji . Considering the
component of the stranger traffic business (3.18) it follows that σstrij > 0. In this case,
ISPj receives net interconnection charges for stranger traffic from ISPi.
Recall that, when αi > αj and βi > βj , the following cases for the traffic volumes are
obtained from conditions (3.5) and (3.6): 1) tij > tji, 2) tij < tji, and 3) tij = tji. The
last case is considered further since the cases 1) and 2) are analogous to those described
above.
Proposition 3.12. If αi > αj, βi > βj, and tij = tji, then ISPi subsidizes ISPj for
stranger traffic.
Proof. From the definition where ISPi is larger than ISPj follows that c
t
i < c
t
j .
Native: Using Corollary 3.1, which gives that tnatij = t
nat
ji , the net payment for native
traffic is given by σnatij = 0. Consequently, the providers’ incremental profits obtained
from exchange of symmetric traffic volumes are equal.
Stranger: From Corollary 3.1 and the component of the stranger traffic business (3.18)
follows that σstrij > 0. The result indicates that, under symmetric stranger traffic vol-
umes, ISPj receives net interconnection charges.
When αi > αj and βi < βj , the following cases for the termination costs are obtained:
1) cti > c
t
j , 2) c
t
i < c
t
j , and 3) c
t
i = c
t
j . Since the cases 1) and 2) are similar to those
described above, we examine the last case 3).
Proposition 3.13. If αi > αj, βi < βj, and c
t
i = c
t
j, then ISPi (ISPj) subsidizes ISPj
(ISPi) for stranger (native) traffic.
Proof. Symmetry of networks in terms of size implies that αiN = βjM and βiM = αjN .
Native: From the conditions (3.3) and (3.4) follows that tnatij > t
nat
ji . Considering the
native traffic business component (3.17), it can be obtained that σnatij < 0. Thus, ISPi
is compensated by ISPj for the costs incurred in carrying native traffic.
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Case α β ct tnat tstr
I αi = αj βi = βj c
t
i = c
t
j t
nat
ij = t
nat
ji t
str
ij = t
str
ji
II αi = αj βi > βj c
t
i < c
t
j t
nat
ij < t
nat
ji t
str
ij > t
str
ji
III αi > αj βi = βj c
t
i < c
t
j t
nat
ij > t
nat
ji t
str
ij < t
str
ji
IV αi > αj βi > βj c
t
i < c
t
j if t
nat
ij = t
nat
ji if t
str
ij = t
str
ji
V αi > αj βi < βj if c
t
i = c
t
j t
nat
ij > t
nat
ji t
str
ij < t
str
ji
Table 3.1: Results of the DTIA Model with Inelastic Demand.
Stranger: Considering the conditions (3.3) and (3.4), we obtain that tstrij < t
str
ji . The
component of the stranger traffic business (3.18) is given by σstrij > 0. In this case, ISPj
receives net payments for stranger traffic exchange from ISPi.
3.3.4 Discussion
We now summarize the results obtained from the analytical studies which considered
symmetric and asymmetric access charges (see Tables 3.1-3.4). Tables 3.1 and 3.2
demonstrate the correlation between the differentiated traffic flows and providers’ mar-
ket shares. Table 3.3 reports how the net payments between peering ISPs depend on
the distinguished traffic types. The comparison of the interconnection charges between
agreements based on the net traffic flow (TF) and differentiated traffic flows compensa-
tions are presented in Table 3.4. In order to calculate the specific outcomes, we impose
the following values of termination costs in the model with reciprocal access charges i)
cti = c
t
j = 1 in cases I and V, ii) c
t
i = 1, c
t
j = 1.5 in all other cases. The termination costs
in the model with non-reciprocal access rates are set as follows i) cti = c
t
j = 1 in cases I
and V, ii) cti = 1, c
t
j = 2 in all other cases. Other parameters are x = 35, N = 100, and
M = 60. The market shares for case V were obtained so that the size of each network
is equal to 0.5(N + M). The parameters are chosen to be reasonable to examine all
available market states in terms of providers’ market shares. However, the specification
is clearly arbitrary. It is important to note that our conclusions do not heavily depend
on the chosen parameter values (see Tables 3.1 and 3.3). The results obtained for a
number of other parameter sets have not produced significant changes.
The net payments in the classical model, i.e., based on the net traffic flow compensation,
with reciprocal and non-reciprocal access charges are calculated as follows
ΠNBSj −Πj = 0.5
[
tji(2a+ c
o
j − cti)− tij(2a+ coi − ctj)
]
ΠNBSj −Πj = 0.5
[
tji(2ai + c
o
j − cti)− tij(2aj + coi − ctj)
]
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Case αi βi t
nat
ij t
str
ij t
nat
ji t
str
ji tij tji
I 0.5 0.5 1500 52500 1500 52500 54000 54000
II 0.5 0.9 300 94500 2700 10500 94800 13200
0.5 0.8 600 84000 2400 21000 84600 23400
0.5 0.773 682 81136 2318 23864 81818 26182
0.5 0.7 900 73500 2100 31500 74400 33600
0.5 0.677 970 71061 2030 33939 72030 35970
0.5 0.6 1200 63000 1800 42000 64200 43800
III 0.9 0.5 2700 10500 300 94500 13200 94800
0.8 0.5 2400 21000 600 84000 23400 84600
0.7 0.5 2100 31500 900 73500 33600 74400
0.6 0.5 1800 42000 1200 63000 43800 64200
IV 0.9 0.9 540 18900 540 18900 19440 19440
αi = βi 0.8 0.8 960 33600 960 33600 34560 34560
0.7 0.7 1260 44100 1260 44100 45360 45360
0.6 0.6 1440 50400 1440 50400 51840 51840
V 0.7 0.167 3500 10500 300 122501 14000 122801
αiN = βjM 0.65 0.25 2925 18375 525 102375 21300 102900
0.6 0.333 2400 28000 800 84000 30400 84800
0.55 0.417 1924 39407 1126 67337 41330 68462
Table 3.2: Traffic Differentiation of the DTIA Model.
Case Reciprocal ACs Non-reciprocal ACs
σnat σstr σnat σstr
I σnatij = σ
nat
ji σ
str
ij = σ
str
ji σ
nat
ij = σ
nat
ji σ
str
ij = σ
str
ji
II σnatij > σ
nat
ji eq. (3.13) σ
nat
ij > σ
nat
ji eq. (3.19)
III eq. (3.14) σstrij > σ
str
ji σ
nat
ij < σ
nat
ji σ
str
ij > σ
str
ji
IV σnatij > σ
nat
ji σ
str
ij > σ
str
ji σ
nat
ij = σ
nat
ji σ
str
ij > σ
str
ji
V σnatij < σ
nat
ji σ
str
ij > σ
str
ji σ
nat
ij < σ
nat
ji σ
str
ij > σ
str
ji
Table 3.3: Interconnection Payments of the DTIA Model with Inelastic Demand.
Several conclusions can be made from the obtained results (see Tables 3.1-3.4). They
demonstrated that, under certain market shares, the net payment of ISPi for a particular
type of traffic is the same as that of ISPj for another type of traffic (see Tables 3.4, case
II). More specifically, σnatij + σ
str
ij = 0, and asymmetric providers decide to interconnect
without monetary transfers. On the other side, symmetric providers in terms of size
(i.e., cost structures are symmetric) can benefit differently due to the different market
shares for consumers and websites (see Tables 3.4, case V).
The results also showed that generally, in spite of termination costs, the more incoming
traffic of a particular type, the more provider benefits from that type of traffic. The
comparison of the symmetric cases in terms of the originated traffic volumes (presented
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Case Reciprocal ACs Non-reciprocal ACs
σnatij σ
str
ij ∆σ/2 σ
nat
ij σ
str
ij ∆σ/2
DTIA TF DTIA TF
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
II 3150 -15750 -12600 -54600 3600 -36750 -33150 -122400
2550 -5250 -2700 -34200 2700 -21000 -18300 -91800
2386 -2386 0 -28636 2455 -16705 -14250 -83454
1950 5250 7200 -13800 1800 -5250 -3450 -61200
811 7689 9500 -9060 1591 -1591 0 -54091
1350 15750 17100 6600 900 1050 11400 -30600
III -1650 68250 66600 108600 -3600 89250 85650 122400
-1050 57750 56700 88200 -2700 73500 70800 91800
-450 47250 46800 67800 -1800 57750 55950 61200
150 36750 36900 47400 -900 42000 41100 30600
IV 270 9450 9720 9720 0 9450 9450 0
480 16800 17280 17280 0 16800 16800 0
630 22050 22680 22680 0 22050 22050 0
720 25200 25920 25920 0 25200 25200 0
V -3200 56001 52801 108801 -3200 56001 52801 108801
-2400 42000 39600 81600 -2400 42000 39600 81600
-1600 28000 26400 54400 -1600 28000 26400 54400
-798 13965 13167 27132 -798 13965 13167 27132
Table 3.4: Comparative Results of the Agreements Based on the Net Traffic Flow
and DT Flows Compensations.
in cases II and III of Tables 3.4) showed that, in DTIA, the net payments that subsidizes
the smaller ISPj in case II is much less than the net payments subsidized by the larger
ISPi in case III. Moreover, at certain market shares, the larger provider compensates
the smaller provider. And finally, the outcomes of the presented model deviate less from
the Nash solution (which is the same in both models) than the outcomes of the classical
model. As a consequence, the proposed strategy significantly reduces the interconnection
payments. Overall, it can be concluded that DTIA achieves a more fair solution for the
interconnected providers since it diminishes the inequity in cost allocation.
3.4 Investigating the Elastic Demand Model
This section expands our studies considering the elastic demand model3 and explores
the role of traffic differentiation in the wholesale and retail markets. In particular, it ex-
amines how beneficial the determination of a transmission initiator is to both customers
and providers. As in the previous section, analytical studies are based on the bargaining
process that is explored using NBS. In order to focus on explicit monetary transfers and
on traffic asymmetry in its simplest way, we examine traffic exchange i) from consumers
3The elastic demand model, where customer demands increase or decrease with market price changes.
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to websites and ii) from websites to consumers. The studies are provided under the
Assumptions 3.1-3.3 and the following
Assumption 3.5. For simplicity, the number of consumers and the number of websites
are normalized to one.
3.4.1 The Economic Model and its Analyses
Demand Structure
We examine a scenario where ISPi has signed an interconnection agreement with ISPj .
Each customer derives utility from sending and receiving traffic. Let qi be an individual
demand, i.e., the traffic volume originated by a particular customer. The marginal utility
of consuming connection services is defined by
u(qi) = (γ − 0.5qi)qi
Given I income, a customer tries to solve the following problem subject to the budget
constraint
max
qi
[u(qi)− piqi] s.t. piqi +m ≤ I (3.20)
where pi is a price for the consumption of connection services and m denotes the con-
sumption of all other goods. By substituting the utility function in (3.20) and solving
the consumer surplus maximization problem, the level of traffic that optimizes the cus-
tomer’s utility is defined by
∂
∂qi
[(γ − 0.5qi)qi − piqi] = γ − qi − pi = 0
which gives
qi(pi) = γ − pi (3.21)
The indirect utility4 of a customer is calculated by substituting (3.21) in the maximiza-
tion problem (3.20) and is given by the following equation
υ(pi) =
(
γ − γ − pi
2
)
(γ − pi)− pi(γ − pi) = (γ − pi)
2
2
(3.22)
Analytical studies are provided using a receiver pays principle [27]. This approach is
taken previously in [36]. Let psi and p
r
i (p˜
s
i and p˜
r
i ) be the network i ’s prices that a
subscribed consumer (a hosted website) pays for sending and receiving a unit of traffic
4The indirect utility function υ(p, y) is the consumer’s maximum utility when the price is p and the
income is y.
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respectively. Hence, the overall net utility derived by a consumer and a website of ISPi
is defined as a function of the costs associated with originating and receiving traffic. It
is calculated as follows
Ui = [u(q
s
i )− psi qsi ] +
[
u(q˜sj )− pri q˜sj
]
(3.23)
U˜i = [u(q˜
s
i )− p˜si q˜si ] +
[
u(qsj )− p˜ri qsj
]
(3.24)
where qsi (q˜
s
i ) is the amount of traffic originated by a consumer (a website) of ISPi.
Since each consumer of the network i initiates qi requests, the total amount of traffic
originated by IPSi is αiqi, where βj proportion goes to ISPj . Analogously, network i ’s
website originates q˜i traffic, and αj proportion of it is terminated in ISPj . As a result,
the amount of native and stranger traffic from ISPi to ISPj is defined by
tnatij = αiβjq
s
i
tstrij = αjβiq˜
s
i
(3.25)
Similarly, qj (q˜j) traffic is generated by each consumer (website) of ISPj , and the pro-
portion βi (αi) is destined for the peered network. Hence, the amount of native and
stranger traffic originating in ISPj and terminating in ISPi is given by
tnatji = αjβiq
s
j
tstrji = αiβj q˜
s
j
(3.26)
Summarizing, the total traffic volumes originated by the providers present the sum of
native and stranger traffic volumes and are calculated as follows
tij = t
nat
ij + t
str
ij
tji = t
nat
ji + t
str
ji
Because a receiver pays principle is considered, qsi and q˜
s
i depend not only on the price
charged by the customer’s provider, but also on the price that the rival network charges
the receiver to terminate traffic. Consequently, at equilibrium between the exchanged
traffic, the amount of traffic originated by a consumer and a website of ISPi and ready to
be accepted in the peered network corresponds to the minimum level of communications
and is given by
qsi = min
{
γ − psi , γ − p˜rj
}
q˜si = min
{
γ − p˜si , γ − prj
} (3.27)
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From (3.27) follows that
if γ − psi − (γ − p˜rj) ≥ 0, psi ≤ p˜rj then qsi = γ − p˜rj
else qsi = γ − psi
if γ − p˜si − (γ − prj) ≥ 0, p˜si ≤ prj then q˜si = γ − prj
else q˜si = γ − p˜si
The results may be summarized in the following way
qsi =
γ − psi if psi ≥ p˜rjγ − p˜rj if psi ≤ p˜rj (3.28)
q˜si =
γ − p˜si if p˜si ≥ prjγ − prj if p˜si ≤ prj (3.29)
Since providers get compensated for utilization of their infrastructures, we assume that
prices for receiving traffic are lower then prices for sending traffic, i.e., psi > p˜
r
j and
p˜si > p
r
j . Figure 3.2 demonstrates the inverse demand functions, which are truncated
compared to the standard one.
qsi                     𝛾-pr̃j    
psi
   
   
   
pr̃j/2
   
   
   
𝛾
   
q̃si                     𝛾-prj    
ps̃i
   
   
   
prj/2
   
   
   
𝛾
   
Figure 3.2: Demand Functions.
3.4.2 Reciprocal Access Charges
We start by examining a market with reciprocal access charges which are set by an
industry regulator and then applied reciprocally. The cost structure is the same as in
the previous section, viz., network i ’s marginal costs of origination and termination are
coi > 0 and c
t
i > 0 respectively, where c
o
i = c
t
i. The providers charge each other the same
access charges a and b for terminating native and stranger traffic respectively, where
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a > b. We follow the assumption made earlier and set the access charge for terminating
native traffic to the lowest termination marginal cost; the access charge for terminating
stranger traffic is defined by b = εa, where 0.5 ≤ ε < 1 (but for simplicity is fixed
ε = 0.5). The marginal (i.e., incremental) costs exhibit increasing returns to scale,
meaning that the incremental costs of network increase as the network size decreases.
For simplicity, fixed network costs are normalized to zero. Also, in this section, the model
ignores on-net traffic since it is focused on explicit monetary transfers between providers.
The incremental profit that ISPi obtains from the interconnection is calculated as follows
Πi = αiβj (p
s
i − coi − a) qsi + αjβi (p˜si − coi − b) q˜si
+ αjβi
(
p˜ri + a− cti
)
qsj + αiβj
(
pri + b− cti
)
q˜sj
(3.30)
where Πi presents the sum of different components: the profit obtained from traffic
originated by the customers of the network, i.e., consumers and websites, and the profit
obtained from incoming traffic which is originated by the other network.
Retail Prices
Consider the case when the providers choose the level of the exchanged traffic in order
to maximize their profits. This demand has to be lower than, or equal to, a certain value
and is given by
max
qsi
Πis.t q
s
i ≤ γ − p˜rj
max
q˜si
Πis.t q˜
s
i ≤ γ − prj
(3.31)
Using the equations (3.28) and (3.29) follows
if qsi = γ − psi then psi = γ − qsi
if q˜si = γ − p˜si then p˜si = γ − q˜si
(3.32)
The first order conditions for the profit maximization after the replacement (3.32) in
(3.30) are given by the following system of equations
∂Πi
∂qsi
=
∂
∂qsi
αiβj(γ − qsi − coi − a)qsi
∂Πi
∂q˜si
=
∂
∂q˜si
αjβi(γ − q˜si − coi − b)q˜si
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which gives the solution of the problem:
(qsi )
∗ =
γ − coi − a
2
(q˜si )
∗ =
γ − coi − b
2
(3.33)
The profit-maximizing prices are calculated as follows
(psi )
∗ =
γ + coi + a
2
(p˜si )
∗ =
γ + coi + b
2
(3.34)
Notice that the prices for originating traffic are increasing functions in costs and access
charges. By substituting (3.34) in (3.28) and (3.29), the optimal prices are given by
psi =

γ+coi+a
2 if
γ+coi+a
2 ≥ p˜rj
p˜rj if
γ+coi+a
2 ≤ p˜rj
(3.35)
p˜si =

γ+coi+b
2 if
γ+coi+b
2 ≥ prj
prj if
γ+coi+b
2 ≤ prj
(3.36)
It is straightforward to show that the first-order conditions, which determine the prices
for terminating traffic, are equal to a perceived marginal cost and are defined as follows
p˜ri = c
t
i − a (3.37)
pri = c
t
i − b (3.38)
Substituting the optimal demands in (3.28), the profit function of ISPi can be rewritten
Πi = αiβj(γ − psi )(psi − coi − a) + αjβi(γ − p˜si )(p˜si − coi − b)
+ αjβi(γ − psj)(p˜ri + a− cti) + αiβj(γ − p˜sj)(pri + b− cti)
The outcome of the network according to the Nash bargaining game (where providers
equally split their payoffs) is defined by
ΠNBS = 0.5(Πi + Πj)
If Πi > Πj , then ISPj receives net interconnection payments from ISPi that is
ΠNBS −Πj = 0.5(Πi −Πj) = 0.5∆σ
+ 0.5
[
αiβj(γ − psi )(psi − coi − a)− αjβi(γ − psj)(psj − coj − a)
]
+ 0.5
[
αjβi(γ − p˜si )(p˜si − coi − b)− αiβj(γ − p˜sj)(p˜sj − coj − b)
] (3.39)
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Replacing the obtained prices in expression (3.39), the net interconnection charge can
be rewritten as follows
0.5(Πi −Πj) = 0.5
[
αiβj
(
γ − coi − a
2
)2
− αjβi
(
γ − coj − a
2
)2]
+ 0.5
[
αjβi
(
γ − coi − b
2
)2
− αiβj
(
γ − coj − b
2
)2] (3.40)
In the DTIA model, the net interconnection payment is considered as two independent
components i) one for a native traffic business, which is denoted by σnatij , and ii) another
for a stranger traffic business that is denoted by σstrij . Then
σnatij = 0.5
[
αiβj
(
γ − coi − a
2
)2
− αjβi
(
γ − coj − a
2
)2]
(3.41)
σstrij = 0.5
[
αjβi
(
γ − coi − b
2
)2
− αiβj
(
γ − coj − b
2
)2]
(3.42)
Analogous to the previous studies, the following analyses explore how the interconnection
payments depend on the differentiated traffic flows considering all available market states
in terms of providers’ sizes (i.e., market shares).
Proposition 3.14. If αi = αj and βi = βj, then net interconnection payments between
providers are zero.
Proof. Given that the networks are symmetric in terms of size, then cti = c
t
j . Considering
the conditions (3.41) and (3.42), it is straightforward to show that σnatij = σ
str
ij = 0.
Proposition 3.15. If αi = αj and βi > βj, then ISPi subsidizes ISPj for stranger
traffic.
Proof. If αi = αj and βi > βj , then c
t
i < c
t
j , αiβj < αjβi and a = c
t
i.
Native: Considering the native traffic business, where (γ − coi − a) > (γ − coj − a), the
condition (3.41) is not straightforward and is given by
σnatij

> 0 if αiβj/αjβi > (γ − coj − a)2/(γ − coi − a)2
= 0 if αiβj/αjβi = (γ − coj − a)2/(γ − coi − a)2
< 0 if αiβj/αjβi < (γ − coj − a)2/(γ − coi − a)2
(3.43)
Stranger: Using (3.42), where (γ− coi − b) > (γ− coj − b), the stranger traffic component
is given by σstrij > 0. In this case, ISPj receives net payments from ISPi.
Proposition 3.16. If αi > αj and βi = βj, then ISPi subsidizes ISPj for native traffic.
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Proof. From the definition follows that cti < c
t
j , αiβj > αjβi, and a = c
t
i.
Native: Considering the condition (3.41), it can be obtained that σnatij > 0. Here, ISPi
gets higher profit than ISPj from native traffic exchange and consequently subsidizes
the peered network.
Stranger: The expression for stranger traffic business (3.42) is not straightforward and
is defined by
σstrij

> 0 if αjβi > αiβj > (γ − coj − b)2/(γ − coi − b)2
= 0 if αjβi > αiβj = (γ − coj − b)2/(γ − coi − b)2
< 0 if αjβi > αiβj < (γ − coj − b)2/(γ − coi − b)2
(γ − coi − b) 6= 0 (3.44)
Assuming that αi > αj and βi > βj , the following cases for the traffic volumes are
obtained from the conditions (3.25) and (3.26): 1) tij > tji, 2) tij < tji, and 3) tij = tji.
The cases 1) and 2) are analogous to those described above. We investigate the case
when the providers’ demands are equal.
Proposition 3.17. If αi > αj, βi > βj, and tij = tji, then αi > βi and βj > αj.
Proof. The result is obtained from the conditions (3.39) and (3.40)
αiβj
(
γ − coi − a
2
)
+ αjβi
(
γ − coi − b
2
)
= αjβi
(
γ − coj − a
2
)
+ αiβj
(
γ − coj − b
2
)
which gives
αiβj
αjβi
=
a− b+ coj − coi
a− b+ coi − coj
Since cti < c
t
j , it can be obtained that (a − b + (coj − coi )) > (a − b − (coj − coi )). Hence,
αiβj > αjβi, which implies that αi > βi and βj > αj .
Proposition 3.18. If αi > αj, βi > βj, and tij = tji, then ISPi subsidizes ISPj for
native traffic.
Proof. From the definition follows that a = cti.
Native: Considering the expression (3.41), it can be obtained that σnatij > 0. Here, under
symmetric traffic volumes, ISPi subsidizes ISPj for native traffic.
Stranger: The component for the stranger traffic business (3.42) is not straightforward
and is defined by (3.44).
Assuming that αi > αj and βi < βj , we investigate the case when providers’ sizes are
symmetric (i.e., cti = c
t
j).
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Proposition 3.19. If αi > αj, βi < βj, and c
t
i = c
t
j, then ISPi (ISPj) subsidizes ISPj
(ISPi) for native (stranger) traffic.
Proof. Symmetry of networks in terms of size implies that βi = αj .
Native: From the condition (3.41) follows that σnatij > 0 and ISPi subsidizes ISPj .
Stranger: Using the expression for the stranger traffic business (3.42), it can be obtained
that σstrij < 0. In this case, ISPi receives net payments from ISPj .
3.4.3 Non-reciprocal Access Charges
This subsection explores how the profits of providers depend on the differentiated traffic
flows considering a market with non-reciprocal access charges. Let ai and bi be network
i ’s access charges for terminating native and stranger traffic respectively, where ai > bi.
To carry out our analysis, we follow the assumptions provided for the studies of the
inelastic demand model in Section 3.3. In particular, the access charge for terminating
native traffic is set to the termination marginal cost, i.e., ai = c
t
i, and for terminating
stranger traffic it is defined by bi = εai (given that 0.5 ≤ ε < 1). To simplify analyses
we fix ε = 0.5. The incremental profit of ISPi obtained from the interconnection is
Πi = αiβj(p
s
i − coi − aj)qsi + αjβi(p˜si − coi − bj)q˜si
+ αjβi(p˜
r
i + ai − cti)qsj + αiβj(pri + bi − cti)q˜sj
Retail Prices
Similar to the studies provided for the symmetric access charges, the first-order condi-
tions for profit maximization gives the following system of equations
psi =

γ+coi+aj
2 if
γ+coi+aj
2 ≥ p˜rj
p˜rj if
γ+coi+aj
2 ≤ p˜rj
(3.45)
p˜si =

γ+coi+bj
2 if
γ+coi+bj
2 ≥ prj
prj if
γ+coi+bj
2 ≤ prj
(3.46)
The retail prices for terminating traffic are equal to the perceived marginal costs, and
therefore, are defined as follows
p˜ri = c
t
i − ai (3.47)
pri = c
t
i − bi (3.48)
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Following the definition that an individual demand of each consumer (website) of network
i is qsi (q˜
s
i ), the total traffic initiated by the particular type of customers of IPSi is αiq
s
i
and βiq˜
s
i . The βj(αj) proportion of the traffic originated by a consumer (a website) of
ISPi goes to ISPj . Hence, using the optimal demand function, the amount of native and
stranger traffic from ISPi to ISPj is defined by
tnatij = αiβj
(
γ − coi − aj
2
)
tstrij = αjβi
(
γ − coi − bj
2
) (3.49)
Similarly, αjq
s
j (βj q˜
s
j ) traffic is generated by the consumers (websites) of ISPj , and
consequently, a proportion βi (αi) is terminated in the peered network. The amount of
differentiated traffic flowing from ISPj to ISPi can be written as follows
tnatji = αjβi
(
γ − coj − ai
2
)
tstrji = αiβj
(
γ − coj − bi
2
) (3.50)
If network j’ s actual outcome is less than an outcome according to NBS, meaning that
Πi > Πj , then the net interconnection payment from ISPi to ISPj is calculated as follows
ΠNBS −Πj = 0.5 (Πi −Πj)
+ 0.5
[
αiβj(γ − psi )(psi − coi − aj)− αjβi(γ − psj)(psj − coj − ai)
]
+ 0.5
[
αjβi(γ − p˜si )(p˜si − coi − bj)− αiβj(γ − p˜sj)(p˜sj − coi − bi)
]
Replacing the profit maximizing prices, the equation above can be rewritten as follows
0.5(Πi −Πj) = 0.5
[
αiβj
(
γ − coi − aj
2
)2
− αjβi
(
γ − coj − ai
2
)2]
+ 0.5
[
αjβi
(
γ − coi − bj
2
)2
− αiβj
(
γ − coj − bi
2
)2] (3.51)
The net payment consists of profits obtained from the exchange of the differentiated
traffic flows. The expression for net interconnection charges is considered as two inde-
pendent parameters for native and stranger traffic flows, that is
σnatij = 0.5
[
αiβj
(
γ − coi − aj
2
)2
− αjβi
(
γ − coj − ai
2
)2]
(3.52)
σstrij = 0.5
[
αjβi
(
γ − coi − bj
2
)2
− αiβj
(
γ − coj − bi
2
)2]
(3.53)
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We now investigate the impact of the transmission initiator on net transfers and provide
analytical studies.
Proposition 3.20. If αi = αj and βi = βj, then net interconnection payments between
providers are zero.
Proof. Given that providers are symmetric in terms of size, then cti = c
t
j , and access
charges for native and stranger traffic flows are equal. From the conditions (3.52) and
(3.53), it can be obtained that σnatij = σ
str
ij = 0.
Proposition 3.21. If αi = αj and βi > βj, then ISPi (ISPj) subsidizes ISPj (ISPi) for
stranger (native) traffic.
Proof. From the definition follows that cti < c
t
j and αiβj < αjβi.
Native: Considering the condition (3.52), where (γ − coi − aj) = (γ − coj − ai) it follows
that σnatij < 0. Here, ISPj subsidizes ISPi for native traffic.
Stranger: Given that (γ − coi − bj) > (γ − coj − bi) and the business for stranger traffic
(3.53), we obtain that σstrij > 0. Thus, ISPj receives payments from ISPi.
Proposition 3.22. If βi = βj and αi > αj, then ISPi subsidizes ISPj for native traffic.
Proof. Given that βi = βj and αi > αj , then c
t
i < c
t
j and αiβj > αjβi.
Native: From the condition (3.52) follows that σnatij > 0. This implies that ISPi subsi-
dizes ISPj for native traffic.
Stranger: Considering the business for stranger traffic, the component (3.53) is not
straightforward and is defined by
σstrij

> 0 if αjβi/αiβj > (γ − coj − bi)2/(γ − coi − bj)2
= 0 if αjβi/αiβj = (γ − coj − bi)2/(γ − coi − bj)2
< 0 if αjβi/αiβj < (γ − coj − bi)2/(γ − coi − bj)2
(γ − coi − bj) 6= 0 (3.54)
When αi > αj and βi > βj , we examine the case of the symmetric demands because the
cases such as tij > tji and tij < tji are similar to those considered above.
Proposition 3.23. If αi > αj, βi > βj, and tij = tji, then αi > βi and βj > αj.
Proof. The result is obtained from the conditions (3.49) and (3.50)
αiβj
(
γ − coi − aj
2
)
+ αjβi
(
γ − coi − bj
2
)
= αjβi
(
γ − coj − ai
2
)
+ αiβj
(
γ − coj − bi
2
)
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which gives
αiβj
αjβi
=
coj − bj
coi − bi
Given that (coj − bj) > (coi − bi), it can be easily obtained that αiβj > αjβi. This gives
αi > βi and βj > αj .
Proposition 3.24. If αi > αj, βi > βj, and tij = tji, then ISPi subsidizes ISPj for
native traffic.
Proof. From the definition follows that cti < c
t
j .
Native: Considering the native traffic business component (3.52) and result of the Propo-
sition (3.23) that is
αiβj
αjβi
> 1, it can be obtained that σnatij > 0. This implies that ISPj
is subsidized by ISPi.
Stranger: The component (3.53) is not straightforward and is defined by (3.54).
Allowing that αi > αj and βi < βj , three cases for the termination costs were obtained.
However, we investigate the case when providers’ sizes are symmetric (i.e., cti = c
t
j),
because the other forms are similar to those examined above.
Proposition 3.25. If αi > αj, βi < βj, and c
t
i = c
t
j, then ISPi (ISPj) subsidizes ISPj
(ISPi) for native (stranger) traffic.
Proof. Symmetry of networks in terms of size implies that βi = αj .
Native: Considering the native traffic component (3.52), it can be obtained that σnatij >
0, and therefore, ISPi subsidizes ISPj .
Stranger: From the condition (3.53) follows that σstrij < 0. In this case, ISPi receives
net payments from ISPj .
3.4.4 Discussion
The summary of the analytical studies considering markets with reciprocal and non-
reciprocal access rates are presented in Tables 3.5-3.9 and Figures 3.3-3.4. The out-
comes of the presented models, which show the dependency of the net interconnection
payments on the market shares, are presented in Table 3.5. Tables 3.6 and 3.8 report the
comparison of the classical model, which performs cost compensation based on the net
traffic flows and DTIA in terms of the demand and the NBS outcomes. Tables 3.7 and
3.9 compare retail revenues obtained from the customers, and providers’ incremental
profits (i.e., obtained from the interconnection). The comparison of providers’ outcomes
is illustrated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.
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Case α β ct Reciprocal ACs Non-reciprocal ACs
σnat σstr σnat σstr
I αi = αj βi = βj c
t
i = c
t
j σ
nat
ij = 0 σ
str
ij = 0 σ
nat
ij = 0 σ
str
ij = 0
II αi = αj βi > βj c
t
i < c
t
j eq. (3.43) σ
str
ij > 0 σ
nat
ij < 0 σ
str
ij > 0
III αi > αj βi = βj c
t
i < c
t
j σ
nat
ij > 0 eq. (3.44) σ
nat
ij > 0 eq. (3.54)
IV αi > αj βi > βj c
t
i < c
t
j σ
nat
ij > 0 eq. (3.44) σ
nat
ij > 0 eq. (3.54)
if tij = tji (αi > βi)
V αi > αj βi < βj if c
t
i = c
t
j σ
nat
ij > 0 σ
str
ij < 0 σ
nat
ij > 0 σ
str
ij < 0
(αj = βi)
Table 3.5: Interconnection Payments of the DTIA Model with Elastic Demand.
Case αi βi tij tji Π
NBS ∆σ/2
DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF
I 0.5 0.5 2.06 2.00 2.06 2.00 8.52 8.00 0.00 0.00
II 0.5 0.9 2.11 2.00 1.89 1.88 8.03 7.52 0.90 0.48
0.5 0.8 2.10 2.00 1.90 1.88 8.03 7.52 0.80 0.48
0.5 0.7 2.09 2.00 1.91 1.88 8.02 7.52 0.70 0.48
0.5 0.6 2.08 2.00 1.93 1.88 8.02 7.52 0.60 0.48
III 0.9 0.5 2.01 2.00 1.99 1.88 8.00 7.52 0.10 0.48
0.8 0.5 2.03 2.00 1.98 1.88 8.01 7.52 0.20 0.48
0.7 0.5 2.04 2.00 1.96 1.88 8.01 7.52 0.30 0.48
0.6 0.5 2.05 2.00 1.95 1.88 8.01 7.52 0.40 0.48
IV 0.9 0.8 1.06 1.04 1.02 0.98 4.17 3.91 0.16 0.25
αi > βi 0.8 0.7 1.56 1.52 1.49 1.43 6.09 5.71 0.28 0.37
0.75 0.65 1.74 1.70 1.66 1.59 6.81 6.39 0.33 0.41
0.7 0.6 1.89 1.84 1.80 1.73 7.37 6.91 0.36 0.45
V 0.9 0.1 3.28 3.28 3.48 3.28 13.97 13.12 -0.83 0.00
αj = βi 0.8 0.2 2.73 2.72 2.88 2.72 11.58 10.88 -0.62 0.00
0.7 0.3 2.34 2.32 2.44 2.32 9.88 9.28 -0.41 0.00
0.6 0.4 2.12 2.08 2.17 2.08 8.86 8.32 -0.21 0.00
Table 3.6: Comparison of the DTIA and Classical Model (TF) in Terms of Demand
and NBS Outcomes (Reciprocal ACs).
Retail revenues that ISPi receives from the subscribed consumers and websites present
the sum of payments for sending and receiving traffic. They are defined as follows
pii(p
s
i , p
r
i ) = t
nat
ij p
s
i + t
str
ji p
r
i (3.55)
p˜ii(p˜
s
i , p˜
r
i ) = t
str
ij p˜
s
i + t
nat
ji p˜
r
i (3.56)
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pii(p
s
i , p
r
i ) p˜ii(p˜
s
i , p˜
r
i ) Πi pij(p
s
j , p
r
j) p˜ij(p˜
s
j , p˜
r
j) Πj
DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF
I 6.53 6.00 6.11 6.00 8.52 8.00 6.53 6.00 6.11 6.00 8.52 8.00
II 1.30 1.20 11.00 10.80 8.93 8.00 12.46 11.45 1.30 1.27 7.13 7.03
2.60 2.40 9.78 9.60 8.83 8.00 11.08 10.18 2.60 2.54 7.23 7.03
3.90 3.60 8.55 8.40 8.72 8.00 9.69 8.90 3.90 3.82 7.32 7.03
5.20 4.80 7.33 7.20 8.62 8.00 8.31 7.63 5.20 5.09 7.42 7.03
III 11.70 10.80 1.22 1.20 8.10 8.00 1.38 1.27 11.70 11.45 7.90 7.03
10.40 9.60 2.44 2.40 8.21 8.00 2.77 2.54 10.40 10.18 7.81 7.03
9.10 8.40 3.67 3.60 8.31 8.00 4.15 3.82 9.10 8.90 7.71 7.03
7.80 7.20 4.89 4.80 8.41 8.00 5.54 5.09 7.80 7.63 7.61 7.03
IV 4.68 4.32 1.96 1.92 4.33 4.16 2.22 2.04 4.68 4.58 4.01 3.66
6.24 5.76 3.42 3.36 6.37 6.08 3.88 3.56 6.24 6.11 5.81 5.34
6.83 6.30 3.97 3.90 7.14 6.80 4.50 4.13 6.83 6.68 6.49 5.98
7.28 6.72 4.40 4.32 7.73 7.36 4.98 4.58 7.28 7.12 7.01 6.47
V 21.16 19.44 0.24 0.24 13.14 13.12 0.26 0.24 19.79 19.44 14.79 13.12
16.72 15.36 0.98 0.96 10.96 10.88 1.05 0.96 15.64 15.36 12.20 10.88
12.80 11.76 2.20 2.16 9.47 9.28 2.35 2.16 11.97 11.76 10.29 9.28
9.41 8.64 3.91 3.84 8.65 8.32 4.18 3.84 8.80 8.64 9.06 8.32
Table 3.7: Profit Comparison of the Agreements Based on the Net Traffic Flow and
DT Flows Compensations (Reciprocal ACs).
Case αi βi tij tji Π
NBS ∆σ/2
DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF
I 0.5 0.5 2.06 2.00 2.06 2.00 8.52 8.00 0.00 0.00
II 0.5 0.9 2.04 1.88 1.89 1.88 7.74 7.03 0.76 0.00
0.5 0.8 2.03 1.88 1.90 1.88 7.72 7.03 0.64 0.00
0.5 0.7 2.01 1.88 1.91 1.88 7.69 7.03 0.53 0.00
0.5 0.6 1.99 1.88 1.93 1.88 7.67 7.03 0.42 0.00
III 0.9 0.5 1.89 1.88 1.99 1.88 7.54 7.03 -0.14 0.00
0.8 0.5 1.91 1.88 1.98 1.88 7.57 7.03 -0.03 0.00
0.7 0.5 1.93 1.88 1.96 1.88 7.59 7.03 0.09 0.00
0.6 0.5 1.95 1.88 1.95 1.88 7.62 7.03 0.20 0.00
IV 0.9 0.8 1.01 0.98 1.02 0.98 3.95 3.66 0.05 0.00
αi > βi 0.8 0.7 1.48 1.43 1.49 1.43 5.78 5.34 0.12 0.00
0.75 0.65 1.65 1.59 1.66 1.59 6.47 5.98 0.15 0.00
0.7 0.6 1.79 1.73 1.80 1.73 7.01 6.47 0.17 0.00
V 0.9 0.1 3.28 3.28 3.48 3.28 13.97 13.12 -0.83 0.00
αj = βi 0.8 0.2 2.73 2.72 2.88 2.72 11.58 10.88 -0.62 0.00
0.7 0.3 2.34 2.32 2.44 2.32 9.88 9.28 -0.41 0.00
0.6 0.4 2.12 2.08 2.17 2.08 8.86 8.32 -0.21 0.00
Table 3.8: Comparison of the DTIA and Classical Model (TF) in Terms of Demand
and NBS Outcomes (Non-reciprocal ACs).
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pii(p
s
i , p
r
i ) p˜ii(p˜
s
i , p˜
r
i ) Πi pij(p
s
j , p
r
j) p˜ij(p˜
s
j , p˜
r
j) Πj
DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF
I 6.53 6.00 6.11 6.00 8.52 8.00 6.53 6.00 6.11 6.00 8.52 8.00
II 1.27 1.17 10.91 10.55 8.36 7.03 11.94 10.55 1.20 1.17 7.13 7.03
2.54 2.34 9.69 9.38 8.21 7.03 10.61 9.38 2.40 2.34 7.23 7.03
3.82 3.52 8.48 8.20 8.06 7.03 9.29 8.20 3.60 3.52 7.32 7.03
5.09 4.69 7.27 7.03 7.92 7.03 7.96 7.03 4.80 4.69 7.42 7.03
III 11.45 10.55 1.21 1.17 7.18 7.03 1.33 1.17 10.80 10.55 7.90 7.03
10.18 9.38 2.42 2.34 7.33 7.03 2.65 2.34 9.60 9.38 7.81 7.03
8.90 8.20 3.64 3.52 7.47 7.03 3.98 3.52 8.40 8.20 7.71 7.03
7.63 7.03 4.85 4.69 7.62 7.03 5.31 4.69 7.20 7.03 7.61 7.03
IV 4.58 4.22 1.94 1.88 3.89 3.66 2.12 1.88 4.32 4.22 4.01 3.66
6.11 5.63 3.39 3.28 5.76 5.34 3.71 3.28 5.76 5.63 5.81 5.34
6.68 6.15 3.94 3.81 6.46 5.98 4.31 3.81 6.30 6.15 6.49 5.98
7.12 6.56 4.36 4.22 7.00 6.47 4.78 4.22 6.72 6.56 7.01 6.47
V 21.16 19.44 0.24 0.24 13.14 13.12 0.26 0.24 19.79 19.44 14.79 13.12
16.72 15.36 0.98 0.96 10.96 10.88 1.05 0.96 15.64 15.36 12.20 10.88
12.80 11.76 2.20 2.16 9.47 9.28 2.35 2.16 11.97 11.76 10.29 9.28
9.41 8.64 3.91 3.84 8.65 8.32 4.18 3.84 8.80 8.64 9.06 8.32
Table 3.9: Profit Comparison of the Agreements Based on the Net Traffic Flow and
DT Flows Compensations (Non-reciprocal ACs).
In the classical model with symmetric access charges, provider i’ s retail prices that
maximize profit are given by
psi = p˜
s
i =
γ + coi + a
2
pri = p˜
r
i = c
t
i − a
and with asymmetric access rates are defined by
psi = p˜
s
i =
γ + coi + aj
2
pri = p˜
r
i = c
t
i − ai
In order to enable us to calculate specific outcomes, the following values of termination
costs were imposed i) cti = c
t
j = 1 in cases I and V, ii) c
t
i = 1, c
t
j = 1.5 in all other
cases. The demand is given by qi(pi) = 10 − pi. It is important to note that, even
though the parameters are chosen arbitrarily, our conclusions do not depend on the
chosen parameter values (see Table 3.5).
The results obtained from analytical studies indicated that the traffic differentiation
approach performed better (in terms of demand and profits) than the classical solution
for both models with symmetric and asymmetric access charges. From the comparison
between the DTIA model and the agreement based on the net traffic flow compensation
follows that the demand (the amount of traffic originated by the providers) is increased.
Specifically, DTIA leads to the increase of the traffic volume originated in one network
and ready to be terminated in the peered network. Because the receiver pays principle
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of Providers’ Outcomes (Reciprocal Access Charges).
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of Providers’ Outcomes (Non-reciprocal Access Charges).
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was considered, the traffic level originated by any customer depends also on another
party which is accepting incoming traffic. This traffic level corresponds to the minimum
level that one would like to originate and another would like to accept. In the proposed
agreement, the prices obtained for stranger traffic are lower than these prices in the clas-
sical model. This is due to the main concept of our strategy, where providers distinguish
traffic and compensate the cost for carrying stranger traffic partially. From economics, it
is known that the relationship between price and demand is an inverse relationship. This
means that a decrease in prices leads to an increase in demand. Obviously, revenues of
providers are also increased. More specifically, retail revenues obtained from consumers
and websites are higher in DTIA than in the classical model. Finally, the determination
of the original initiator of a transmission induces providers to receive higher profits and
increases providers’ outcomes according to NBS.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter presented a new inter-provider cost distribution model, called Differentiated
Traffic-based Interconnection Agreement (DTIA), considering private peering arrange-
ments. The key idea behind the approach is the determination of the original initiator
of a transmission by distinguishing traffic into two types, called native and stranger. In
comparison to the existing financial settlement arrangements under which the intercon-
nection payments are based on the net traffic flow, the described model compensates the
costs of carrying traffic according to the differentiated traffic flows. More specifically,
each provider fully compensates the termination costs incurred from delivering native
traffic, which is originally initiated by its own customers, and partially the termination
costs incurred from carrying stranger traffic that is originally initiated by the customers
of the peered network. The proposed model shares the total interconnection costs be-
tween the providers and does not impose any constraints on retail pricing schemes.
A critical challenge in DTIA is determining the original initiator of a transmission in the
packet-switched networks. In this work, we have tackled this challenge by marking the
information about the transmission initiator in the IP packet header, and have proposed
a traffic differentiation mechanism. The main advantage of the presented mechanism is
its simplicity that is significant in the Internet. In particular, the provider does not have
to maintain a complex identification process of the transmission initiator and to inspect
the IP header of packets in order to determine and record all subsequent packets of the
transmission. Instead, the defined membership label (ML) allows accounting the volume
of the appropriate traffic type and therefore leads to low computational complexity.
Chapter 3. The DTIA Model for Private Peering Arrangements 62
In order to evaluate the impact of the determination of a transmission initiator on the
wholesale and retail markets, we have formulated economic models and analyzed their
behaviors. The results indicated that DTIA provides better outcomes than the classical
model for both customers and providers. The analyses deal with all available market
states in terms of providers market shares.
The following conclusions can be made from the analytical studies, which investigated
the inelastic demand model (see Tables 3.1-3.4). They demonstrated that the symme-
try of the costs is not a required prerequisite for peering, and asymmetric providers can
arrange the interconnection without monetary transfers. Further, in contrast to the com-
pensation based on the net traffic flow, the determination of the transmission initiator
yields more fair outcomes for all parties. And finally, the proposed model outperforms
the classical model in terms of the net interconnection payments which are relatively
small. This is achieved mainly by the decrease in deviation of the DTIA outcomes from
the NBS outcomes. Specifically, our outcomes deviate less from a fair solution than
the outcomes of the classical model. Hence, DTIA provides a more fair solution for
interconnected providers.
The studies that explored traffic differentiation-based approach considering the elastic
demand model concluded that the total demand (the total traffic volume originated by
a particular provider) is higher in the proposed scheme than in the classical model (see
Tables 3.5-3.9, Figures 3.3-3.4). As a consequence of the demand growth, the retail
revenues obtained by the providers are also increased. And finally, the obtained results
showed that, in contrast to the net traffic flow based compensation, the consideration of
the initiator of a transmission enables providers to obtain greater profits. As a conclu-
sion, the proposed model outperforms the classical model in terms of the profits which
are remarkably high.
Chapter 4
Differentiated Traffic-based
Interconnection Agreement for
Transit Arrangements
“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.”
Albert Einstein
The objective of this section is to extend the DTIA model and its traffic management
mechanism for transit arrangements. Section 4.1 presents the traffic differentiation mech-
anism that satisfies the scalability criterion. It describes the defined functionalities to
support traffic differentiation. In order to evaluate the proposed approach, Sections 4.2
to 4.4 present economic models and their analytical studies. More specifically, Section 4.2
explores the effect of traffic differentiation on the payments of customer providers. Fol-
lowing that, Section 4.3 investigates how attractive the DTIA model is to the providers
of different layers. And finally, Section 4.4 aims to analyze economic efficiency of the
market that improves social welfare. The conclusions are reported in Section 4.5.
4.1 Traffic Management Mechanism
In the following we propose the traffic management mechanism for interconnection ar-
rangements, which allows recognizing the packet type throughout the network. Unlike
the mechanism presented in Chapter 3 which considered only two providers, this mecha-
nism examines transit arrangements and therefore, must be scalable. The key aspect of
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the proposed mechanism is the identification the type of traffic based on a two-bit field
in the IP packet header, referred to as the Membership Label (ML).
Packet Marking by a Transmission Initiator
We assume that all nodes within the network support packet marking, where each node
sets the first bit of the ML field of a native packet to ’1’ and a packet of stranger traffic
to ’0’. The assignment of the first bit of the label to ’1’ is done once when a node
originally initiates a transmission.
A consumer can request a webpage either from a subscribed network or from another
network. This implies that a transmission endpoint, such as the destination can belong
to the same network as the transmission initiator or to another network. Hence, a packet
that appears in the network can be originated either by a local transmission endpoint or
by an endpoint located in another network. We distinguish the location of a transmission
endpoint (i.e., the originator and the terminator) with respect to the network where the
packet appears.
The second bit of the label set to ’1’ indicates that an endpoint is local, and ’0’ shows
that it is located in another network. The assignment of the second bit of ML to ’1’
is done once, when an endpoint of a transmission originates a packet. Obviously, an
original initiator of a transmission sets the ML field to ’11’. Table 4.1 presents the
description of the four available values of the label, which will be discussed later in this
section.
Outgoing Packet Re-marking
It is obvious that native traffic with regard to one network is stranger with regard to
the other. Hence, it is necessary to differentiate the traffic exchanged between networks.
In order to achieve that we distinguish the provider’s border nodes which are trust
boundaries and maintain a connection with an adjacent network, and refer to them
as the Provider-to-Provider Border (PPB) nodes. For calculating the first bit of the
membership label of outgoing traffic, a PPB node performs the XOR logical operation
on both bits of the ML label. Obviously, the PPB nodes set the second bit to ’0’.
Even though packets within a domain can be marked by any available value of ML,
interdomain traffic can take on only ’00’ or ’10’ values of the label (i.e., stranger or
native traffic originated by a transmission endpoint located in any network).
In addition, in order to carry out intercarrier compensation based on the differentiated
traffic (DT) flows, each PPB node keeps two counters (one for inbound and another
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one for outbound traffic) which calculate the volume of a particular type of traffic, i.e.,
native or stranger with regard to its network. The volume of the other type of traffic,
e.g., native (stranger) can be easily determined by subtracting the volume of stranger
(native) traffic from the total count. Table 4.2(a) demonstrates the logic of the PPB
nodes for outgoing packet re-marking and for counting outgoing native traffic.
Values of ML Description
00 Stranger packet, originated by an endpoint located in another network
01 Stranger packet, originated by a local endpoint
10 Native packet, originated by an endpoint located in another network
11 Native packet, originated by a local endpoint
Table 4.1: Available Values of the Membership Label Field.
(a) Outgoing Packet Re-marking and Counting.
Input Output Counter
00 00 NOP
01 10 NOP
10 10 NOP
11 00 Counter1a++
(b) Incoming Packet Re-marking and Counting.
Input Output(Counter)
If IP destination
address is local
Otherwise
00 01 (NOP) 00 (NOP)
10 11 (Counter2b++) 10 (NOP)
a Counter1 shows the current value of the counter for outgoing native traffic.
b Counter2 shows the current value of the counter for incoming native traffic.
Table 4.2: Packet Re-marking and Counting.
Incoming Packet Re-marking
As mentioned before, a website requested by a consumer can be hosted either by the
local network or by another network. As a result, traffic originated by an endpoint of a
transmission, can be part of a transmission originally initiated either by the network’s
customer or by the customer of another network. Therefore, the identification of the type
of traffic (i.e., native or stranger) originated by the transmission endpoint is necessary.
For incoming traffic that is destined to the network (i.e., the IP destination address is
local), the PPB nodes perform the NOT logical operation on the second bit of the label
and do not change the first bit.
The transmission endpoint does not re-examine the label. It sends response packets with
the same ML field (i.e., the values ’01’ or ’11’ are copied from the request packet). It
is obvious that incoming network traffic with the first bit set to ’1’ and destined to the
Chapter 4. The DTIA Model for Transit Arrangements 66
network is part of a transmission initiated by its own customers. Table 4.2(b) shows
the logic of the PPB nodes for incoming traffic and for counting incoming native traffic.
An example that helps to understand how the described traffic management mechanism
works is described below.
Example
As an example, consider a model consisting of ISPi, ISPj and their customers as well as
the transit network ISPk, where each provider calculates the volumes of native traffic.
Assume that a customer of ISPi requests data available on ISPj . Let N1 be the PPB
node of ISPi, which receives a packet marked by ’11’. Before forwarding it to ISPk,
N1 performs the XOR operation on the ML field of the outgoing packet (i.e., sets the
label to ’00’ ), and increases the counter for outgoing native traffic. The PPB node N2
of ISPk reads the IP destination address, however does not re-mark the label (since
the packet is not destined to its network), and then forwards the packet to PPB node
N3, which maintains connectivity with ISPj . N3 node performs the XOR operation on
the outgoing packet label (as a result, the ML value remains the same, i.e., ’00’ ) and
forwards it to PPB node N4 of ISPj . N4 node reads the destination IP address, and
since the packet is destined for its network, applies the NOT operation on the second
bit of the label of the incoming packet (i.e., sets ML to ’01’ ) and forwards it to the
destination, e.g. the N5 node (see Figure 4.1(a)). After receiving the packet, N5 sends
a packet stream with the requested data, where the label remains the same (’01’ i.e.,
stranger traffic, which is originated locally). The similar procedure follows on the inverse
path with only one difference that ISPi considers the incoming traffic as native, initiated
by its own customers. The principle of traffic management mechanism is illustrated in
Figure 4.1.
4.1.1 Incentive Compatibility
Although it is out of scope of this thesis to address security issues, this section briefly
discusses the desirable property of our mechanism that is incentive compatibility. This
implies that strategic agents have no incentive to lie or cheat, i.e., perform untruthful
packet marking. In the DTIA model, customers have no incentive to cheat if retail
prices for differentiated traffic types, such as native and stranger, are equal to each
other. We believe that setting different retail prices for each type of traffic is unlikely
since it does not effect the quality of service. Moreover, it was shown that customers do
not want to be faced with varying prices, which may be difficult to understand [19]. On
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(a) Outgoing Packet Re-marking
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(b) Incoming Packet Re-marking
Figure 4.1: Principle of Traffic Differentiation Mechanism.
the other hand, providers in DTIA indeed have an incentive to mark only native packets
as stranger in order to reduce the payments.
Unlike the proposed traffic management mechanism, which operates on the network
layer of the Open System Interconnection (OSI) model, the proposed security mecha-
nism operates on an upper layer, i.e., the transport layer. It is known that most of the
applications run under the TCP or the UDP transport protocols. First, we consider
applications running under TCP that is connection-oriented and provide a possible so-
lution. We continue the example above where a customer of ISPi request data available
at ISPj . TCP sockets in a listening state are waiting for a connection request from any
remote client. In the first step to establish a TCP connection, a client (i.e., a customer
of ISPi) sends a TCP packet with the SYN flag set to a server (i.e., a customer of ISPj).
At this stage the server receiving the packet tries to establish a connection for the new
client. We allow that the TCP pseudo-header (that contains information from the IP
header and verifies that a packet has reached the correct destination) also includes the
ML information. Before replying to the client, the server checks the IP source address
and the ML field. If the source address is not local and the first bit of the ML field is set
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to ’1’ the server simply does not reply. Hence, the client charged by the transit ISP for
the request packet, which is marked untruthfully, will not receive a response. Financial
loss creates no incentive to cheat. Figure 4.2 outlines the pseudocode of the incentive
compatibility mechanism for TCP.
The UDP transport protocol is connectionless, therefore sockets have no states. After
receiving a packet, the UDP server (ISPj) also checks the IP source address and the
first bit of the ML field. Now, if the source address is not local and the packet is
marked as native, this implies that it is the server, i.e., N5 node of ISPj which originally
initiated this traffic and received a response. Allowing that a node keeps the destination
addresses of the initiated transmissions, it can be extracted whether a received packet
is native. If a server detects that a packet is marked untruthful, it simply drops it and
does not reply. Economically, this creates no incentive to lie or cheat in packet marking.
Figure 4.3 outlines the pseudocode of the incentive compatibility mechanism for UDP,
where Initiated = FALSE indicates that the UDP server has not originally initiated a
particular transmission.
if (IP src 6= local and ML = 11) then
drop packet
else
send SYN/ACK
end if
Figure 4.2: Pseudocode of Incentive Compatibility Mechanism for TCP.
if (IP src 6= local and Initiated = FALSE and ML = 11) then
drop packet
else
reply
end if
Figure 4.3: Pseudocode of Incentive Compatibility Mechanism for UDP.
4.1.2 Incorporating the ML Label into the IP Header
Incorporation of the defined label in the IP packet header is a matter of finding unused
or reserved bits in the header while remaining compatible with the current standards
and protocols. To achieve this goal, we propose to use the first two bits of the flags field
in the IPv4 header, which implement fragmentation. More specifically, the first bit is
reserved and must be zero; the second bit is Don’t Fragment (DF). The fragmentation
can be avoided if a sender knows the Maximum Transfer Unit (MTU) size of a path to
the destination and sends packets whose size is less than the MTU size. In this case the
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DF bit can be set to arbitrary value. In the IPv6 header there are more available bits
than required to encode the ML field.
4.2 Exploring Payments of Customer Providers
This section extends the analytical studies provided in Chapter 3 and examines tran-
sit models. In particular, it explores the role of the DTIA model on net payments of
customer providers interconnected trough the transit provider. The studies consider
both unilateral (where a customer ISP pays to a transit ISP for sent and received traf-
fic) and bilateral (where the payments are based on the net flow of traffic) settlement
arrangements.
4.2.1 The Economic Model and its Analyses
We follow the assumption made in the previous chapter in order to capture traffic asym-
metry and therefore, consider two types of customers, such as consumers and websites.
To capture explicit net transfers between providers in its simplest way, traffic exchange
from consumers to websites and from websites to consumers is examined. The studies
are provided under the Assumptions 3.2 - 3.4 and the following one:
Assumption 4.1. Let αi ∈ (0, 1) be network i’s market share for consumers and βi ∈
(0, 1) its market share for websites. The market consists of only one transit provider
and two customer providers, i and j, where i 6= j = 1, 2 and αi + αj = 1, βi + βj = 1.
We examine a scenario in which ISPi and ISPj exchange traffic through the transit
provider ISPk. The amount of the differentiated traffic originating from ISPi with des-
tination to ISPj is given by
tnatik = αiβjNM
tstrik = αjβiNMx
(4.1)
where tnatik denotes the amount of outgoing native traffic (exchanged from consumers
to websites) and tstrik is the amount of stranger traffic (exchanged from websites to
consumers) with respect to ISPi. The variable x denotes the average amount of traffic
requested from a website. Similarly, the differentiated traffic volumes originated by ISPj
and destined to ISPi are calculated as
tnatjk = αjβiNM
tstrjk = αiβjNMx
(4.2)
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Here, tnatjk represents the outgoing native traffic and t
str
jk represents the outgoing stranger
traffic with respect to ISPj . The total amount of traffic originated by ISPi and ISPj is
tik = t
nat
ik + t
str
ik (4.3)
tjk = t
nat
jk + t
str
jk (4.4)
4.2.2 Unilateral Settlement Arrangements
We start by examining unilateral settlement models, in which the transit provider
charges the customer providers for every unit of traffic sent and received. Let ak and
bk be access fees that ISPk charges customer ISPs for the unit of native and stranger
traffic respectively, where ak > bk (since the providers compensate partially the costs
of carrying stranger traffic). The access charge for the stranger traffic is set bk = εak,
where 0.5 ≤ ε < 1. To simplify our analysis, we set ε = 0.5. The interconnection
payments of ISPi and ISPj to the transit provider are given by
fik = ak(t
nat
ik + t
str
jk ) + bk(t
str
ik + t
nat
jk ) (4.5)
fjk = ak(t
nat
jk + t
str
ik ) + bk(t
str
jk + t
nat
ik ) (4.6)
The sum of these payments represents the incremental revenue of the transit provider
obtained from the interconnection, that is
pik = fik + fjk
In the DTIA model the interconnection payments of ISPi and ISPj are interpreted as
two independent components i) one for a native traffic business, and ii) another for a
stranger traffic business. These differentiated payments are calculated as follows
fnati = ak(t
nat
ik + t
str
jk ) f
nat
j = ak(t
nat
jk + t
str
ik ) (4.7)
fstri = bk(t
str
ik + t
nat
jk ) f
str
j = bk(t
str
jk + t
nat
ik ) (4.8)
The following analyses explore how the interconnection payments of the customer providers
depend on the determination of a transmission initiator. Analogous to the previous stud-
ies, five available market states in terms of relative provider sizes (i.e., market shares)
are considered.
Proposition 4.1. If αi = αj and βi = βj, then the interconnection charges of customer
providers are the same.
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Proof. From the conditions (4.1) and (4.2) follows that (tnatik + t
str
jk ) = (t
str
ik + t
nat
jk ).
As a result, using (4.5)-(4.8), it can be obtained that fnati = f
nat
j , f
str
i = f
str
j and
fik = fjk.
Proposition 4.2. If αi = αj and βi > βj, then the payments of ISPi are less than the
payments of ISPj.
Proof. Observing the conditions (4.1) and (4.2), it can be obtained that (tnatik + t
str
jk ) <
(tstrik + t
nat
jk ). Therefore, from (4.7) and (4.8) we get that f
nat
i < f
nat
j and f
str
i > f
str
j .
Subtracting expression (4.5) from (4.6) gives that fik < fjk.
Proposition 4.3. If αi > αj and βi = βj, then the payments of ISPi are higher than
the payments of ISPj.
Proof. From the conditions (4.1)and (4.2) follows that (tnatik + t
str
jk ) > (t
str
ik + t
nat
jk ), which
gives fnati > f
nat
j , f
str
i < f
str
j . Using 4.5 and 4.6 we obtain that fik > fjk.
Similar to the previous studies, when αi > αj and βi > βj , the following cases for
the traffic volumes are obtained from the conditions (4.3) and (4.4): 1) tik > tjk, 2)
tik < tjk, and 3) tik = tjk. The last case is investigated below since the cases 1) and 2)
are analogous to those described above.
Proposition 4.4. If αi > αj, βi > βj, and tik = tjk, then αi = βi.
Proof. The result is obtained using conditions (4.3) and (4.4).
Corollary 4.1. If αi > αj, βi > βj, and tik = tjk, then t
nat
ik = t
nat
jk and t
str
ik = t
str
jk .
Proposition 4.5. If αi > αj, βi > βj, and tik = tjk, then the payments of customer
providers are equal, i.e., fik = fjk.
Proof. The result is obtained from the conditions 4.5 and 4.6 analogous to the previous
cases.
Proposition 4.6. If αi > αj and βi < βj, then the payments of ISPi are higher than
the payments of ISPj.
Proof. Considering the conditions (4.1) and (4.2) it can be obtained that (tnatik + t
str
jk ) >
(tstrik + t
nat
jk ). Consequently, from the expressions (4.5)-(4.8) follows that f
nat
i > f
nat
j ,
fstri < f
str
j , and fik > fjk.
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4.2.3 Bilateral Settlement Arrangements
This subsection formulates bilateral settlement models, in which providers (i.e., transit
and customer ISP) get compensated for the costs of carrying traffic. Analytical stud-
ies are provided to explore the affect of the determination of a transmission initiator
on intercarrier compensation considering arrangements with both reciprocal and non-
reciprocal access charges.
4.2.3.1 Reciprocal Access Charges
We examine a model where access charges are set by an industry regulator and then
applied reciprocally. Let access fees for every unit of received native and stranger traffic
which ISPi (ISPk) charges ISPk (ISPi) be denoted by ai (ak) and bi (bk) respectively,
where ai > bi (ak > bk). In the case of symmetric access charges ak = ai = aj and
bk = bi = bj , where bk = εak and 0.5 ≤ ε < 1 (in our analyses ε = 0.5). The net
interconnection payments from ISPi to the transit provider and vice versa are denoted
by fik and fki correspondingly
fik = akt
nat
ik + bkt
str
ik (4.9)
fki = bk
(
tnatjk + t
str
jk
)
(4.10)
From equation (4.10), it can be noticed that the transit network is charged based on
the rate for stranger traffic because we assume that it does not have any customers of
its own (Assumption 4.1). Similarly, the net transfers from ISPj to the transit provider
and vice versa are denoted by fjk and fkj respectively
fjk = akt
nat
jk + bkt
str
jk (4.11)
fkj = bk
(
tnatik + t
str
ik
)
(4.12)
The total interconnection payment and the incremental profit of the transit provider are
calculated as follows
fk = fki + fkj (4.13)
pik = fik + fjk − fk (4.14)
where the profit presents the difference between the payments received from and paid
to the customer ISPs. The differentiated payments of ISPi and ISPj for native and
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stranger traffic are
fnati = akt
nat
ik f
nat
j = akt
nat
jk (4.15)
fstri = bkt
str
ik f
str
j = bkt
str
jk (4.16)
The following lines analyze interconnection payments from the perspective of the cus-
tomer providers in the DTIA model, considering all available market states.
Proposition 4.7. If αi = αj and βi = βj, then the interconnection charges of the
customer providers are the same.
Proof. From the conditions (4.15) and (4.16) follows that fnati = f
nat
j and f
str
i = f
str
j .
Consequently, the payments of providers are equal, that is fik = fjk.
Proposition 4.8. If αi = αj and βi > βj, then the payments of ISPi are higher than
the payments of ISPj.
Proof. From the equations (4.1) and (4.2) follows that tnatik < t
nat
jk and t
str
ik > t
str
jk . The
payment of ISPj defined by (4.15) for native traffic is higher than that of ISPi, i.e.,
fnati < f
nat
j . Similarly, we obtain that the payment defined by (4.16) for stranger
traffic is higher for ISPi, i.e., f
str
i > f
str
j . By subtracting (4.11) from (4.9) we get
(tnatik − tnatij )(ak − bkx). Given that (ak − bkx) < 0 since x >> 2, it can be obtained that
fik > fjk.
Proposition 4.9. If αi > αj and βi = βj, then the payments of ISPi are less than the
payments of ISPj.
Proof. Using the expressions (4.1) and (4.2), it can be obtained that tnatik > t
nat
jk and
tstrik < t
str
jk . The comparison of the payments defined by (4.15) and (4.16) gives f
nat
i >
fnatj and f
str
i < f
str
j . Therefore, from the conditions (4.9) and (4.11) follows that
fik < fjk.
Proposition 4.10. If αi > αj, βi > βj, and tik = tjk, then the payments of customer
providers are equal.
Proof. Using Proposition (4.4) that gives αi = βi and the expressions, which define the
differentiated payments, it can be obtained that fnati = f
nat
j , f
str
i = f
str
j . Summarizing,
fik = fjk.
Proposition 4.11. If αi > αj and βi < βj, then the payments of ISPj are higher than
the payments of ISPi.
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Proof. The structure of the proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.9. That is
fnati > f
nat
j , f
str
i < f
str
j , and fik < fjk.
4.2.3.2 Non-reciprocal Access Charges
This subsection considers that the customer providers set non-reciprocal access charges.
The net interconnection payments of transit ISPk to ISPi and ISPj are calculated as
fki = bi
(
tnatjk + t
str
jk
)
(4.17)
fkj = bj
(
tnatik + t
str
ik
)
(4.18)
where bi is the network i’ s access charge for every unit of received stranger traffic with
respect to ISPk. Similarly, bj is the network j’ s access charge. The net transfers from
the customer providers to ISPk are given by the equations (4.9) and (4.11). To carry
out analysis, we assume that each customer network’s access charge for terminating the
native traffic is set to the termination marginal cost, and for terminating the stranger
traffic is defined by bi = εai. We examine the case when the marginal (incremental) costs
exhibit increasing returns to scale meaning that the incremental costs of the network
decrease as the network size increases.
The further investigation is done similar to the case of reciprocal access charges (see
Subsection 4.2.3.1) above. More specifically, the obtained results indicated that the net
payments of ISPi and ISPj to the transit provider are the same for both DTIA models
with symmetric and asymmetric access charges. The only difference is the increase in
payments of the transit provider to the customer providers.
4.2.4 Discussion
This subsection analyzes the results of analytical studies which considered both unilat-
eral and bilateral settlement arrangements (see Tables 4.3-4.5). Table 4.3 demonstrates
the effect of traffic differentiation on the net payments of the customer providers to
the transit provider. The comparison results between the classical transit model and
DTIA with unilateral and bilateral settlements are presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. For
the calculation of specific outcomes, we have assumed the following parameter values:
ak = 1.5, x = 35, N = 100, and M = 60. The non-reciprocal access charges of the
customer providers are set as follows: i) ai = aj = 0.6 in case I and ii) ai = 0.6, aj = 1
in all other cases1. The parameters are chosen to be reasonable to examine all available
1In case V the termination costs of customer providers can be written in one of the forms: ai > aj ,
ai < aj , and ai = aj .
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Case α β tnat tstr f
Unilateral Bilateral
I αi = αj βi = βj t
nat
ik = t
nat
jk t
str
ik = t
str
jk fik = fjk fik = fjk
II αi = αj βi > βj t
nat
ik < t
nat
jk t
str
ik > t
str
jk fik < fjk fik > fjk
III αi > αj βi = βj t
nat
ik > t
nat
jk t
str
ik < t
str
jk fik > fjk fik < fjk
IV αi > αj βi > βj if t
nat
ik = t
nat
jk if t
str
ik = t
str
jk fik = fjk fik = fjk
V αi > αj βi < βj t
nat
ik > t
nat
jk t
str
ik < t
str
jk fik > fjk fik < fjk
Table 4.3: Interconnection Payments of the DTIA Models with Unilateral and Bilat-
eral Settlements.
Case αi βi t
nat
ik t
str
ik t
nat
jk t
str
jk Unilateral
fik fjk fk pik
I 0.5 0.5 1500 52500 1500 52500 121500 121500 0 243000
II 0.5 0.9 300 94500 2700 10500 89100 153900 0 243000
0.5 0.8 600 84000 2400 21000 97200 145800 0 243000
0.5 0.7 900 73500 2100 31500 105300 137700 0 243000
0.5 0.6 1200 63000 1800 42000 113400 129600 0 243000
III 0.9 0.5 2700 10500 300 94500 153900 89100 0 243000
0.8 0.5 2400 21000 600 84000 145800 97200 0 243000
0.7 0.5 2100 31500 900 73500 137700 105300 0 243000
0.6 0.5 1800 42000 1200 63000 129600 113400 0 243000
IV 0.9 0.9 540 18900 540 18900 43740 43740 0 87480
αi = βi 0.8 0.8 960 33600 960 33600 77760 77760 0 155520
0.7 0.7 1260 44100 1260 44100 102060 102060 0 204120
0.6 0.6 1440 50400 1440 50400 116640 116640 0 233280
V 0.9 0.2 4320 4200 120 151200 236520 123120 0 359640
0.8 0.25 3600 10500 300 126000 202500 113400 0 315900
0.7 0.35 2730 22050 630 95550 164430 107730 0 272160
0.6 0.4 2160 33600 960 75600 142560 110160 0 252720
Table 4.4: Comparative Results of DTIA with Unilateral Settlements.
market states in terms of the providers’ market shares. However, the specification is
clearly arbitrary. It is important to note that our conclusions do not heavily depend on
the chosen parameter values (see Table 4.3). The results obtained for a number of other
parameter sets have not produced significant changes.
In the classical model based on the traffic flow compensation, the net interconnection
payments of the customer providers and revenue of the transit provider are calculated
as follows
fˇik = fˇjk = ak(tik + tjk)
pˇik = fˇik + fˇjk
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Case Classical Bilateral
fik fjk fk pik fik fjk fk pik
DTIAa DTIAb DTIAa DTIAb
I 162000 162000 0 324000 41625 41625 81000 2250 32400 50850
II 162000 162000 0 324000 71325 11925 81000 2250 51360 31890
162000 162000 0 324000 63900 19350 81000 2250 49320 33930
162000 162000 0 324000 56475 26775 81000 2250 47280 35970
162000 162000 0 324000 49050 34200 81000 2250 45240 38010
III 162000 162000 0 324000 11925 71325 81000 2250 35040 48210
162000 162000 0 324000 19350 63900 81000 2250 37080 46170
162000 162000 0 324000 26775 56475 81000 2250 39120 44130
162000 162000 0 324000 34200 49050 81000 2250 41160 42090
IV 58320 58320 0 116640 14985 14985 29160 810 15552 14418
103680 103680 0 207360 26640 26640 51840 1440 27648 25632
136080 136080 0 272160 34965 34965 68040 1890 36288 33642
155520 155520 0 311040 39960 39960 77760 2160 41472 38448
V 239760 239760 0 479520 9630 113580 119880 3330 49656 73554
210600 210600 0 421200 13275 94950 105300 2925 44940 63285
181440 181440 0 362880 20633 72608 90720 2520 41244 51996
168480 168480 0 336960 28440 58140 84240 2340 40848 45732
a The DTIA model with reciprocal ACs.
b The DTIA model with non-reciprocal ACs.
Table 4.5: Comparative Results of DTIA with Bilateral Settlements and the Classical
Model with Unilateral Settlements.
The following observation can be made form the obtained results. They showed that
in DTIA with unilateral settlements the more outgoing native traffic, the higher costs
of the customer ISP (see Table 4.3). This is explained by the higher access charges for
native traffic than for stranger traffic. In contrast, in the bilateral settlement model, the
costs of the customer ISPs are increased as more traffic is originated. In the classical
model with unilateral settlements, the smaller and larger customer providers compensate
equally (see Table 4.5). In comparison to this model, both DTIA models with unilateral
and bilateral settlements provided unequal and significantly reduced payments of the
customer provider (except for case IV, which is the symmetric in terms of traffic volumes
and where providers’ payments are equal). This is achieved by the main concept of our
approach, where providers get compensated differently for traffic originally initiated by
their own customers, as opposed to traffic initiated by customers of other networks.
Obviously, this results in a decrease in the profits of the transit provider in DTIA, who
shares the interconnection costs with other ISPs. Finally, in contrast to the the DTIA
and classical models with unilateral settlements, the payments of the transit ISP in DTIA
with bilateral settlements are different from zero. As a consequence, the payments of the
customer ISPs are lower in DTIA with bilateral settlements than in the other models.
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4.3 Exploring Payments of Different Layer Providers
This section extends the analytical studies presented in the previous section and investi-
gates the influence of the determination of a transmission initiator on the interconnection
payments of different providers. In particular, a key question addressed here is how at-
tractive the DTIA approach is to different layer providers, such as transit and customer.
Unlike the prior reported studies, this section considers customer providers which op-
erate in different cost areas and are charged for connectivity differently. The model
structure is similar to the one described in Section 4.2.1.
4.3.1 Unilateral Settlement Arrangements
The investigations begin by examining unilateral settlement arrangements where a tran-
sit provider charges customer providers for every unit of traffic sent and received. Let
cki and c
k
j be the marginal costs of the connectivity of ISPi and ISPj correspondingly.
We assume that the providers operate in different cost areas so that cki < c
k
j , and the
marginal costs exhibit increasing returns to scale (i.e., ISPi is larger than ISPj). ISPk
charges the customer providers (ISPi and ISPj) ak and bk for every unit of native and
stranger traffic respectively, where ak > bk (ISPs pay less for stranger traffic). The
DTIA is attractive to ISPk only if its own costs are covered. To satisfy this condition we
have concluded that in DTIA a customer provider i) compensates fully the imbalance in
the connectivity costs between endpoints if the exchanged traffic is native, and ii) does
not compensate this difference if the originated traffic is stranger. The difference in the
costs of the exchanged traffic between the points is defined by
∆ = ckj − cki (4.19)
Proposition 4.12. The access charge for stranger traffic is set to the lowest cost of the
connectivity, i.e., bk = c
k
i .
Proof. Interconnection costs between the customer providers are covered by the access
charges. Since native traffic for ISPi is stranger for ISPj , the sum of fees for native and
stranger traffic is equal to the whole costs of interconnection
cki + c
k
j = ak + bk (4.20)
In the DTIA model, a provider compensates the imbalance in the costs expressed by
(4.19) fully only for native traffic. This cost difference is not compensated for the stranger
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traffic. Consequently, it can be written that
ak = bk + ∆ (4.21)
By substituting (4.19) and (4.21) in (4.20), it can be obtained that the access rate for
stranger traffic is set to the lowest cost of the connectivity, that is
bk = c
k
i (4.22)
The access charge for native traffic is set to the highest cost of connectivity, that is
ak = c
k
i + ∆ (4.23)
The interconnection payments of ISPi and ISPj are calculated by equations (4.5) and
(4.6) correspondingly. Analytical studies carried out for asymmetric providers in terms
of size are analogous to the cases II-V in Subsection 4.2.2 and produced the same results.
In addition to that, we examine the following case
Proposition 4.13. If αi > αj, βi > βj, and tik < tjk, then the payments of ISPi are
higher than the payments of ISPj.
Proof. Given that tik < tjk, from the equations (4.3) and (4.4) we obtain αi > βi and
αj < βj . Using (4.1) and (4.2) follows (t
nat
ik + t
str
jk ) > (t
str
ik + t
nat
jk ). This gives that
fnati > f
nat
j and f
str
i < f
str
j . By subtracting (4.5) from (4.6) we get that fik > fjk.
The following lines explore the payments of the customer providers in classical and DTIA
models. The net payments of the customer providers according to the traffic flow based
compensation are denoted by fˇik and fˇjk and are calculated as follows
fˇik = c
k
i (tik + tjk) (4.24)
fˇjk = c
k
j (tik + tjk) (4.25)
Proposition 4.14. The payment of larger (smaller) providers are higher (less) in DTIA
than those in the classical model.
Proof. Considering the net payments of the larger network ISPi, from the equations (4.5)
and (4.24) it follows that fˇik − fik = (bk − ak)(tnatik + tstrij ) < 0, i.e., fik > fˇik. Similarly,
comparing the net payments of the smaller provider in the DTIA and classical models
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given by (4.6) and (4.25), it can be obtained that fˇjk − fjk = (ak − bk)(tnatik + tstrij ) > 0.
This leads to fjk < fˇjk.
4.3.2 Bilateral Settlement Arrangements
This subsection examines bilateral settlement arrangements, under which each provider
(including the customer provider) gets compensated for the costs of carrying traffic.
Again, the models with reciprocal and non-reciprocal access charges are considered.
4.3.2.1 Reciprocal Access Charges
In the following we explore the case when the customer providers charge the transit
provider reciprocal access charges. Let b be the access payment that ISPk subsidizes
ISPi and ISPj for every unit of traffic, where b < c
k
j . The marginal connectivity costs
of the customer providers charged by ISPk can be written as follows
cki + c
k
j = ck + σ (4.26)
where ck is the marginal transportation cost of the transit provider and σ is an arbitrary
constant.
Proposition 4.15. The access charge for stranger traffic set by ISPk is equal to bk =
ck + b (i.e., the total costs of ISPk).
Proof. The network k’ s costs are comprised of the marginal transmission cost and the
payment to access customer provider’s infrastructure, i.e., ck+b. The bilateral settlement
model is attractive to ISPk only if its own costs are covered. These costs correspond to
the minimum level of access charge set by ISPk, that is
ck + b = min{ak, bk}
According to the proposed strategy, a provider compensates less the costs of carrying
stranger traffic, thus
bk = ck + b (4.27)
Obviously, the access charge for native traffic set by the transit provider is increased by
the arbitrary constant and is calculated as follows
ak = bk + σ = c
k
i + c
k
j + b (4.28)
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The net interconnection payments of ISPi and ISPj to ISPk are defined by the equations
(4.9) and (4.11), correspondingly. The net transfers of ISPk to the customer providers
are given by
fki = b
(
tnatjk + t
str
jk
)
(4.29)
fkj = b
(
tnatik + t
str
ik
)
(4.30)
The results of the analyses that explored asymmetric providers in terms of sizes where
ISPi is larger than ISPj , are similar to the results of the cases II-V in Subsection 4.2.3.
In addition to that, we examine the following case
Proposition 4.16. If αi > αj, βi > βj, and tik < tjk, then the payments of ISPj are
higher than the payments of ISPi.
Proof. Given that tik < tjk, from the equations (4.3) and (4.4) we obtain αi > βi and
αj < βj . From (4.1) and (4.2) follows t
nat
ik > t
nat
jk and t
str
ik < t
str
jk . This gives that
fnati > f
nat
j , f
str
i < f
str
j . By subtracting (4.9) from (4.11) we get that fik < fjk.
The following lines compare the payments of the customer providers in the DTIA and
classical models with bilateral settlements. Before that, we consider access charges and
net payments in the classical solution. Let bˇ be the payment paid by ISPk to the
customer providers for sending traffic. The access charge set by the transit provider, aˇk,
is defined by
aˇk = c
k
i + c
k
j + bˇ (4.31)
Assume that ISPk has users, therefore b (in DTIA) is the rate charged by the customer
providers for every unit of stranger traffic only, while bˇ (in the classical model) is payment
for every unit of traffic. As a result, it can be obtained that bˇ ≥ b. The interconnection
payments of ISPi and ISPj are given by
fˇik = aˇktik (4.32)
fˇjk = aˇktjk (4.33)
Proposition 4.17. The net payments of the customer providers in the DTIA model are
less than those in the classical model.
Proof. Considering the payments of ISPi, from the conditions (4.9) and (4.32) follows
fˇik − fik = tnatik (aˇk − ak) + tstrik (aˇk − bk) > 0 (4.34)
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Similarly, from the payments of the smaller ISPj defined by the equations (4.11) and
(4.33), it can be obtained that
fˇjk − fjk = tnatjk (aˇk − ak) + tstrjk (aˇk − bk) > 0 (4.35)
4.3.2.2 Non-reciprocal Access Charges
We continue the examination of bilateral settlement arrangements with asymmetric ac-
cess charges. Let bi and bj (bi < bj) be the access rates for every unit of traffic received
by ISPi and ISPj , correspondingly. Following results of Proposition 4.15, fees that the
transit provider charges the customer providers for stranger traffic can be rewritten as
bik = ck + bj (4.36)
bjk = ck + bi (4.37)
Analogously, the rates for native traffic defined by (4.28) have the following form
aik = bik + σ = c
k
i + c
k
j + bj (4.38)
ajk = bjk + σ = c
k
i + c
k
j + bi (4.39)
The net interconnection payments from ISPi to the transit provider and vice versa
defined by (4.9) and (4.10) can be rewritten as follows
fik = aikt
nat
ik + bikt
str
ik (4.40)
fki = bi
(
tnatjk + t
str
jk
)
(4.41)
Similarly, the net transfers from ISPj to the transit provider and vice versa defined by
(4.11) and (4.12) take the following form
fjk = ajkt
nat
jk + bjkt
str
jk (4.42)
fkj = bj
(
tnatik + t
str
ik
)
(4.43)
We do not report studies that investigate the impact of traffic differentiation on inter-
carrier compensation because they are similar to the previous analyses. The obtained
results for all cases except the one when αi > αj , βi > βj , and αi = βi are not straight-
forward. Instead, the following lines aim to explore the payments of customer ISPs in
the classical and DTIA models. For this purpose, we consider access charges and pay-
ments in the traffic flow-based compensation model. The access rates that ISPk charges
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ISPi and ISPj are
aˇik = c
k
i + c
k
j + bˇj (4.44)
aˇjk = c
k
i + c
k
j + bˇi (4.45)
where bˇi and bˇj (bˇi ≥ bi and bˇj ≥ bj) are access fees set by the customer providers
correspondingly. The net payments of the customer providers are given by
fˇik = aˇiktik (4.46)
fˇjk = aˇjktjk (4.47)
Proposition 4.18. The interconnection payments of the customer providers are less in
DTIA than those in the classical model.
Proof. From the payments of ISPi defined by the equations (4.40) and (4.46) follows
fˇik − fik = tnatik (aˇik − aik) + tstrik (aˇik − bik) > 0 (4.48)
Similarly, examining the payments of ISPj given by (4.41) and (4.47) we get
fˇjk − fjk = tnatjk (aˇjk − ajk) + tstrjk (aˇjk − bjk) > 0 (4.49)
4.3.3 Discussion
Tables 4.6-4.10 report the results of analytical studies, which examined how beneficial
the determination of a transmission initiator is to the providers of different layers. The
comparison results between unilateral settlement models are presented in Table 4.6.
Tables 4.7-4.10 demonstrate the comparison between bilateral settlement arrangements
with symmetric and asymmetric access charges. The analyses considered all available
market states in terms of providers’ market shares, where ISPi is larger than ISPj . The
following parameter values were chosen to calculate the specific outcomes: cki = 0.4,
ckj = 1.5, ck = 0.9, b = 0.5, bi = 0.3, bj = 0.5, x = 35, N = 100, and M = 60. In order
to simplify analyses we assume that bˇ = b, bˇi = bi, and bˇj = bj .The parameters are
chosen to satisfy the condition that providers operate in different cost areas. However,
the specification is clearly arbitrary. It is important to note, that our conclusions do not
heavily depend on the chosen parameter values (see Table 4.3, cases II-V; Propositions
4.13-4.14 and 4.16-4.17). The results obtained for a number of other parameter sets have
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Case αi βi f
nat
i f
nat
j fik fjk pik
DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF
I 0.5 0.9 16200 145800 55080 43200 150120 162000 205200 205200
αi = αj 0.5 0.8 32400 129600 66960 43200 138240 162000 205200 205200
βi > βj 0.5 0.7 48600 113400 78840 43200 126360 162000 205200 205200
0.5 0.6 64800 97200 90720 43200 114480 162000 205200 205200
II 0.9 0.5 145800 16200 150120 43200 55080 162000 205200 205200
αi > αj 0.8 0.5 129600 32400 138240 43200 66960 162000 205200 205200
βi = βj 0.7 0.5 113400 48600 126360 43200 78840 162000 205200 205200
0.6 0.5 97200 64800 114480 43200 90720 162000 205200 205200
III 0.9 0.8 58320 25920 65232 22464 41472 84240 106704 106704
αi > αj 0.8 0.7 77760 45360 89856 32832 66096 123120 155952 155952
βi > βj 0.7 0.6 90720 58320 106272 39744 82512 149040 188784 188784
αi > βi 0.6 0.55 87480 71280 106488 42336 94608 158760 201096 201096
IV 0.9 0.9 29160 29160 36936 15552 36936 58320 73872 73872
αi > αj 0.8 0.8 51840 51840 65664 27648 65664 103680 131328 131328
βi > βj 0.7 0.7 68040 68040 86184 36288 86184 136080 172368 172368
αi = βi 0.6 0.6 77760 77760 98496 41472 98496 155520 196992 196992
V 0.9 0.2 233280 6480 235008 63936 68688 239760 303696 303696
αi > αj 0.8 0.25 194400 16200 198720 56160 68040 210600 266760 266760
βi < βj 0.7 0.35 147420 34020 156492 48384 73332 181440 229824 229824
0.6 0.4 116640 51840 130464 44928 82944 168480 213408 213408
Table 4.6: Comparative Results of the Unilateral Settlement Arrangements.
not produced significant changes. Network i’ s total incremental cost of connectivity
represents difference between paid and received payments, that is
ri = fik − fki
Network k’ s profit obtained from interconnection is calculated as follows
rk = (fik + fjk)− (fki + fkj) = pik − (fki + fkj)
where pik as in the previous section represents the total revenue of ISPk received from
the customer providers.
Comparative results obtained for the arrangements with unilateral settlements (see Table
4.6) demonstrated that in the presented model the payments are decreased for the smaller
ISPj and are increased for the larger ISPi. This is achieved by the different access charges
for the distinguished traffic flows. More specifically, the payments of ISPi are increased
due to the native traffic compensation, while the payments of ISPj are decreased due
to the stranger traffic compensation. Further, the results showed that in the proposed
model the more outgoing traffic we have the lower are costs of the provider. In particular,
incoming and outgoing native traffic are directly proportional. Hence, the network
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Case fik fjk fki fkj
DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF
I 133020 227520 21180 31680 6600 6600 47400 47400
119040 203040 35160 56160 11700 11700 42300 42300
105060 178560 49140 80640 16800 16800 37200 37200
91080 154080 63120 105120 21900 21900 32100 32100
II 21180 31680 133020 227520 47400 47400 6600 6600
35160 56160 119040 203040 42300 42300 11700 11700
49140 80640 105060 178560 37200 37200 16800 16800
63120 105120 91080 154080 32100 32100 21900 21900
III 26112 42912 54072 91872 19140 19140 8940 8940
44616 74016 72576 122976 25620 25620 15420 15420
56952 94752 84912 143712 29940 29940 19740 19740
68568 114768 82548 139248 29010 29010 23910 23910
IV 27756 46656 27756 46656 9720 9720 9720 9720
49344 82944 49344 82944 17280 17280 17280 17280
64764 108864 64764 108864 22680 22680 22680 22680
74016 124416 74016 124416 25920 25920 25920 25920
V 16248 20448 211968 363168 75660 75660 4260 4260
23340 33840 177120 303120 63150 63150 7050 7050
37422 59472 135282 230832 48090 48090 12390 12390
52224 85824 108144 183744 38280 38280 17880 17880
Table 4.7: Payments Comparison of the Bilateral Settlement Arrangements (Recip-
rocal ACs).
Case pik rk ri rj
DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF
I 154200 259200 100200 205200 126420 220920 -26220 -15720
154200 259200 100200 205200 107340 191340 -7140 13860
154200 259200 100200 205200 88260 161760 11940 43440
154200 259200 100200 205200 69180 132180 31020 73020
II 154200 259200 100200 205200 -26220 -15720 126420 220920
154200 259200 100200 205200 -7140 13860 107340 191340
154200 259200 100200 205200 11940 43440 88260 161760
154200 259200 100200 205200 31020 73020 69180 132180
III 80184 134784 52104 106704 6972 23772 45132 82932
117192 196992 76152 155952 18996 48396 57156 107556
141864 238464 92184 188784 27012 64812 65172 123972
151116 254016 98196 201096 39558 85758 58638 115338
IV 55512 93312 36072 73872 18036 36936 18036 36936
98688 165888 64128 131328 32064 65664 32064 65664
129528 217728 84168 172368 42084 86184 42084 86184
148032 248832 96192 196992 48096 98496 48096 98496
V 228216 383616 148296 303696 -59412 -55212 207708 358908
200460 336960 130260 266760 -39810 -29310 170070 296070
172704 290304 112224 229824 -10668 11382 122892 218442
160368 269568 104208 213408 13944 47544 90264 165864
Table 4.8: Comparative Results of the Bilateral Settlement Arrangements (Reciprocal
ACs).
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Case fik fjk fki fkj
DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF
I 133020 227520 18540 29040 3960 3960 47400 47400
119040 203040 30480 51480 7020 7020 42300 42300
105060 178560 42420 73920 10080 10080 37200 37200
91080 154080 54360 96360 13140 13140 32100 32100
II 21180 31680 114060 208560 28440 28440 6600 6600
35160 56160 102120 186120 25380 25380 11700 11700
49140 80640 90180 163680 22320 22320 16800 16800
63120 105120 78240 141240 19260 19260 21900 21900
III 26112 42912 46416 84216 11484 11484 8940 8940
44616 74016 62328 112728 15372 15372 15420 15420
56952 94752 72936 131736 17964 17964 19740 19740
68568 114768 70944 127644 17406 17406 23910 23910
IV 27756 46656 23868 42768 5832 5832 9720 9720
49344 82944 42432 76032 10368 10368 17280 17280
64764 108864 55692 99792 13608 13608 22680 22680
74016 124416 63648 114048 15552 15552 25920 25920
V 16248 20448 181704 332904 45396 45396 4260 4260
23340 33840 151860 277860 37890 37890 7050 7050
37422 59472 116046 211596 28854 28854 12390 12390
52224 85824 92832 168432 22968 22968 17880 17880
Table 4.9: Payments Comparison of the Bilateral Settlement Arrangements (Non-
reciprocal ACs).
Case pik rk ri rj
DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF
I 151560 256560 100200 205200 129060 223560 -28860 -18360
149520 254520 100200 205200 112020 196020 -11820 9180
147480 252480 100200 205200 94980 168480 5220 36720
145440 250440 100200 205200 77940 140940 22260 64260
II 135240 240240 100200 205200 -7260 3240 107460 201960
137280 242280 100200 205200 9780 30780 90420 174420
139320 244320 100200 205200 26820 58320 73380 146880
141360 246360 100200 205200 43860 85860 56340 119340
III 72528 127128 52104 106704 14628 31428 37476 75276
106944 186744 76152 155952 29244 58644 46908 97308
129888 226488 92184 188784 38988 76788 53196 111996
139512 242412 98196 201096 51162 97362 47034 103734
IV 51624 89424 36072 73872 21924 40824 14148 33048
91776 158976 64128 131328 38976 72576 25152 58752
120456 208656 84168 172368 51156 95256 33012 77112
137664 238464 96192 196992 58464 108864 37728 88128
V 197952 353352 148296 303696 -29148 -24948 177444 328644
175200 311700 130260 266760 -14550 -4050 144810 270810
153468 271068 112224 229824 8568 30618 103656 199206
145056 254256 104208 213408 29256 62856 74952 150552
Table 4.10: Comparative Results of the Bilateral Settlement Arrangements (Non-
reciprocal ACs).
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that sends more native traffic incurs higher costs than the network that receives this
traffic. This is explained by the higher access charges for native traffic than for stranger
traffic. The costs of both customer networks are equal only in the case when their
native and stranger traffic volumes are symmetric correspondingly. Finally, the results
demonstrated that the revenues of the transit provider in the classical model based on
the traffic flows compensation and DTIA are equal.
The key consequences provided below are based on the analytical studies, which ex-
plored bilateral settlement arrangements with symmetric and asymmetric access fees
(see Tables 4.7-4.10). In DTIA, the payments paid by the customer providers are de-
creased and those of transit provider remain the same (see Tables 4.7 and 4.9). More
specifically, providers ISPi and ISPj compensate based on the differentiated traffic flows
where the access charge for stranger traffic flow is lower than the access charge set in the
classical model. As a consequence, the total incremental costs of the customer providers
(ri and rj) are also decreased (see Tables 4.8 and 4.10). On the other side, profits of
ISPk obtained from the interconnection (i.e., differences between received and paid pay-
ments, rk) are lower than those in the traffic flow-based compensation model. However,
as mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, it was argued that compensation in bilateral arrange-
ments cannot be solely done based on traffic flows, which provide a poor basis for the
interconnection cost sharing.
The provided studies examined a model consisting of one transit and two customer ISPs.
One question that arises here is on the robustness of the obtained results for more realistic
scenarios, which consider more transit and customer ISPs. From Propositions 4.14, 4.17
and 4.18, it can be noticed that the results depend only on the access charges of both
DTIA and classical models. More specifically, in the unilateral settlement arrangements,
the results rely on the inequality (ak − bk) > 0. Analogously, the results given by (4.34)
and (4.35) depend on the inequalities (aˇk − ak) > 0 and (aˇk − bk) > 0, while results
expressed by (4.48) and (4.49) are based on (aˇik − aik) > 0 and (aˇik − bik) > 0. Hence,
the provided conclusions remain the same. Obviously, in the extended scenarios, access
charges are obtained by solving a system of linear equations.
4.4 Exploring Social Welfare
The objective of this section is to explore the efficiency of traffic differentiation in terms
of social welfare. We formulate economic models with bilateral and unilateral settlements
and provide analytical studies, which consider the elastic demand model (i.e., customer
demands increase or decrease with market price changes). The described models follow
Assumptions 3.2, 3.3, 3.5, and 4.1.
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4.4.1 Unilateral Settlement Arrangements
This subsection considers a market with unilateral settlements, where customer providers
compensate the transit provider for the costs of carrying traffic, and analyzes its social
welfare.
Demand Structure
We examine a scenario where ISPi and ISPj are interconnected through a transit provider
ISPk, and focus on an asymmetric traffic pattern (considering traffic exchange from
consumers to websites and vice versa). The demand structure is similar to the structure
described in Section 3.4.1. Thus, an individual demand that optimizes the customer’s
utility is defined by equation (3.21). Let qsi and q˜
s
i be the levels of traffic originated by
each consumer and each website of ISPi, respectively. For simplicity, we consider that
these demands depend only on the price set by the customer’s provider; they do not
depend on the receiver price. Thus, they are calculated as follows
qsi = γ − psi
q˜si = γ − p˜si
(4.50)
Similarly, an individual demand of each type of the customers subscribed to ISPj is
qsj = γ − psj
q˜sj = γ − p˜sj
(4.51)
The utilities derived by a consumer and a website of ISPi for sending and receiving
traffic are given by
Ui = [u(q
s
i )− psi qsi ] +
[
u(q˜sj )− pri q˜sj
]
(4.52)
U˜i = [u(q˜
s
i )− p˜si q˜si ] +
[
u(qsj )− p˜ri qsj
]
(4.53)
where psi and p
r
i (p˜
s
i and p˜
r
i ) are network i ’s prices that the subscribed consumer (the
hosted website) pays for sending and receiving a unit of traffic.
Cost Structure and Profits
Consider the case when ISPi operates in a low cost area while ISPj is located in a high
cost area. The connectivity cost structure is the same as in the previous section, viz.,
cki and c
k
j are the marginal costs of connectivity of ISPi and ISPj , correspondingly. The
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operation of networks in different cost areas implies that cki < c
k
j , i.e., ISPi is larger than
ISPj . Let c
o
i > 0 and c
t
i > 0 be network i ’s marginal costs of origination and termination
respectively, where coi = c
t
i. These costs exhibit increasing returns to scale, meaning that
the incremental costs of the network increase as the network size decreases, i.e., coi < c
o
j .
For simplicity, fixed network costs are neglected. The profits of the customer providers
present the sum of profits for sending and receiving traffic and are given by
Πi = αiβj (p
s
i − coi − ak) qsi + αjβi (p˜si − coi − bk) q˜si
+αjβi
(
p˜ri − cti − bk
)
qsj + αiβj
(
pri − cti − ak
)
q˜sj (4.54)
Πj = αjβi
(
psj − coj − ak
)
qsj + αiβj
(
p˜sj − coj − bk
)
q˜sj
+αiβj
(
p˜rj − ctj − bk
)
qsi + αjβi
(
prj − ctj − ak
)
q˜si (4.55)
where ak and bk are access charges set by ISPk for the distinguished traffic and have the
same structure as the rates in Section 4.3.1. Then
ak = c
k
i + ∆
bk = c
k
i
The profit of the transit provider comprises of the payments obtained from the customer
ISPs and is given by
Πk = ak
(
αiβjq
s
i + αiβj q˜
s
j
)
+ bk
(
αjβiq˜
s
i + αjβiq
s
j
)
+ak
(
αjβiq
s
j + αjβiq˜
s
i
)
+ bk
(
αiβj q˜
s
j + αiβjq
s
i
)
(4.56)
Retail Prices
Consider the case when ISPi and ISPj maximize their profits, setting retail prices equal
to the perceived marginal costs. Hence, the prices for every unit of traffic sent and
received by a customer are given by
psi = c
o
i + ak p
s
j = c
o
j + ak
pri = c
t
i + ak p
r
j = c
t
j + ak
(4.57)
Similarly, the retail prices for websites are defined by
p˜si = c
o
i + bk p˜
s
j = c
o
j + bk
p˜ri = c
t
i + bk p˜
r
j = c
t
j + bk
(4.58)
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It can be noticed that the retail prices are increasing functions in costs and access
charges.
Social Welfare
Social welfare of the market presents the sum of consumer surplus and provider surplus
(i.e., profit), that is
W = αiβj(Ui + U˜j) + αjβi(Uj + U˜i) + Πi + Πj + Πk (4.59)
Notice that Ui is the utility of a consumer who initiates q
s
i requests where a βj propor-
tion goes to ISPj . Since we neglected on-net traffic and considered only off-net traffic,
therefore, the sum of consumer utilities subscribed to the network i is given by αiβjUi.
Analogously, an αj proportion of traffic originated by a website of ISPi is terminated
in ISPj . As a result, the total utility generated by websites hosted by the network i
is defined by αjβiU˜i. Replacing the components of social welfare by their expressions,
where Πi = 0 and Πj = 0 (since the prices are set to the perceived marginal costs),
equation (4.59) can be rewritten as follows
W = αiβj((γ − 0.5qsi )qsi − psi qsi + (γ − 0.5q˜sj )q˜sj − pri q˜sj )
+ αjβi((γ − 0.5q˜si )q˜si − p˜si q˜si + (γ − 0.5qsj )qsj − p˜ri qsj )
+ αjβi((γ − 0.5qsj )qsj − psjqsj + (γ − 0.5q˜si )q˜si − prj q˜si )
+ αiβj((γ − 0.5q˜sj )q˜sj − p˜sj q˜sj + (γ − 0.5qsi )qsi − p˜rjqsi )
+ ak
(
αiβjq
s
i + αiβj q˜
s
j
)
+ bk
(
αjβiq˜
s
i + αjβiq
s
j
)
+ ak
(
αjβiq
s
j + αjβiq˜
s
i
)
+ bk
(
αiβj q˜
s
j + αiβjq
s
i
)
(4.60)
The following lines compare social welfare in the DTIA and classical models, both with
unilateral settlements. For that purpose, we consider providers’ profits and social welfare
in the traffic flow-based compensation model. As defined before cki and c
k
j are fees that
ISPk charges customer ISPs to access its infrastructure. The profits of the customer
providers are defined by
Πˇi = αiβj
(
P si − coi − cki
)
Qsi + αjβi
(
P˜ si − coi − cki
)
Q˜si
+αjβi
(
P˜ ri − cti − cki
)
Qsj + αiβj
(
P ri − cti − cki
)
Q˜sj (4.61)
Πˇj = αjβi
(
P sj − coj − ckj
)
Qsj + αiβj
(
P˜ sj − coj − ckj
)
Q˜sj
+αiβj
(
P˜ rj − ctj − ckj
)
Qsi + αjβi
(
P rj − ctj − ckj
)
Q˜si (4.62)
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where Pi, P˜i are retail prices set to the perceived marginal costs as in DTIA; Qi, Q˜i
denote demand functions calculated similar to equations (4.50) and (4.51). The profit
of the transit provider is given by
Πˇk = (c
k
i + c
k
j )
(
αiβjQ
s
i + αjβiQ˜
s
i + αjβiQ
s
j + αiβjQ˜
s
j
)
(4.63)
The social welfare function of the classical model can be written as follows
Wˇ = αiβj((γ − 0.5Qsi )Qsi − P si Qsi + (γ − 0.5Q˜sj)Q˜sj − P ri Q˜sj)
+ αjβi((γ − 0.5Q˜si )Q˜si − P˜ si Q˜si + (γ − 0.5Qsj)Qsj − P˜ ri Qsj)
+ αjβi((γ − 0.5Qsj)Qsj − P sjQsj + (γ − 0.5Q˜si )Q˜si − P rj Q˜si )
+ αiβj((γ − 0.5Q˜sj)Q˜sj − P˜ sj Q˜sj + (γ − 0.5Qsi )Qsi − P˜ rj Qsi )
+ (cki + c
k
j )
(
αiβjQ
s
i + αjβiQ˜
s
i + αjβiQ
s
j + αiβjQ˜
s
j
)
(4.64)
Proposition 4.19. Social welfare in DTIA is higher than that in the classical model.
Proof. From the comparison of the expressions (4.60) and (4.64) where Πk = Πˇk (because
the transit provider in both models covers its own costs and as a result, generates the
same profits) follows
W − Wˇ = αiβjqsi (2γ − qsi − psi − p˜rj) + αjβiq˜si (2γ − q˜si − p˜si − prj)
+ αjβiq
s
j (2γ − qsj − psj − p˜ri ) + αiβj q˜sj (2γ − q˜sj − p˜sj − pri )
− αiβjQsi (2γ −Qsi − P si − P˜ rj )− αjβiQ˜si (2γ − Q˜si − P˜ si − P rj )
− αjβiQsj(2γ −Qsj − P sj − P˜ ri )− αiβjQ˜sj(2γ − Q˜sj − P˜ sj − P ri )
Now, by substituting the demand expressions through prices, the equation above can be
rewritten as follows
W − Wˇ = 2αiβj(γ − p˜sj)(γ − psi ) + 2αjβi(γ − psj)(γ − p˜si )
− 2αiβj(γ − P˜ sj )(γ − P si ) + 2αjβi(γ − P sj )(γ − P˜ si )
= 2αiβj(c
t
j − cti)(ckj − cki )
(4.65)
Given that (ctj − cti) > 0 and (ckj − cki ) > 0, it can be easily obtained that W > Wˇ .
4.4.2 Bilateral Settlement Arrangements
The objective of this subsection is to analyze social welfare of the market where each
provider is compensated for the costs incurred in carrying traffic.
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Cost Structure and Profits
We assume that the demand and cost structures are the same as in the previous Section
4.4.1; the structure of access charges is similar as in Section 4.2.3.1. The profits of the
interconnected providers can be written as follows
Πi = αiβj (p
s
i − coi − ak) qsi + αjβi (p˜si − coi − bk) q˜si
+αjβi
(
p˜ri − cti + bk
)
qsj + αiβj
(
pri − cti + bk
)
q˜sj (4.66)
Πj = αjβi
(
psj − coj − ak
)
qsj + αiβj
(
p˜sj − coj − bk
)
q˜sj
+αiβj
(
p˜rj − ctj + bk
)
qsi + αjβi
(
prj − ctj + bk
)
q˜si (4.67)
Πk = ak
(
αiβjq
s
i + αjβiq
s
j
)
+ bk
(
αjβiq˜
s
i + αiβj q˜
s
j
)
−bk
(
αiβjq
s
i + αjβiq
s
j + αjβiq˜
s
i + αiβj q˜
s
j
)
(4.68)
It can be noticed that the profit of ISPk presents the difference between payments
received from and paid to the customer providers.
Retail Prices
In order to maximize the profits, the customer providers set the retail prices for carrying
traffic to the perceived marginal costs. These prices paid by the consumer for sending
and receiving a unit of traffic are defined by
psi = c
o
i + ak p
s
j = c
o
j + ak
pri = c
t
i − bk prj = ctj − bk
(4.69)
and prices paid by website for subscription are given by
p˜si = c
o
i + bk p˜
s
j = c
o
j + bk
p˜ri = c
t
i − bk p˜rj = ctj − bk
(4.70)
Social Welfare
The following lines examine social welfare in the DTIA and classical models, both with
bilateral settlements. For this purpose, we start by examining the providers’ profits in
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the classical solution, which are given by
Πˇi = αiβj (P
s
i − coi − aˇk)Qsi + αjβi
(
P˜ si − coi − aˇk
)
Q˜si
+αjβi
(
P˜ ri − cti + bˇ
)
Qsj + αiβj
(
P ri − cti + bˇ
)
Q˜sj (4.71)
Πˇj = αjβi
(
P sj − coj − aˇk
)
Qsj + αiβj
(
P˜ sj − coj − aˇk
)
Q˜sj
+αiβj
(
P˜ rj − ctj + bˇ
)
Qsi + αjβi
(
P rj − ctj + bˇ
)
Q˜si (4.72)
where Pi, P˜i are retail prices set to the perceived marginal costs as in DTIA; Qi, Q˜i
denote demand functions calculated analogous to the equations (4.50) and (4.51); aˇk
and bˇ are access fees paid by ISPk and the customer ISPs. Following the main idea of
the proposed approach that a provider compensates less for costs of traffic originally
initiated by customers of other networks, gives that ak = aˇk and bk = εak. As argued
bˇ ≥ bk, however, to simplify studies we allow bˇ = bk. The profit of the transit provider
is defined by
Πˇk = (aˇk − bˇ)
(
αiβjQ
s
i + αjβiQ˜
s
i + αjβiQ
s
j + αiβjQ˜
s
j
)
(4.73)
The social welfare functions in both models are defined by equation (4.59).
Proposition 4.20. Social welfare in DTIA is higher than that in the classical model.
Proof. From the expressions for the profits of the customer providers it follows that
Πi = Πˇi = Πj = Πˇj = 0. The equations (4.50) and (4.51) result in q
s
i = Q
s
i and q
s
j = Q
s
j .
The comparison of social welfares in the DTIA and classical models is given by
W − Wˇ = (ak − bk)(αiβj(γ − pri ) + αjβi(γ − prj))− (ak − bk)(αjβiQ˜si + αiβjQ˜sj)
= (ak − bk)(αiβj(P˜ sj − pri ) + αjβi(P˜ si − prj))
(4.74)
Given that (P˜ sj − pri ) > 0 and (P˜ si − prj) > 0, it can be obtained that (W − Wˇ ) > 0.
4.4.3 Discussion
The comparison results of analytical studies which investigated the impact of traffic
differentiation on social welfare in the unilateral and bilateral settlement arrangements
are presented in Tables 4.11-4.12 and Figures 4.4-4.5. For the calculation of specific
outcomes, the following parameters are used: i) in the model with bilateral settlements,
the costs are ak = 1.5, c
t
i = 0.4, c
t
j = 1.5; the market shares for customers are αi = 0.8,
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Figure 4.4: Social Welfare Comparison in the Unilateral Settlement Arrangements.
βi = 0.7, and ii) in the model with unilateral settlements: c
t
i = 0.4, c
k
j = 1.5, c
k
i and
ctj are defined randomly, where c
k
i < c
k
j and c
t
i < c
t
j (because ISPi is larger than ISPj).
According to Assumption 3.5, the number of consumers and the number of websites are
set to 1. The parameters are chosen to satisfy the condition that providers operate in
different cost areas. However, the specification is clearly arbitrary. It is important to
note that our conclusions do not heavily depend on the chosen parameter values (see
Propositions 4.19 and 4.20). The results obtained for a number of other parameter sets
have not produced significant changes. Indeed, in Proposition 4.19, the expression (4.65)
depends on inequalities (ctj − cti) > 0 and (ckj − cki ) > 0 because providers operate in
different cost areas where ISPi is larger than ISPj . Analogously, considering Proposition
4.20, the result given by (4.74) is based on (ak−bk) > 0, (P˜ sj −pri ) > 0 and (P˜ si −prj) > 0.
Hence, the provided conclusions remain the same.
Comparative results demonstrated that DTIA provided better outcomes (in terms of
social welfare) than the classical model with both unilateral and bilateral settlements.
More specifically, in DTIA with unilateral settlements, the increase in demand of the
smaller ISPj is more than the decrease in demand of the larger ISPi (see Table 4.11 and
Figure 4.4). The demand increase is achieved due to the native traffic compensation
while the demand decrease is the result of the stranger traffic compensation. However,
as discussed earlier, customers in different areas have different levels of affordability and
willingness to pay. Hence, it is more likely that the demand decrease will be negligible
(close to zero). Considering the total consumer surplus (Ui + U˜j), it can be noticed
that it is higher in DTIA than in the classical solution. Finally, the results showed that
DTIA stimulates the enhancement of social welfare of the system.
The following observations can be made from the comparison of bilateral settlement
arrangements (see Table 4.12 and Figure 4.5). The results reported that profits of the
transit provider in DTIA are less than those in the classical model. More specifically,
Chapter 4. The DTIA Model for Transit Arrangements 94
cki c
t
j Ui U˜j W ∆W/Wˇ ,%
DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF
0.781 1.953 15.663 18.046 12.586 9.667 44.415 43.879 1.221
0.735 1.874 15.686 18.261 13.052 9.936 45.186 44.645 1.213
0.211 1.956 15.738 20.184 14.714 9.305 47.653 46.691 2.062
0.424 1.299 15.743 19.741 16.439 11.976 50.683 50.219 0.925
0.769 1.045 15.746 18.489 16.083 13.113 50.263 50.037 0.452
0.472 1.051 15.729 19.660 17.230 12.978 51.998 51.677 0.622
0.679 1.620 15.727 18.601 14.216 10.862 47.130 46.649 1.031
0.305 1.811 15.741 19.921 14.911 9.922 48.060 47.250 1.714
0.428 1.099 15.730 19.813 17.211 12.768 51.946 51.586 0.698
0.555 1.080 15.738 19.318 16.783 12.895 51.312 51.003 0.605
0.630 1.129 15.744 19.003 16.298 12.734 50.555 50.251 0.605
0.525 1.036 15.733 19.452 17.075 13.058 51.772 51.474 0.578
0.820 1.075 15.746 18.279 15.765 13.013 49.765 49.545 0.444
0.593 0.986 15.734 19.204 17.008 13.283 51.693 51.438 0.496
0.424 1.869 15.728 19.432 14.239 9.776 47.005 46.246 1.641
0.686 1.386 15.743 18.680 15.080 11.758 48.579 48.194 0.799
0.545 0.954 15.727 19.405 17.325 13.393 52.185 51.931 0.489
0.750 1.235 15.746 18.497 15.416 12.364 49.164 48.863 0.616
0.357 1.974 15.724 19.619 14.094 9.335 46.708 45.844 1.884
0.519 1.371 15.746 19.336 15.788 11.741 49.663 49.206 0.929
0.316 1.190 15.728 20.220 17.299 12.358 52.031 51.582 0.870
0.294 1.345 15.738 20.230 16.770 11.730 51.152 50.605 1.082
0.455 0.940 15.716 19.768 17.739 13.416 52.813 52.542 0.515
0.229 1.722 15.746 20.268 15.548 10.220 49.079 48.272 1.670
0.417 1.342 15.744 19.745 16.294 11.803 50.441 49.951 0.980
0.645 1.237 15.746 18.902 15.816 12.317 49.774 49.430 0.695
0.207 1.403 15.736 20.542 16.885 11.457 51.287 50.665 1.228
0.289 1.589 15.746 20.115 15.833 10.773 49.597 48.907 1.413
0.366 1.480 15.746 19.875 15.958 11.241 49.855 49.267 1.193
0.345 1.514 15.746 19.939 15.904 11.094 49.753 49.135 1.257
0.455 0.975 15.720 19.758 17.603 13.276 52.593 52.305 0.551
Table 4.11: Social Welfare: Analyses of the Unilateral Settlement Arrangements.
the payments of ISPk received from the customer ISPs are decreased which is explained
by the lower access charges for stranger traffic. Obviously, the decrease in access charges
leads to the fall in retail prices and consequently, to the increase in consumer surplus.
Hence, the social welfare is improved since the decrease in profit of the transit provider
is less than the increase in consumer surplus.
4.5 Conclusions
In this section we presented DTIA for intercarrier compensation considering transit ar-
rangements. In comparison to the existing solution, the proposed model determines
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Case αi βi U Πk W ∆W/Wˇ ,%
DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF
I 0.5 0.9 77.198 73.688 2.666 5.663 79.864 79.350 0.647
αi = αj 0.5 0.8 77.239 73.688 2.708 5.663 79.946 79.350 0.751
βi > βj 0.5 0.7 77.280 73.688 2.749 5.663 80.029 79.350 0.855
0.5 0.6 77.321 73.688 2.790 5.663 80.111 79.350 0.959
II 0.9 0.5 77.528 73.688 2.996 5.663 80.524 79.350 1.479
αi > αj 0.8 0.5 77.486 73.688 2.955 5.663 80.441 79.350 1.375
βi = βj 0.7 0.5 77.445 73.688 2.914 5.663 80.359 79.350 1.271
0.6 0.5 77.404 73.688 2.873 5.663 80.276 79.350 1.167
III 0.9 0.8 40.270 38.318 1.514 2.945 41.783 41.262 1.263
αi > αj 0.8 0.7 58.837 56.003 2.193 4.304 61.030 60.306 1.200
βi > βj 0.7 0.6 71.215 67.793 2.646 5.210 73.861 73.002 1.176
αi > βi 0.6 0.55 75.836 72.214 2.795 5.549 78.631 77.763 1.116
IV 0.9 0.9 27.851 26.528 1.019 2.039 28.870 28.566 1.063
αi > αj 0.8 0.8 49.512 47.160 1.812 3.624 51.324 50.784 1.063
βi > βj 0.7 0.7 64.985 61.898 2.378 4.757 67.363 66.654 1.063
αi = βi 0.6 0.6 74.268 70.740 2.718 5.436 76.986 76.176 1.063
V 0.9 0.2 114.785 109.058 4.479 8.381 119.264 117.438 1.555
αi > αj 0.8 0.25 100.798 95.794 3.908 7.361 104.706 103.155 1.503
βi < βj 0.7 0.35 86.790 82.530 3.315 6.342 90.106 88.872 1.388
0.6 0.4 80.540 76.635 3.027 5.889 83.567 82.524 1.263
Table 4.12: Social Welfare: Analyses of the Bilateral Settlement Arrangements.
an original initiator of a transmission and compensates differently for traffic originally
initiated by their own customers, as opposed to traffic initiated by customers of other
networks. We have marked the information about the transmission initiator in the IP
packet header using a two-bit field, and thus have extended the traffic management
mechanism proposed earlier (in Chapter 3). The defined functionalities of the mech-
anism are simple and lead to low computational complexity (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2).
The mechanism considers scalability issues that along with simplicity are the basic re-
quirements for the deployment in the Internet. Further, we have addressed the issue of
incentive compatibility (i.e., how to ensure that it is in the best interest of a provider to
mark packets truthfully). More specifically, if a provider marks a packet untruthfully, it
bears financial loss.
We have formulated economic models and analyzed their behaviors to evaluate the pro-
posed approach from different perspectives. The studies considered unilateral and bi-
lateral settlement arrangements. First, analytical studies were carried out to investigate
the impact of the determination of a transmission initiator on interconnection payments
of the customer providers (Tables 4.3-4.5). In comparison to the classical model, DTIA
models with both unilateral and bilateral settlements provided significantly decreased
payments of the customer providers (except the symmetric traffic volumes in case IV
where payments are equal). This is mainly due to the lower access charges for stranger
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Figure 4.5: Social Welfare Comparison in the Bilateral Settlement Arrangements.
traffic. As a result, profits of the transit provider obtained from the interconnection are
lower in DTIA than in the existing scheme. Hence, it can be concluded that DTIA is
beneficial for the customer providers since it outperforms the classical model in terms
of payments (which are relatively small).
Furthermore, the studies were extended to explore how the determination of a transmis-
sion initiator affects different providers, operating in different cost areas and arranged
interconnection with unilateral and bilateral settlements (Tables 4.6-4.10). The results
obtained from analytical studies showed that DTIA was able to find better outcomes (in
terms of interconnection payments) than the classical solution for both models. More
specifically, the proposed model decreases the existing inequity in allocation of the in-
terconnection costs.
From the comparison between unilateral settlement models follows that the costs of the
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smaller provider are decreased. This stimulates falling retail prices in the market, where
the provider operates and consequently, the development of the infrastructure in terms of
subscribed customers. The growth of the smaller ISP leads to a balance of the volumes of
a particular traffic type, and as a result, reduces the imbalance in cost allocation between
providers. Obviously, the revenue of the larger ISP obtained from the retail market will
be increased. From the perspective of a transit provider, its revenues obtained from the
customer providers remain the same in the DTIA and classical models. In the bilateral
settlement arrangements, the net payments of both customer ISPs in the DTIA model
are decreased. This leads to a decrease in the incremental revenue obtained by the
transit provider. Finally, the comparison between the existing model with unilateral
settlement and DTIA with bilateral settlement showed that our approach generally
performed better for both smaller and larger ISPs in terms of reduced net payments. For
the smaller provider, DTIA dominates in all cases over the classical model, and for the
larger provider only in cases II and V. The profits of the transit provider in the bilateral
settlement model are decreased since it shares the interconnection costs with other ISPs.
Resuming, the provision of a model, which compensates providers while exploiting their
infrastructures, is advantageous for a sustainable environment. From this point of view
the proposed DTIA model is beneficial.
Finally, the results obtained from the studies which examined customers and providers
indicated that DTIA in both cases (with unilateral and bilateral settlements) stimu-
lates the economic efficiency of the market that improves overall social welfare (Tables
4.11-4.12). More specifically, consumer surplus in all cases is higher in the proposed
approach than in the classical solution. Summarizing, it can be concluded that DTIA
stimulates the development of the market by ensuring that each provider is compensated
for utilization of its infrastructure.
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter concludes this dissertation by summarizing its contributions in Section 5.1
and by proposing directions for future work in Section 5.2.
5.1 Contributions
International Internet interconnection requires efficient costs allocation to provide sus-
tainable conditions for all providers. This thesis provided a novel intercarrier compensa-
tion model to overcome the apparent lack of fairness in the distribution of interconnection
costs. In order to achieve that we follow the principle that each provider has to be com-
pensated for utilization of its infrastructure. The main contribution of this research is
to support the development and profitability of the communications market by reduc-
ing the existing imbalance in the interconnection cost allocation. The key idea behind
the proposed approach is that instead of performing intercarrier compensation based on
flows of traffic, which provide a poor basis for cost allocation, compensation is performed
based on the original initiator of a transmission. In the DTIA model, providers get com-
pensated differently for traffic originally initiated by their own customers, as opposed
to traffic initiated by customers of other networks. Such an approach does not admit
imposition of uniform retail prices, but supports the existing diversity of the Internet
pricing schemes.
A critical challenge in DTIA is determining the original initiator of a transmission in
the Internet. Determination of a transmission initiator in packet-switched networks
is a complicated task that deals with technical issues and incurs considerable costs.
In this research, we have tackled this challenge by marking the information about the
transmission initiator in the IP packet header, and have proposed a traffic differentiation
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mechanism that has low computational complexity. Further, we have addressed the issue
of incentive compatibility (i.e., how to ensure that it is in the best interest of a provider
to mark packets truthfully). More specifically, if a provider marks a packet untruthfully,
it bears financial loss. In order to evaluate the impact of the traffic differentiation-
based model on intercarrier compensation, we have formulated economic models and
analyzed their behaviors from different perspectives (on retail and wholesale levels).
The proposed approach stimulates the development of a market by ensuring that each
provider is compensated for utilization of its infrastructure.
• Chapter 2 presents the background information related to this research. It dis-
cusses the fundamental differences between the telephony and Internet infrastruc-
tures in order to understand the economics of interconnection of these networks.
Interconnection challenges and possible solutions, which are mainly focused on the
interconnection pricing were reviewed.
Major contributions of this thesis are provided in the following Chapters:
• Chapter 3 provided Differentiated Traffic-based Interconnection Agreement (DTIA)
considering private peering arrangements. Two type of traffic, namely native that
is originally initiated by the provider’s own customers and stranger, which is initi-
ated by the customers of other networks were defined. Based on DTIA providers
are compensated less for the costs incurred in transferring stranger traffic. To per-
form intercarrier compensation based on the differentiated traffic flows, a packet
carries information about the traffic type, which is incorporated in the IP header
using a one-bit field, referred to as Membership Label (ML); border routers support
packet re-marking and counting, by performing the defined operations. Such an
approach allows to avoid a detailed inspection of the packet header in order to de-
termine the transmission initiator and its subsequent packets, and therefore leads
to low computational costs. To evaluate the proposed model, economic models
and their analytical studies were formulated. In particular, we investigated retail
and wholesale levels of the market considering different (symmetric and asymmet-
ric) access charges and all available market states in terms of providers’ shares.
More specifically, we examined the role of the transmission initiator on intercon-
nection payments, demand, and providers’ profits. At the wholesale level, the
results showed that DTIA was able to achieve more fair outcomes in terms of
providers’ payments than the classical solution. The investigation of the retail
market demonstrated that the proposed solution generates higher demand, and
consequently, profits of the providers.
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• Chapter 4 examines the application of the DTIA model for the transit arrange-
ments. To achieve this, the traffic management mechanism that satisfies simplicity
and scalability properties was presented. In particular, to recognize the traffic type
between networks the mechanism uses a two-bit value incorporated in the IP header
and supports packet re-marking and counting operations at border nodes. In order
to evaluate the proposed approach a set of analytical studies were provided, consid-
ering in detail all available states of the market. At first, we considered the impact
of traffic differentiation on the customer providers. Then, the benefits of different
layer providers, which operate in different cost areas were examined. Finally, the
studies were extended by investigating the market efficiency in terms of social wel-
fare. The obtained results showed that DTIA with both unilateral and bilateral
settlements provides better outcomes in terms of interconnection payments and
social welfare than the classical model.
Summarizing the proposed model addresses the important problem of the inequality in
the interconnection cost allocation. In particular, results demonstrated that our solution
stimulates development of infrastructures in developing countries and on the other side,
does not harm bigger or transit ISPs.
5.2 Future Work
This research brings the interconnection cost allocation issue to the forefront and makes
a start in coming up with a new cost sharing indicator. Although the proposed model
was analyzed from different perspectives, the studies can be extended in the technical
and economical context.
• In particular, the important property of the proposed model is incentive compati-
bility. Although, the thesis provides the solution, it would be interesting to cover
this issue in more detail.
• Another open area for further research in the economical context is the inves-
tigation of the traffic differentiation-based approach by providing mathematical
analyses considering varieties of different models.
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